Snap parliamentary elections in Serbia are testing not only Aleksandar Vučić’s political future but also Russia’s strategic position in the Western Balkans. Over the past two years, Vučić has faced persistent student protests against ‘state capture’ and corruption. Amid growing anti-government sentiment, the 25 October elections have taken on the character of a political referendum on Vučić’s regime, which has been in power for 12 years. These elections will set the tone for the presidential election scheduled for 25 December.
If the opposition wins the parliamentary elections, Serbia could follow Hungary’s path towards democratisation and a cautious distancing from Russia. Alternatively, destabilisation is also likely, given the opposition’s lack of unified political leadership. Neither outcome is optimal for Russia, which partly explains why it is reviving an older narrative that a ‘coloured revolution’ is being orchestrated against Serbia’s governing forces.
Russia-driven ‘coloured revolution’ and Vučić’s ‘balancing act’
Fears of a ‘coloured revolution’ during Serbia’s 2026 electoral cycle emerged in Russian official assessments of the Serbian anti-government protests. In June 2026, Sergey Shoygu, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, likened the movement among Serbian youth to the 2014 Euromaidan in Ukraine. He even alleged that the West was seeking to exploit public discontent with the Serbian authorities and pave the way for regime change by force.
These Russian suspicions do not reflect the profoundly domestic agenda of the main opposition forces behind the protesting students. Nonetheless, in August 2026, Russian diplomatic channels continued to warn the Serbian authorities of a ‘coloured revolution’ scenario in the aftermath of the elections. This narrative has recurred since the protests began in 2024, when the collapse of a roof at a train station in Novi Sad, rebuilt by a Chinese company, sparked anti-corruption protests.
In September 2025, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) accused the ‘Euro-elites’ — the EU — of ‘coloured revolutions’, alleging that they had financed non-governmental organisations and media outlets to produce a ‘Serbian Maidan’. In October, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chair of the Security Council, became the latest senior Russian official to accuse the West of interfering in Serbia’s electoral process with the help of ‘radical destructive forces’, although he did not explicitly use the phrase ‘colored revolution’.
Russia’s allegations that the West intends to support opposition forces in order to remove Vučić, however, run counter to the reality on the ground. Over recent years, the EU and the US have been somewhat complacent about the political status quo in Serbia and have developed sectoral cooperation, which has strengthened Vučić’s ability to balance against overdependence on Russia. Yet Vučić is fully aware that Russian leverage helps him preserve greater autonomy as Serbia moves closer to the EU.
While not recognising Kosovo’s independence, Serbia under Vučić signed the EU-mediated 2023 agreement on normalising relations with Kosovo. In this sense, Serbia has committed to contributing to Europe’s security and peace by developing ‘good-neighbourly relations’ with Kosovo. If fully implemented, the EU-brokered agreement would be a significant prerequisite for EU accession. Despite being a signatory, however, Vučić remains suspected of disruptive actions targeting Kosovo, as illustrated by allegations of Serbian involvement in sabotage attacks on Kosovo’s water-related critical infrastructure in late 2024.
Vučić’s openness to cooperation with the EU has frequently been counterbalanced by his strategic alliance with Russia. During the wildfires in the summer of 2026, for example, Serbia first called on Russia, which deployed its Ilyushin Il-76 firefighting aircraft. The EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism was activated only afterwards.
Another example of Vučić’s hedging can be seen in his policy towards Ukraine. On the one hand, Serbia resisted the EU’s attempt to link sanctions against Russia with the accession process. On the other hand, Belgrade did not prevent Serbian-manufactured weapons from being sold to Czech and Bulgarian intermediaries and subsequently transferred to Ukraine in 2024. This drew repeated criticism from Russia’s foreign intelligence, which accused Belgrade of damaging traditionally ‘brotherly’ relations.
Vučić went further in projecting a positive image in Brussels by inviting Volodymyr Zelensky to Belgrade in August 2026. This decision, however, was widely interpreted as an effort to secure his political survival, as it made the EU more cautious about the student protests. The meeting with Zelensky came two years after Vučić denied being a ‘Trojan Horse’ for Russia, while maintaining his direct channel to Putin.
To build further credibility with the EU, Vučić signed the 2024 lithium agreement with the EU, which Germany will implement, and agreed to purchase 12 Rafale fighter jets from France for 2.7 billion euros.
Vučić’s approach to the United States is similarly rooted in a balancing-act logic. Media reports suggest that the Serbian leader allegedly exerted influence in a failed attempt to designate historical sites in Belgrade for the construction of a USD 500 million hotel complex, including a Trump Tower. Promoting real-estate projects linked to Trump’s associates creates opportunities to cultivate more personalised and informal ties with the US administration.
Belgrade has also used constructive dialogue with Washington to secure an exemption for Serbia’s only refinery, Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), from sanctions imposed on Russia. To comply with the sanctions regime, the US allowed the Hungarian oil and gas company MOL Group to acquire a 56.1 per cent majority stake in NIS, which is owned by Russia’s Gazprom and Gazprom Neft. By balancing between Trump and Putin, Vučić expects to benefit from US-Russia transactionalism and to secure a solution that keeps NIS operational.
All in all, Vučić has no fundamental problems in his relations with Russia, as demonstrated by his effective communication with Moscow and with Putin personally. The episodes in which Serbia appears to deviate from a fully pro-Russian foreign policy are best explained by Vučić’s need to navigate a hostile geopolitical environment created by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its hybrid warfare against the EU. His preserved strategic partnership with Russia is therefore consistent with a balanced multi-vector policy: Serbian political leadership diversifies geopolitical risks and extracts benefits from the various powers competing for influence in Serbia and the Western Balkans.
