For a year and a half the Kremlin has maintained a wait-and-see posture toward Donald Trump. While criticizing U.S. actions—in Ukraine, Iran, and Venezuela—Russian officials and state propaganda carefully avoid personal attacks on Trump himself. This leaves Moscow room for a possible deal with him on Ukraine and for broader understandings on security, the global agenda, and economic issues. The Kremlin rates the chances of such agreements as modest, yet still greater than zero.
In Russian discourse Trump exists in two images at once: as the most consistent advocate of multipolarity and, in the words of presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov, a world leader whose “methods do not entirely correspond to our approaches to a multipolar world.” Western analysts are equally divided: some see Trump as a gift to Putin’s foreign policy; others view him as the source of its strategic paralysis.
Why such polar assessments—not only among outside observers but also among Russian officials and the foreign-policy community? Is it already possible to say unequivocally whether Trump benefits Moscow or, on the contrary, hinders it?
Declarative Multipolarity
Official Russian declarative multipolarity rests on an institutional approach. Moscow insists that the new world order must be shaped by consensus among key non-Western organizations—BRICS, SCO, and to some extent the UN. As one of the leaders of the “global majority,” Russia stresses that the formation of a new, “correct” world order must be exclusively voluntary and mutually beneficial.
The “peaceful character” of Russia’s multipolarity policy is emphasized not only by experts who flesh out official concepts but also by senior officials. They openly contrast Moscow’s “peace-loving” foreign-policy line with the aggressive policies of the United States and, increasingly, the European Union. The problem is that Russia has no such “peace-loving” foreign policy. The most obvious example is the full-scale war in Ukraine, which continued the unilateral interference in that country’s internal affairs that began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war, and in a number of African conflicts, likewise lacked institutional approval: neither BRICS, nor the SCO, nor the UN authorized Russian intervention, still less occupation. In practice these organizations and groupings offered Russia neither legal nor open political support.
The “global majority” at best maintains neutrality toward Russia’s most important foreign-policy campaigns. Even Moscow’s closest allies have refused to give legal endorsement to its actions or to recognize any of its territorial gains. Even Alexander Lukashenko, ultra-loyal to the Kremlin, still does not recognize Crimea as Russian territory, despite Belarus and Russia formally constituting a “Union State.”
Equally telling is the gap between Russian rhetoric and reality inside the very associations that Moscow regards as central to building a multipolar world. Since 2009 BRICS has discussed the creation of stable and inclusive financial architecture. In 2014 the New Development Bank was launched as an alternative to the IMF and World Bank. Yet already in 2022, the bank suspended financing for new projects in Russia. So, when the Russian prime minister speaks of accumulated investments of $ 40 billion (of which only $ 4 billion are linked to Russia), he deliberately omits the fact that all of the bank’s Russian projects date from agreements concluded before the full-scale war.
Since 2022 Russia has expended enormous effort to promote a whole set of financial instruments capable of almost entirely replacing Western financial infrastructure. Western sanctions have certainly accelerated the process. Yet Russia’s flagship initiatives—the BRICS Cross-Border Payment Initiative (BCBPI), BRICS Bridge, and BRICS Clear—which appear fully consistent with Russia’s declarative multipolar discourse and receive verbal support from other BRICS members, encounter serious obstacles.
Russia’s key partners in the grouping refuse to discuss these projects in earnest, largely for fear of additional Western sanctions. Even without the sanctions factor, success is far from guaranteed. Serious contradictions exist among individual BRICS countries, and members prefer to avoid hard commitments: they are prepared to support only what is advantageous “here and now.”
In all the years of BRICS’s existence Russia has achieved not a single meaningful success that survived 2022. It has failed to secure direct support or solidarity from the “global majority” on the issue that matters most to it—the war in Ukraine. Consequently, either Russian multipolarity as practiced by the country’s leadership does not match its “declarative form,” or the institutional path to multipolarity simply does not work.
It is no exaggeration to say that the international organizations and institutions most important to Moscow remain, despite ambitious statements, interest clubs without real obligations. This renders the task of building a multipolar world on the basis of consensus among the “global majority” simply unachievable.
Multipolarity in Practice
Far more important is Russia’s practical approach to changing the international order. Moscow does not ask permission or seek coordination of its actions from any of the powers of the “global majority.” Russian policy, as the Kremlin likes to emphasize, is fully “sovereign.” Radical steps are taken solely on the basis of emerging opportunities; attempts to “legalize” them and, when possible, obtain the approval of BRICS or SCO partners come only after the fact.
