Public discourse on Central Asia frequently depicts the region as shedding Russia’s influence — whether through deliberate decolonization, a pivot toward China, or the pursuit of greater autonomy. In practice, however, the picture on the ground remains considerably more complex. In Astana, for instance, the arrival of senior Russian officials continues to be accompanied by ceremonial flyovers of Kazakh jets spraying Russian tricolor in the sky. Such scenes suggest that Russian influence, far from receding, retains substantial structural weight across the region.
The Decoupling Narrative: Rhetoric and Evidence
Advocates of the decoupling thesis typically advance three interconnected claims. The first concerns decolonization. Central Asia’s incorporation into the Russian Empire involved episodes of extreme violence, including punitive expeditions such as the 1873 campaign against the Yomud Turkmen. These massacres and colonial expansion were underpinned by justifications of spreading European values, not dissimilar from the French or British imperial claims. The Soviet period added further layers of exploitation, with the region serving as a site for nuclear testing, rocket testing, mass deportations, and the incarceration of political prisoners.
In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Central Asian states and societies have sought to distance themselves from the legacies of Russian and Soviet colonialism, at least rhetorically. Public discourse between 2022 and 2023 prominently featured narratives of rejection of Russian influence, including shifts toward indigenous languages at the expense of Russian as a lingua franca and criticism of Russian wartime migrants on social media. Between 2021 and 2023, Kazakhstan experienced organized grassroots language patrols that targeted restaurants and businesses for insufficient Kazakh-language signage.
The second argument stems from the fact that Russia is an economically lagging player compared to other external actors in Central Asia. China and the European Union have indeed emerged as more attractive trade partners for much of Central Asia. China has advanced several large-scale infrastructure initiatives aimed at enhancing regional connectivity and its own standing. In Kazakhstan, the light rail line in Astana was formally inaugurated after more than a decade of construction, with the final phase completed at an accelerated pace by Chinese workers and engineers. Beijing is also developing a major railway line from Kashgar in China to Andijan in Uzbekistan, passing through Kyrgyzstan. In everyday economic life, Chinese influence has become more visible; Chinese electric vehicles now constitute the majority of newly registered cars in Tajikistan’s Khujand. The Middle Corridor, a segment of the Belt and Road Initiative running through Kazakhstan, represents a further channel of engagement.
The third thesis is that the Central Asian states are seeking to strengthen their own sovereignty — both at the individual and collective levels — in order to reduce their dependence on what they themselves define as Russian neocolonial influence. The five states report cooperation in defense, cultural projects, trade, and transport. A recent illustration is the coordinated evacuation of Central Asian nationals from Iran, in which even reclusive Turkmenistan participated by granting transit. For the first time since 1991, no active armed border conflicts exist among Central Asian states. Borders that until recently generated serious tensions, particularly between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have now been delineated, at least formally.
Beyond the Rhetoric: Russia’s Enduring Dominance in Central Asia
Nevertheless, Russia remains the dominant external power in the region. This persistence requires closer examination across several dimensions.
The societal backlash against Russian influence has not translated into corresponding shifts in state policy. Central Asian regimes are authoritarian and therefore less directly responsive to public sentiment than democratic systems would be. While Russians face societal resistance in certain contexts, this has not prompted governmental decoupling from Moscow.
Elites in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have employed decolonial rhetoric. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev addressed a Russian delegation in Kazakh during a widely circulated episode, implicitly challenging Putin’s longstanding characterization of Kazakhstan as a Russophone state. The gesture strengthened Tokayev’s reputation for assertiveness among Kazakhstani audiences online, who gave him the monicker “tiger”.
In 2022, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon also criticized Russia’s approach to the region at the Central Asia-Russia summit. According to him, the same problems that were the main reason for the Soviet Union’s collapse still persist in relations between the countries. “Back then — and forgive me for saying this — just like now, there was no attention paid to the smaller republics or the smaller peoples. Traditions, customs, and everything else were disregarded. They didn’t provide any support for development,” Rahmon noted.
Such statements have remained largely declarative. In the same speech, immediately after his remarks to Putin, Rahmon requested additional Russian investment in Tajikistan, particularly in education, while bemoaning shortages of Russian-language textbooks.
Tokayev authorized construction of a large Russian Orthodox Church complex in Astana, the biggest in Central Asia. Russian businesses continue to operate with minimal restrictions across the region, and Russian citizens enjoy liberal migration regimes in every Central Asian state except Turkmenistan.
Russophone culture remains deeply embedded in Central Asia, reflecting the region’s relatively recent Soviet past. The Soviet Union integrated Central Asia into extensive networks of physical infrastructure, academic institutions, and cultural production rather than treating it solely as a peripheral zone. Central Asians continue to draw on these transport links, logistical chains, and cultural resources. Younger cohorts primarily access Russophone content through social media, while older generations rely more on television.
Pro-Kremlin outlets, including Sputnik, Russia Today, and federal channels such as Channel One, remain freely available. A 2023 USAID-supported survey documented continued reliance on Russian television for domestic news: 18 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 23 percent in Kazakhstan, 17 percent in Tajikistan, and 9 percent in Uzbekistan.
