Foreign policy
Russia - EU

Hybrid Attacks, Visa Sanctions and the Future of Russia-Europe Relations

Alexey Uvarov on the balance between Europe’s security and maintaining ties with Russians

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On 20 November 2026, Denmark proposed that EU member states stop issuing tourist visas to Russian citizens and cease recognizing Russian non-biometric passports. The move followed an investigation into an alleged plot to assassinate the American-Ukrainian rapper Albert Vasilyev, known as Kiyvstoner, which Danish authorities linked to Russian intelligence services. According to the investigation, the suspected perpetrators were two Danish citizens with ties to local organized crime. The case demonstrates that Russian intelligence services may recruit local operatives for operations abroad, including individuals from criminal networks.

The debate over tightening visa rules for Russian citizens had already intensified in October 2026. Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen then called for a complete halt to the issuance of tourist visas to Russians until the war in Ukraine ends. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz suggested that new restrictions could be imposed on private and business travel. The European Council, in turn, called for additional visa measures to be considered in response to Russian hybrid threats.

All of this continues the course set by the EU in autumn 2022, when it suspended the visa facilitation agreement with Russia. In November 2025, rules for issuing multiple-entry Schengen visas to Russian citizens were tightened further. Over time, the rationale offered by European governments has shifted: while the initial restrictions were justified by the EU’s political position on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, security concerns and the need to counter Russian hybrid threats have since moved to the fore.

Visas: A privilege or an instrument of soft power?

The EU-Russia visa facilitation agreement, concluded in 2007, was intended to “promote the development of people-to-people contacts” and strengthen economic, humanitarian, cultural and scientific ties. It would be wrong to view it as a kind of “reward” for Russia: rather, it was part of mutually beneficial cooperation. Economic ties were expanding rapidly at the time: between 2000 and 2007, trade between the EU and Russia grew from € 86.5 billion to € 234.1 billion.

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, visa policy was still regarded as an instrument of foreign policy, though less as a restrictive measure than as a means of sustaining dialogue. Among the “Five Guiding Principles” on Russia adopted by the Council of the EU in 2016 was the development of people-to-people contacts and support for Russian civil society.

In 2021, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, advocated further easing visa rules, above all for young Russians, scholars and professionals. He stressed that accessible travel was necessary to preserve people-to-people contacts: “If Russians remain in Russia and Europeans remain in Europe, what people-to-people contacts can we speak of?”

In September of that year, the European Parliament also called for lower visa fees, fewer bureaucratic obstacles and an information campaign to attract Russians to Europe. These measures were envisaged alongside pressure on the Russian authorities and support for civil society.

Thus, until February 2022, the gradual easing of visa rules remained part of an EU strategy based on distinguishing between the Russian leadership and Russian society. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine brought about a fundamental revision of that approach.

The 2022 tightening: lost trust and the moral argument

On 25 February 2022, the EU partially suspended the visa facilitation agreement for Russian diplomats, officials and business representatives. On 9 September, the restrictions were extended to Russian citizens as a whole. Czech Interior Minister Vít Rakušan stated that easier access to the EU was a privilege for citizens of partner countries that share European values. Russia’s aggression, he argued, had undermined the trust on which previous arrangements had been built.

In September of that year, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland restricted the entry of Russian citizens across the Schengen area’s external borders. In justifying these measures, the governments cited threats to security and public order, as well as the unacceptability of Russians travelling freely around Europe during the war. In October, the Czech Republic introduced similar restrictions.

The tightening of visa policy in 2022 was therefore driven primarily by the loss of trust in Russia as a partner and by the view that Russian tourist travel to Europe was unacceptable while Russia was waging an aggressive war. Countries bordering Russia additionally pointed to national security risks. Yet preventing sabotage was not yet the central argument in the EU-wide visa debate at that stage.