Russian policy since 2014, and especially since 2022, has been marked by consistent flexibility. No quasi-allied relationships prevent Moscow from withholding support even from close partners—as happened with Iran and, to some extent, Venezuela. The Kremlin swiftly changes course and builds relations with the victors, even if they were recently regarded as clear adversaries—as in the case of Syria. It is prepared to enter into conflict with its own allies when the current agenda demands it—as occurred with Armenia.
The “practical” version of Russian multipolarity prizes above all flexibility and the ability to adapt to constantly changing circumstances. This approach best describes Russia’s foreign policy in the 2020s. It rests on a view of the present world order as a phase of global chaos.
From the Kremlin’s perspective and that of its strategists, Western institutions that dominated for decades have not yet been fully destroyed. Their collapse is supposedly inevitable, yet the half-life of the process may be prolonged. While it continues, Russia sees no point in trying to “build a new world” in the image of Western institutions. It needs to survive the chaos, extract maximum gains, and avoid wasting resources on projects of dubious value (as the Soviet Union once did, only to collapse successfully afterward).
The “Good Trump”
The most obvious and immediate argument that Donald Trump serves Russia’s vision of multipolarity is his consistent weakening of the Euro-Atlantic partnership. Constant tariff wars against the EU, periodic threats to withdraw American troops from Europe, and a broader strategic retreat from the region all work to dismantle the existing order. Even the threats directed at Greenland, however unrealistic, accelerate the erosion of the status quo.
The damage Trump has already inflicted on transatlantic unity is itself deserving of open gratitude from Moscow. An EU without the United States is viewed in the Kremlin as a far less serious potential adversary—partly because of the obvious difficulties the EU faces in forging a common long-term policy toward Russia and Ukraine. This becomes especially noticeable over the longer term if more right-leaning forces come to power in certain EU countries, forces inclined to compromise with Moscow at Kyiv’s expense.
Russian officials speak quite directly and regularly of the many opportunities Trump creates for Russia. As one senior diplomat noted, “the geopolitical configuration of the Euro-Atlantic is beginning to resemble a layer cake, which opens possibilities for our policy on the West European track.”
Second important argument is that the Trump administration directly acknowledges the end of the “unipolar moment” and, moreover, explicitly names Russia as one of the key poles of a multipolar world. As Marco Rubio has stated, “it’s not normal for the world to simply have a unipolar power. That was not — that was an anomaly. It was a product of the end of the Cold War, but eventually you were going to reach back to a point where you had a multipolar world, multi-great powers in different parts of the planet. We face that now with China and to some extent Russia, (…).”
Such a declaration, while important, still requires supporting actions: the Kremlin certainly expects progressive positive dynamics within this approach, and the data needed to fully trust Rubio’s words remain scarce. Nevertheless, this kind of rhetoric from official U.S. figures is already a revolution. It would have been unimaginable under any other administration in Washington.
Third, the “America First” principle and its manifestations—the loss of U.S. interest in a range of world regions, the abandonment of soft-power instruments and, above all, the dismantling of USAID—have opened substantial opportunities for Russian and Chinese expansion. When Washington stopped funding a number of African countries, China quickly stepped in. Beijing began providing some of the financial assistance that had previously come from the United States and simultaneously bought up civil-society organizations formerly oriented toward the U.S. In a similar vein, the loss of American support significantly reduced the activity of Central Asian NGOs and their ability to pressure regional governments in defense of democratic principles. Against this background Moscow has been able to advance its own interests more effectively. In particular, the procedure for deporting Russian anti-war activists and citizens who fled to Central Asia to escape mobilization was simplified.
Fourth, both Donald Trump and J.D. Vance, along with other members of the American administration, actively support the same political forces in the EU on which Russia is betting. While open support for Marine Le Pen and Alternative for Germany, as well as for the already defeated Viktor Orbán, is problematic for Moscow and forces it to act by less direct methods, Trump and Vance do so openly. Whether Trump’s support actually boosts the ratings of AfD and other right-wing parties remains an open question. Yet the very fact of complete unity between Moscow and Washington on this issue cannot fail to please the Kremlin. For it, the rise to power of right and far-right parties is the path to ending the rule of the “liberal elites.” It is precisely these elites, in Moscow’s view, that obstruct peace in Ukraine, the normalization of relations with Moscow, and the return of Russian gas supplies to the European market. Both the Putin and Trump administrations favor a Europe of many separate, sovereign states over a united Europe with a strong and effective decision-making center capable of acting as a more active player on the international stage.
