Andrei Loginov, rector of the Russian State University for the Humanities and a member of the Russian Historical Society (RIO), has proposed introducing short history courses for civil servants and employees of pro-government media. The idea was endorsed by RIO chairman and Foreign Intelligence Service director Sergei Naryshkin. The proposal fits neatly into the broader trend of all-out indoctrination that the political bloc led by Sergei Kiriyenko has been steadily advancing.
Since 2022, every Russian first-year student has been subjected to this ideological-patriotic indoctrination: they must pass assessments in a subject called “Foundations of Russian Statehood” (FRS). The course was developed under the guidance of Andrei Polosin, a close Kiriyenko ally, political technologist, and former senior executive at Rosatom who is now a vice-rector at RANEPA. Students are taught that Russia is a “civilization-state” and that collectivism is a defining trait of its citizens. Older generations, for understandable reasons, have so far been left out of this campaign. Yet Kiriyenko’s team has already begun rolling out condensed versions of FRS for employees of state corporations and large businesses loyal to the authorities. From 2027, Russian universities will also introduce a common socio-humanitarian core curriculum for all students, comprising courses on Russian history, the foundations of Russian statehood, philosophy, and the Russian language.
Now, RIO officials are proposing to take ideologized history teaching beyond the universities as well. Vladimir Putin, who has long been fascinated by history—or, more precisely, by its “ultra-patriotic” interpretation—is likely to welcome the initiative. The political bloc, for its part, will readily take up its implementation if it receives the appropriate instruction. Other figures within the power vertical are certain to advance similar proposals: officials and would-be ideologues, such as the Kovalchuk brothers and film director Nikita Mikhalkov. As long as Vladimir Putin remains in power, therefore, the system of ideological influence over state-dependent social groups can be expected to expand further.
The “social architects” will draw such citizens into quasi-plebiscites, community clean-up campaigns, and personnel competitions; the “mobilizers” will monitor their participation in elections; and the developers of propaganda courses will steadily expand their audiences at their expense.
For now, the authorities are merely experimenting with extending indoctrination courses to the adult population. But the broader trend is clear: their audience will continue to grow. Participation in such programs may become voluntary in name only—for example, enrollment could be tied to prospects for career advancement. A similar dynamic is already visible in the mobilization of employees to take part in elections and in the organization of supposedly voluntary fundraising drives for participants in the war against Ukraine.
Adult education courses would make it easier to introduce a system of “social ratings” modeled on that of the People’s Republic of China. Citizens could be ranked according to whether they have enrolled in “patriotic courses” and how they perform in them, then rewarded or restricted accordingly.
At the same time, for Putin and part of his inner circle, the ideological dimension of indoctrination takes priority. For the nominal “technocrats”—such as Sergei Kiriyenko or Moscow mayor Sergei Sobyanin—the key objective may instead be the construction of a system of control. Viewed in this light, the most important task is to create the infrastructure for mass education and assessment of citizens. Its ideological content could, if necessary, be revised or replaced altogether with another program in the event of a political transition or a shift in priorities.
Higher Education for the Military
On Thursday, Vladimir Putin proposed creating an educational program and personnel competition for participants in the war against Ukraine who do not hold a university degree. That same morning, Alexei Komissarov, rector of RANEPA—the university that serves as the institutional base for the presidential administration’s personnel programs—announced in Kommersant a new form of education for this category of citizens. But after Putin’s statement, the article disappeared from the newspaper’s website. Apparently, the president decided to present himself as the program’s sole initiator.
The “Time of Heroes” personnel competition, which provides education for war participants, was initially open only to military personnel with higher education. Judging by Komissarov’s remarks, those without a university diploma will now be able to apply as well. The RANEPA rector promised that those who pass the selection process would be enrolled in the academy’s bachelor’s programs, where they would study for three years.
This suggests that the Kremlin’s political bloc expects “Time of Heroes” to continue receiving funding in the years ahead. Yet the three-year budget plan proposed by the government and approved by parliament allocates funds for the program only through 2027. The new model of education—effectively, obtaining a first degree or, for some participants, a second diploma—will require considerably greater spending.
Expanding the program’s audience may attract people who were previously excluded from the “Time of Heroes” competition: those without higher education. They make up the majority of participants in the war against Ukraine. In the longer term, this could spark interest in military service under contract among some prospective applicants. In this way, the political bloc within the presidential administration is contributing to efforts to solve the problem of contract recruitment.
Moreover, the news about expanding the competition’s eligibility is addressed directly to Vladimir Putin—and he has already endorsed the idea. Indeed, he has publicly become its “author.” Kiriyenko and his subordinates are demonstrating to the president their readiness to forge the very “genuine, new elite” from the trenches that he so often speaks about.
The “big political bloc” long ago developed its own approach to promoting military personnel: genuinely influential positions go to serving members of the elite who announce that they are leaving for the war. Loyal mid- and junior-ranking personnel who have passed testing through personnel programs are offered positions connected with youth policy, patriotic education, or cooperation with the security services. The case of Nikita Gorelov, former head of the small town of Sosnovka, shows that genuine “veterans” from the trenches can create problems for the power vertical. Educating and testing such servicemen over three years reduces the likelihood of such cases. By recruiting war participants without higher education and educating them, the political bloc can, on the one hand, report progress to Putin; on the other, it can subject trench veterans to prolonged testing and indoctrination. In particular, they will have to study the same propaganda courses on the “Foundations of Russian Statehood,” history, and philosophy.
Still, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the scale of real servicemen’s integration into the power vertical. The planned intake for the new cohort of “Time of Heroes” is only 80 people. A significant share will already hold university degrees, while some will belong to the serving elite. Moreover, graduates of the program are appointed chiefly not to federal but to regional and even municipal government bodies. The vertical can readily absorb several dozen former military personnel into the administrative system, especially after preliminary selection and appropriate training.
“Time of Heroes” retains its opportunistic, imitative character. It is less a social elevator than a filter through which the power vertical selects figures who will not disrupt its usual way of operating or introduce alien rules and language, as Gorelov did. Three years of education will turn servicemen into standard protégés of Kiriyenko’s political bloc, which operates in a corporate manner. They will follow the same scripts—as graduates of the civilian “Leaders of Russia” program already do—apply the same managerial techniques and orient themselves toward further training in Kremlin programs.
A logical extension of this strategy would be to recruit Russians without higher education into the Kremlin’s “civilian” personnel competitions and then educate them within the same programs. In this way, the political bloc could present the president with a new image for such programs—one that is more popular and mass-based—while avoiding the risk of internal conflicts within the administrative vertical, such as the Gorelov affair.