The Kremlin actively maintains these linkages. Russia’s soft-power agency Rossotrudnichestvo maintains a substantial presence in the region and continues to support new institutions, including a large new campus for the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University outside Bishkek, scheduled for completion by 2030 at a cost of $ 30 million.
Russian economic engagement has not diminished.
China has scaled back its participation in costly, high-risk mega-projects, shifting instead toward a policy of “small and elegant” initiatives. Utilization of the Middle Corridor remains limited by persistent bottlenecks. In Kyrgyzstan, China formally withdrew from the $ 275-million At-Bashi Logistics Hub after mass protests in 2020(It later emerged that the Chinese partners had not fully withdrawn from the project. While they are no longer involved in construction or land leasing, local media reports indicate that they remain engaged in the project’s logistics and technology implementation). This adjustment reflects a reorientation toward more manageable sectors such as electric vehicles and digital platforms rather than a broader withdrawal.
Meanwhile, Russia’s Rosatom is contracted to construct Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant at an estimated cost of $ 14.4 billion. Much of Russia’s economic leverage continues to rest on Soviet-era infrastructure. The bulk of the region’s oil exports, especially Kazakh crude, transits Russian territory through Russian pipelines; the same applies to a substantial share of natural gas exports.
Labor migration from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan remains oriented primarily toward Russia. Russian Interior Ministry estimates for 2024 placed the number of Central Asian guest workers in Russia above 10 million. These patterns are subject to adjustment. Kazakhstan is actively developing alternative oil export infrastructure amid disruptions to Russian routes caused by Ukrainian strikes. Following the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack carried out by Tajik nationals, Russian authorities adopted a stricter posture toward Central Asian migrants. Coupled with pre-existing state-level xenophobia and documented cases of recruitment of Central Asian migrants for the war in Ukraine, this migration policy shift is negatively impacting migrant flows from Central Asia.
Kyrgyz migration to Russia, for example, fell by roughly half—from approximately 650,000 in 2023 to around 350,000 by the end of 2024. Central Asians are exploring new destinations such as Turkey and the European Union, and regional officials have periodically described Russia as an unsafe destination. Nevertheless, Russia is likely to remain the principal destination for Central Asian labor migrants for the foreseeable future. It is accessible and lucrative — even lucrative enough for over ten thousands of Central Asians to join the Russian army in Ukraine.
Russian economic influence continues to permeate the region, and Central Asian governments have shown no willingness or capacity to reduce it. Russian platforms such as Ozon and Yandex, together with parallel-import mechanisms that support Russia’s sanctions evasion, remain structurally important to regional economies.
Russian commercial presence is ubiquitous in daily economic life. Navigation relies heavily on Russian services such as 2GIS and Yandex Maps. Ride-hailing and delivery are dominated by Yandex and the formerly Russian InDrive. Russian business activity in the region expanded after 2022; Uzbekistan, for instance, experienced a rapid rollout of Yandex e-hailing and food-delivery services.
Skepticism is also warranted concerning the depth of collective sovereignty and cooperation among Central Asian states. Every Central Asian country faces intensifying pressures from water scarcity, desertification, and land degradation, yet no substantial joint programs have materialized to address these shared challenges.
Russia further exercises influence through resilient informal and corrupt networks that span the post-Soviet space. These networks, forged through shared Soviet-era institutions, educational experiences, Komsomol activities, and penal systems, have proven durable. A clear illustration is the A7 transborder payment network, used by Russia to circumvent SWIFT restrictions. Operated by Moldovan oligarch Ilham Shor with Kremlin backing, the network routes significant activity through Kyrgyzstan as its principal banking hub.
Russian dominance is most pronounced in the security domain. Russia remains the only external power with permanent military bases in Central Asia and exercises unchallenged primacy on security questions.
Two of the five Central Asian regimes have historically depended on Russian military support to consolidate or preserve power: through the CSTO operation in Kazakhstan in January 2022 and, more decisively, during the Tajik civil war of the 1990s, when Russian involvement was instrumental in enabling Emomali Rahmon’s rise to power—a position he has held continuously since. Although China is occasionally framed as a security competitor, Moscow and Beijing cooperate within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization framework against the “three evils” of extremism, separatism, and terrorism. Both sides have repeatedly affirmed the non-competitive character of this partnership, with Beijing directing its primary strategic attention elsewhere.
The CSTO’s credibility has been damaged, yet no credible alternative security guarantor has emerged for the region.
Conclusion: Constrained Choices
With the United States and European states limiting their engagement to trade arrangements, the five Central Asian capitals face narrow options, centered on Moscow and Beijing. In the post-USAID period, adherence to previous international norms has weakened, allowing open coordination with Moscow, including the transfer of dissidents.
This alignment has reduced Central Asia’s attractiveness as a refuge for Russian dissidents, many of whom had relocated there—especially to Kazakhstan—after 2022 under relatively permissive migration rules. Central Asian governments have demonstrated readiness to assist the Kremlin on matters involving its political opponents.
Central Asian states are developing and their societies are exploring alternatives to the old colonial relationship with Russia. Yet the five capitals have chosen an authoritarian path that enables them to extract benefits from Moscow’s transnational networks, parallel-import channels, and willingness to provide regime security. They remain firmly embedded within Russia’s sphere of influence, with their elites appearing both aware of and advantaged by this position.