The last point that can only conditionally be counted among the “pluses” of Trump’s presidency for Moscow is his position on Ukraine. The Kremlin would of course like the American president to pressure Kyiv into accepting Russian terms and recognizing the legitimacy of the occupation of part of Ukrainian territory. Normalization on Moscow’s terms would open the way to the subsequent lifting of sanctions. So far Trump has either been unwilling or unable to implement this scenario. At the same time, under his administration the United States has not increased support for Ukraine in either the financial or military spheres. Strategic uncertainty persists regarding both current assistance and the long-term reliability and timeliness of arms deliveries to the EU that are subsequently sent to Ukraine.
Russia’s position on the war, at least as formulated by Vladimir Putin, reduces to a simple thesis: Russia will inevitably establish control over the entire territory of Donetsk oblast, after which dialogue on a cessation of hostilities will become possible. And until now it is Trump who is regarded in Moscow as the most suitable candidate for the role of mediator capable of helping conclude a deal that would satisfy at least the Kremlin’s minimum demands.
Trump’s readiness to discuss Ukraine without the participation of Ukraine itself or the European Union fits perfectly into the Russian picture of a multipolar world—a world in which great powers have the right to decide the fates of “small” states.
The “Bad Trump”
Russia, which before Trump’s arrival happily violated the rules (in Ukraine and elsewhere) by relying on its own strengths, almost certainly did not expect the American president to do roughly the same thing, only while drawing on far greater resources. On the one hand, it suits Moscow that Trump is dismantling brick by brick the world order the United States upheld for decades. On the other, Trump regularly confronts the Kremlin with faits accomplis that directly affect Russian interests, whether in Venezuela or Iran.
What matters, however, is that Moscow—albeit without enthusiasm—adapts to the new reality. In almost every case it adjusts its approach so that Trump’s foreign-policy adventures are not perceived as its own defeats. Venezuela had already lost priority status for Moscow before Maduro’s capture, as virtually all resources were reoriented toward the Ukrainian track. In the case of Iran, Russia was saved by the fact that Trump failed to overthrow the ruling regime, allowing Moscow to preserve its influence in the region. Moreover, Washington’s chaotic actions around Iran have for a fourth consecutive month been delivering Russia additional oil and gas revenues that are critical for the budget under current conditions.
At the same time Trump still does not treat Russia as a fully equal actor and almost nowhere takes account of its interests (in their Putinist interpretation)—with the exception of Ukraine, and even there only at the level of rhetoric and with substantial caveats. He rejects Russian offers of mediation on Iran and actively pursues “diplomatic expansion” in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Belarus. Yet this activity, despite extensive media coverage, has so far produced no radical shifts in the balance of power. And the spoiled relations between Moscow and Yerevan and Baku are more the result of Russian policy than of the presence of the United States or the EU in the region.
Moscow has already observed more than once how Donald Trump’s words, proposals, and even agreements can be revised to the opposite extreme. This makes any agenda of strategic dialogue maximally unpredictable. The collapse of Washington’s understandings with Iran serves as a clear confirmation. Therefore, no stable institutional agreements with Trump are conceivable. Moscow is forced to rely exclusively on situational decisions and to preserve maximum flexibility in order to achieve a favorable outcome.
Overall, despite all the caveats, Trump remains the principal destroyer of the old world order. And there are no grounds for believing that the next two years will be any different. Trade wars against the EU will continue to undermine Euro-Atlantic unity. A decline in the quality of the American military presence in Europe is not excluded, nor is the appearance of ever new flashpoints of tension around the world.
The decisive factor will be the final position on Ukraine. If Trump shifts toward more open support for Kyiv and attempts to increase pressure on Russia through new sanctions, this would certainly diminish all the positive effects of his presidency for Moscow. Yet the Kremlin proceeds from the assumption that Trump has already “unleashed” enough global conflicts, and that U.S. domestic politics is clearly not working in his favor. This makes a substantial shift toward supporting Ukraine and direct escalation with Russia less probable. Washington’s considerable resources and capabilities also have their limits.
While acknowledging that the unipolar world has ended, the Trump administration continues to try to impose its will on other countries. Lacking sufficient resources and domestic support, Washington is unlikely to resolve successfully all the contradictions that accumulated both before Trump and under him. Under these conditions the downsides of Trump’s presidency for Moscow are unlikely to outweigh its obvious upsides.