Russia’s toolbox for preventing Serbia from becoming ‘another Hungary’
Broadly, anti-Vučić sentiment among the opposition is driven primarily by the absence of independent institutions, from the courts to the media. When accusing Vučić of presiding over a ‘state of capture‘ in Serbia, the ‘student list’ — Vučić’s main electoral adversary — largely sets foreign policy aside. The demands set out in the electoral programme of the ‘student list’ movement contain no geopolitical agenda.
Relations with Russia, as well as with the EU, the US and China, have defined Serbia’s ‘balancing act’ foreign policy throughout Vučić’s long rule. Serbia’s existing foreign policy, which has remained friendly towards Moscow despite constant pressure from the West, is not a central driver of the opposition’s electoral demands.
Despite representing one of the main obstacles to EU accession, Vučić has adopted a policy of non-alignment with respect to anti-Russian sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Serbia has also abstained from UN General Assembly resolutions on Ukraine condemning the Russian invasion, making it the only Western Balkan country indirectly supporting Russia in this respect.
While maintaining its neutrality on international sanctions and its positioning within international organisations, the Serbian leadership has also preserved high-level political dialogue with Moscow. This was demonstrated by three meetings between Vučić and Vladimir Putin in Moscow and Beijing. In a bilateral phone call in September 2026, Vučić expressed gratitude to Putin for Russia’s ‘comprehensive assistance to Serbia’ and for their existing ‘strategic partnership’.
Furthermore, 2,400 Russia-linked companies and 13,500 individual entrepreneurs operate freely in Serbia. This makes the country Europe’s principal refuge — followed by Montenegro — for Russian businesspeople who left Russia for fear of mobilisation or the financial consequences of Western sanctions.
The cultural dimension of Russia-Serbia relations is equally significant for Moscow. The ‘Russian House’, which has been closed elsewhere in Europe, remains fully operational in Serbia and organised more than 500 events in 2025 alone, including Russian film screenings and historical exhibitions. Another cultural channel is the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots in Serbia, which brings together around 20 associations of Russian citizens and receives direct support from the Russian Embassy in Serbia.
Among these instruments of Russian influence, the combination of energy leverage and the dissemination of Russian narratives stands out. Gazprom’s short-term extension of gas supplies creates uncertainty about Serbia’s energy security, signalling to Serbian voters that they should support Vučić, who can secure cheaper Russian gas.
In the information war, Moscow mobilises the SVR and other official channels to launch and amplify narratives linking Serbia’s protesting students, and their candidates’ participation in the elections, to ‘coloured revolutions’ and the 2014 Euromaidan, which is portrayed as the trigger of the war in Ukraine. By invoking Ukraine and the spectre of ‘coloured revolutions’, Russia may seek to exert psychological pressure on Serbian voters and draw them towards Vučić, whom parts of the Serbian public associate with ‘peace’ and ‘stability’.
The most critical dimension of Russia-Serbia relations, however, lies in the energy sector. In addition to securing exemptions for NIS refinery capacities, which previously depended on imported Russian oil, from sanctions restrictions, Serbia’s current leadership also seeks to maintain access to cheap Russian gas. Awaiting the election outcome, Moscow has agreed to extend the gas contract negotiated by Vučić only until the end of 2026.
The possibility of Serbia purchasing Russian gas at 318 euros per thousand cubic metres — especially when European market prices reached 1,000 dollars per cubic metre amid the Middle East crisis and the shocks caused by effective Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure — strengthens Russia’s geopolitical leverage and Vučić’s electoral advantage.
Finally, pro-Russian media coverage in Serbia has been amplified by RT Balkan, launched in November 2022, which draws on the resources of RT and Sputnik branches banned in Europe under sanctions. Although the EU has criticised Russian disinformation spread through RT Balkan and numerous Facebook and Instagram accounts, and has linked the issue to Serbia’s accession process, Vučić has taken no action. With this additional media apparatus funded by Moscow, Vučić benefits from more favorable coverage.
Viktor Orbán’s defeat in the April 2026 elections has considerably reduced Russia’s capacity to influence EU decision-making, particularly in foreign policy. Moscow has already registered changes in the positioning of Prime Minister Péter Magyar and in Hungary’s voting in the EU Council, which allowed Ukraine to open 4 of 6 accession clusters — an outcome difficult to imagine under Orbán.
Furthermore, without theatrical gestures or excessive anti-Russian rhetoric, Hungary’s new leadership expelled 10 Russian diplomats on national-security grounds. Finally, driven largely by drought and reduced water levels in the Danube, Magyar also acknowledged that Rosatom’s project to expand the capacity of Hungary’s Paks nuclear power plant could be revised.
Facing this geopolitical setback in Hungary, Moscow is closely monitoring developments in Serbia. Russia’s principal concern is that, should Vučić’s political demise occur, a process similar to Hungary’s ‘de-Orbanisation‘ of foreign policy towards Moscow could unfold in Serbia.
This concern fuels Russian narratives about a potential ‘coloured revolution’ against the election outcome should Vučić win, a scenario attributed to the EU. The prevailing view in Vučić’s office is that mass protests after the elections will have only a temporary effect. In anticipation of unrest, the US Embassy in Belgrade issued a September alert advising its citizens of an ‘unpredictable’ — in other words, volatile — situation around the Serbian elections, hinting at the risk of post-electoral instability.
If Orbán’s political downfall deprived Russia of a useful key for blocking EU decision-making, Vučić’s defeat could similarly weaken Moscow’s influence over Western Balkan affairs. Establishing new rules of the game with unpredictable opposition forces in a post-Vučić context could require resources that Russia cannot easily afford. Given the strategic risks to its geopolitical positioning, Moscow is therefore likely to prioritise disinformation and energy leverage in order to preserve Vučić’s rule until another more predictable and loyal alternative emerges.