The 2025 visa restrictions: a security focus

On 6 November 2025, the European Commission adopted a decision that substantially restricted the issuance of multiple-entry Schengen visas to Russian citizens. Its rationale cited Russia’s use of migration as an instrument of pressure, sabotage in the EU and the Baltic region, cyber and industrial espionage, and the risks of propaganda and subversion. It concluded that Russian applicants required more rigorous screening.

Presenting the new rules, the EU’s High Representative, Kaja Kallas, referred to acts of sabotage on European territory and drone incidents. She stressed that travel to the EU and freedom of movement within Europe were privileges, not entitlements. European Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration Magnus Brunner said that the new rules would enhance security in the Schengen area. European Commission spokesperson Markus Lammert described the measures as part of “joint action to reduce the issuance of visas to Russian citizens”.

By 2025, security considerations had become markedly more prominent in the EU-wide case for restrictions. Yet member states’ positions differed: Estonia treated the continued issuance of tourist visas as a security threat, while Greece, although supporting the common European measures, emphasized the need to distinguish between the Russian leadership and Russian citizens. Moral arguments persisted alongside security concerns: on the day the decision was published, Kaja Kallas wrote that “starting a war and expecting freedom of movement across Europe is difficult to justify.”

Russian sabotage in Europe: with or without Schengen?

European politicians’ concerns that Russians could use Schengen visas to carry out operations in Europe were not unfounded. In October 2014, GRU Unit 29155 officers Anatoly Chepiga and Alexander Mishkin, known as Ruslan Boshirov and Alexander Petrov, arrived in Prague on tourist visas issued by Italy and France. Five days later, an explosion occurred at an ammunition depot in Vrbětice, killing two people. To gain access to the site, the agents used forged passports issued in the names of Moldovan and Tajik citizens.

In 2015, another officer from the same unit, Denis Sergeev, travelled to Bulgaria repeatedly under the name Sergei Fedotov. Bulgarian authorities later accused him of involvement in attempts to poison the arms dealer Emilian Gebrev and others.

The best-known case is that of Vadim Krasikov, who in 2019 killed Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, a former Chechen field commander, in Berlin. In July of that year, Krasikov obtained a multiple-entry French visa using a Russian passport in the name of Vadim Sokolov, then travelled via Paris to Berlin, where he carried out the killing.

These episodes show that Russian intelligence services did indeed use multiple-entry Schengen visas to prepare and conduct operations in Europe. They also point to the need to improve identity checks on applicants, detect cover documents and strengthen information-sharing among European intelligence services. Restricting visa issuance may complement, but cannot replace, these mechanisms.

Operations under false identities

Much of the information about sabotage operations remains classified. Nevertheless, several studies analyzing hybrid attacks between 2022 and 2026 have already been published on the basis of available information. In particular, a study by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism and GLOBSEC, published in September 2025, covers 110 sabotage and other violent operations linked to Russia and carried out in Europe between January 2022 and July 2025. In 63 cases, the identities of 131 participants were established. Of these, 23 people, or 17.6 per cent, held Russian citizenship.

The researchers note that dual Russian-European citizenship is widespread among identified perpetrators, particularly among members of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states. However, the exact number of such cases is not given. Taken together, the data suggest that Russian intelligence services make extensive use of citizens of other countries.

More detailed statistics are provided by Bart Schuurman, a researcher at Leiden University. According to his data, of 145 identified participants in operations carried out between 2022 and 2025, 24 (16.6 per cent) held Russian citizenship, nine of whom also held a second citizenship. If only the 93 direct perpetrators are considered, the share of Russian citizens is even lower: 11 people (11.8 per cent) held Russian passports. Six of them held a second citizenship, including five who were citizens of an EU member state.

In the 2010s, Russian intelligence services used undercover agents travelling on false passports and multiple-entry Schengen visas. After the start of the full-scale war, the way operations were organized changed: alongside deployed intelligence officers, the services increasingly relied on intermediaries and recruited perpetrators, including individuals linked to criminal networks.

