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The Expectations Trap

Andrey Pertsev sums up the political week (November 16−20)

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On the eve of the APEC summit in Shenzhen, China, where a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping, U.S. President Donald Trump, and Russian President Vladimir Putin was expected to take place, the Kremlin and its affiliated commentators created an atmosphere of inflated expectations. The meeting was presented as an opportunity to agree on a new distribution of spheres of influence in world politics, while Putin was portrayed as an equal participant in such a dialogue and one of those who would determine its outcome.

Symbolic gestures matched this image. On the eve of the summit, an installation called “Yalta-2” was erected in Livadia Park in annexed Crimea, evoking the 1945 meeting of Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill. It was placed next to a monument to those historical figures. On November 4, Putin stopped by a replica of the monument at the “Christian Tradition: Our Times” exhibition at the Manege and recalled the Yalta Conference: “The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union gathered to discuss how to organize the world—the future world in Europe after the war ended.”

Experienced Kremlin officials and diplomats, including presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov, tried to lower the level of expectations and rejected suggestions of a “new Yalta.” Peskov called such comparisons “political science exercises” that had “nothing to do with reality.” By then, however, the corresponding atmosphere had already taken shape. Repeated statements by Russian officials and informal spokespeople about the prospects of the meeting only fueled the hype. Presidential aide Yuri Ushakov and Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, regularly commented on whether the meeting would take place and how substantive its agenda would be. As a result, the meeting attracted heightened attention both inside Russia and abroad. Observers followed not only the content of the negotiations but also the behavior of the participants and the smallest details of protocol.

In the end, the expectations the Kremlin had created became a problem for it. By persistently presenting Putin as a political player equal to Trump and Xi, Moscow itself made the ceremonial side of the meeting the subject of close scrutiny. While the Chinese president personally greeted the U.S. president at the airport, Putin was met by Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Given the peculiarities of China’s political system, it is difficult to find a direct equivalent of his post in Russia’s power hierarchy. In terms of standing, he is probably closest to Sergei Kiriyenko, first deputy head of the presidential administration—that is, formally not the first, second, or even third figure in the state.

The welcoming ceremony immediately became a subject of complaints: Putin was allegedly greeted by an official of insufficient rank. In response, explanations appeared claiming that Xi Jinping does not usually personally greet arriving leaders, making exceptions only for certain guests, including Donald Trump, and that Cai Qi acted as his trusted representative. Quite possibly, by the standards of Chinese protocol, the level of Putin’s reception was sufficiently high. But it did not match the expectations that the Kremlin itself had created. Had the Russian leadership not tried to present the summit as a meeting of three equally powerful world leaders, the ceremonial details would hardly have attracted so much attention.

The next occasion for mockery was the seating arrangement in the group photo. Donald Trump and Xi Jinping stood in the center of the front row, while Vladimir Putin ended up next to the wife of the Chinese president. But had it not been for the pre-summit inflation of expectations and the attempt to present the summit as a meeting of leaders claiming equal status and effectively discussing a new division of the world, hardly anyone would have seriously analyzed the participants’ placement in the photograph or interpreted it as a demonstrative humiliation of the Russian president.

Apparently, the substantive part of the summit gave the Kremlin little cause for satisfaction. Unsurprisingly, the official Telegram channel of the Kremlin press pool described the outcome of the meeting in the tersest possible terms: “overall, good.” Putin’s dialogue with Trump and the trilateral meeting took place in a compressed format. One of the main news items was Xi Jinping’s proposal to advocate for a complete ban on nuclear weapons. This initiative clearly does not align with Putin’s interests or those of his circle: for decades, the nuclear arsenal has been one of the main instruments of international influence for the Soviet, and later Russian, leadership.

The “declaration on peace” adopted at the end of the talks was, in essence, a set of generic good wishes. Judging by coverage in pro-Kremlin media and commentary from Kremlin-loyal experts, the main symbolic outcome of the event was that the Chinese president personally walked Putin to his car.

The APEC summit story is just one example of how inflated expectations built around the Russian president’s actions ultimately backfire on him. This practice has long been a hallmark of Putin’s system of governance: subordinates do not merely carry out the head of state’s instructions; they also strive to present events to him in the most favorable light possible. Thus, generals from the General Staff report to Putin about Ukrainian settlements allegedly captured, after which the president himself and his representatives use this information with utmost seriousness in the context of possible peace negotiations. Maxim Oreshkin, deputy head of the presidential administration for economic affairs, meanwhile, knows how to present virtually any economic indicator in a positive light, finding attractive figures even amid crisis phenomena and accumulated problems. Putin then takes these figures public (his speech at the APEC summit was no exception) and surprises the public with the extent to which he is detached from reality.

The Russian president’s trip to the APEC summit was organized along the same logic. With a more realistic presentation, its outcome could quite plausibly have been framed as a diplomatic success: Putin received an invitation to an international event, and some Asian leaders demonstrated an interest in maintaining contacts with Moscow. But the Kremlin, it seems, expected much more. The summit was supposed to become a kind of “new Yalta”—a meeting of the three pillars of world politics who would discuss the future world order as equals and effectively determine spheres of influence. That did not happen. And it was precisely the gap between the scale of the preliminary expectations and the actual substance of the event that ultimately turned a potentially acceptable diplomatic episode into a story that many perceived as a failure for Putin.

The New Political Language

At the “PR Days-26” event in Moscow, the Russian Public Relations Association, which cooperates with the Kremlin’s political bloc, held a meeting with representatives of parliamentary parties. Participants called on party members to adopt the concept of “social architecture,” which Sergei Kiriyenko’s political bloc has been actively promoting for nearly two years. Dmitry Yelovsky, a political technologist at the Kremlin-affiliated Expert Institute for Social Research (EISR) and one of the main speakers on the topic, called this “architecture” a “new generally accepted political language.” Judging by the remarks of the meeting’s participants, most systemic parties, with the exception of the Communist Party (KPRF), are already prepared to speak it.

The essence of “social architecture” is to replace real political competition with social initiatives. These include, for example, pseudo-plebiscites on issues such as improving apartment-block courtyards, allocating school budgets, or branding regional projects.

Sergei Perminov, a senator and one of the main overseers of United Russia’s election campaigns, said that “the voter demands local results,” referring precisely to such social projects. In turn, Sardana Avksentyeva, a former mayor of Yakutsk and one of the most prominent figures in the New People party, noted that her party’s main competitor in the State Duma elections was not United Russia or other political forces, but “voter apathy,” which New People, she said, had fought against.

These statements fit neatly into the framework of the “new political language.” Under the logic of “social architecture,” parties do not compete with one another for power and voter support; rather, they “work” with electoral groups holding particular views, channeling their votes in the direction the Kremlin needs. United Russia, in effect, legitimizes the use in party campaigning of projects funded from the state budget. New People, for its part, effectively acknowledges that it is carrying out a “social project” to mobilize an apathetic electorate to vote.

The KPRF, as the only ideological parliamentary party, is still resisting this approach, which brackets out both ideology and the voters’ actual political preferences. Sergei Obukhov, secretary of the KPRF Central Committee and a political technologist, for example, complained about “unprecedented administrative interference in the electoral process.” Such criticism clearly falls outside the “new political language.”

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