One key reason for this transformation was the mass expulsion of Russian diplomats and intelligence personnel from European countries. According to ICCT and GLOBSEC, more than 600 Russian representatives were expelled from Europe from 2018 onwards, including a substantial number of intelligence officers. This significantly limited the operational capabilities of Russian intelligence services, forcing them to rely more heavily on local operatives.

Russian intelligence services had turned to criminal intermediaries and local perpetrators as early as the 2010s. After the start of the full-scale war, however, the practice expanded considerably. At the same time, the substantial tightening of rules for issuing multiple-entry Schengen visas did not occur until November 2025. It would therefore be wrong to attribute the change in Russian intelligence tactics directly to visa restrictions. Such restrictions do not, in themselves, eliminate the threat of sabotage and must be complemented by other security measures.

The other side of the coin

The visa restrictions introduced between 2022 and 2025 had consequences not only for security, but also for other areas of European policy. Before 2022, the EU regarded the visa regime partly as a means of communicating and engaging with Russian society independently of the official authorities. After the start of the full-scale war, this approach was substantially curtailed, though it can hardly be considered entirely exhausted.

Despite the war, sanctions and visa restrictions, Russians continue to spend substantial sums on travel abroad. According to Bank of Russia data, Russian residents’ spending abroad under the “travel” category reached $ 49.3 billion in 2025, $ 10.4 billion more than a year earlier. The geography of travel has changed significantly, however: whereas EU countries accounted for 33 per cent of trips abroad from Russia in 2019, by 2024 that share had fallen to 7.6 per cent. In 2025, Russians made 4.61 million tourist trips to Turkey, 1.72 million to the UAE, 1.63 million to Egypt, 1.36 million to China and almost 886,000 to Thailand.

The decline in tourist flows from Russia to Europe is explained not only by political decisions to tighten entry conditions for Russians, though these undoubtedly played a significant role. Additional factors include restrictions on payment systems and the absence of direct flights. In 2019, Russians were issued 4.05 million Schengen visas, 82.6 per cent of which were multiple-entry. By 2025, the figure had fallen to 619,000 visas, with multiple-entry visas accounting for only 28.4 per cent.

Russian tourism was not an indispensable source of income for European economies. Greece, despite receiving substantial revenues from Russian tourists in 2019, was able to compensate for their departure with tourists from other countries. Yet what matters is not only the potential lost revenue for European economies, which is extremely difficult to calculate, but also the geography of the redistribution of tourist spending. A significant share now goes to China and Turkey — countries that maintain close economic relations with Russia and help it circumvent sanctions.

Conclusion

The examples above show that Russian intelligence services have indeed used Schengen visas to prepare and conduct operations on European territory. At the same time, research on sabotage between 2022 and 2025 indicates that most identified perpetrators held the citizenship of other countries. These data neither invalidate the need for visa controls nor allow for a definitive assessment of how far restrictions on tourist and multiple-entry visas have reduced the threat of sabotage.

Visa restrictions may be one instrument of security policy, alongside stronger vetting of applicants, intelligence-sharing and efforts to counter the recruitment of local operatives. However, security concerns should not be considered in isolation from the task of preserving ties with Russian society.

Support for Russian civil society did not end after 2022: the EU continues to fund independent media and human rights organizations, and the new visa rules provide exemptions for dissidents, journalists and civil society activists. According to European Commissioner Marta Kos, the EU has allocated around € 70 million to support Russian civil society and independent media since 2021. Yet targeted support for organizations and activists is not equivalent to preserving broad opportunities for Russian citizens to travel to Europe.

Ensuring Europe’s security requires, above all, strengthening the continent’s own defense capabilities, supporting Ukraine and ensuring that intelligence services work effectively. Russian civil society alone cannot, of course, prevent a new war. But in the long run, durable peace in Europe depends not only on military deterrence, but also on Russia’s political system, the existence of independent societal institutions and mechanisms for holding state power to account.

The central question, therefore, is not whether to choose between security and maintaining contact with Russians, but which visa restrictions genuinely correspond to the nature of the existing threats — and how to apply them without severing ties with Russian society.

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