Russian officials have long touted grain as the country’s “new oil.” The comparison is easy to understand. Russia already holds a dominant position in global grain markets and, until recently, appeared poised to strengthen it further. Oil, by contrast, faces a less certain future, as the energy transition in advanced economies is expected to weigh on long-term demand. Export revenues from grain and other agricultural products have surged in recent years, exceeding even official expectations. But in 2026, that success story ran up against the Kremlin’s overriding priority: the war in Ukraine.
How Russia Became a Grain Superpower
During the final two decades of its existence, the Soviet Union was both one of the world’s largest grain producers and its biggest importer. The contradiction reflected the inefficiencies of the Soviet economy: large quantities of grain were lost in storage and transit, while vast volumes were consumed by the livestock sector. The transition to a market economy transformed agriculture. Large companies consolidated land, invested in modern equipment and technologies, and adopted higher-yielding seed varieties. State support also played an important role. By the early 2000s, Russia had become one of the world’s ten largest wheat exporters; by the end of the decade, it ranked among the top three. After overtaking competitors to become the world’s largest wheat exporter in the second half of the 2010s, Russia increasingly earned a reputation as a “grain superpower.”
Russia currently accounts for 21% of the global wheat market, which makes up the bulk of the country’s grain exports. The EU, the second-largest exporter, holds 15.1%, followed by Canada (12.6%), Australia (11.6%), and the US (11.4%). Among major producers, Russia ranks fourth, with a share of around 10%, trailing China, the EU, and India.
Unlike most other civilian sectors of the Russian economy, agriculture thrived in the opening years of the war in Ukraine. Russian producers escaped Western sanctions. Moreover, capitalizing on shrinking Ukrainian exports—in 2022, Ukraine harvested roughly half as much grain as in 2021—they strengthened their foothold in global markets. Backed by exceptionally favorable weather conditions, Russia brought in a record grain harvest in 2022. Exports in the 2022−2023 marketing year, which runs from July 1 to June 30, also hit a record of 60 million tonnes. The following year, despite a less generous harvest, even more was shipped abroad—topping 70 million tonnes.
Grain as a “Silent Weapon”
Grain accounts for a relatively small share of Russia’s overall foreign trade. In 2025, export revenues from grain shipments stood at about $ 11.2 billion, or roughly 2.7% of total export earnings, while the broader agricultural sector accounted for 10%. Within agriculture, grain remains the largest category, making up 27% of export value in 2025, down from 37% in 2024. Fats and oils followed with 22%, processed food products with 14%, and fish and seafood with 14%.
Russia’s status as a “grain superpower” offers more than financial gains. Early in the war, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev dubbed food “our silent weapon” and proposed restricting supplies to “unfriendly” nations. In practice, Russian grain goes primarily to countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa that Moscow classifies as “friendly.” Russia is a vital supplier to African states. Although Russia’s overall trade volume with Africa remains modest, its dominance in supplying key commodities such as food, fertilizers, and arms, alongside its military presence, gives it disproportionate influence across the continent. That influence translates into political support on the global stage—most notably in voting outcomes at the UN General Assembly.
Using food exports as a “silent weapon,” especially along the lines proposed by Medvedev, requires strict control over shipments. The Russian authorities set out to achieve this soon after the war began and have largely succeeded. State-linked companies now handle the lion’s share of shipments. Western traders have left the country. Their formerly largest Russian rival, the grain trader Rodnye Polya (formerly TD RIF), was nationalized following a lawsuit by the Prosecutor General’s Office and subsequently sold to Demetra, a firm linked to VTB. Demetra also owns several other major assets. Overall, almost the entire grain export sector is now controlled by state or state-affiliated players. In 2026, the Ministry of Agriculture distributed 90% of the main export quota among 213 companies. The largest share, 3.5 million tonnes, went to Grain Gates, a company linked to Demetra and VTB. Aston, an independent trader, ranked second with 2.05 million tonnes, followed in third place by the United Grain Company, which is majority-owned by the state.
Exports Under Siege
Grain harvests in Russia fluctuate widely from year to year, ranging from 113 million tonnes in the drought-hit year of 2018 to a record 157.7 million tonnes in 2022. For 2026, the harvest within Russia’s internationally recognized borders is projected at 137 million tonnes, including 88 million tonnes of wheat. Export potential is estimated at 59 million tonnes. Yet realizing that full potential will prove impossible: this summer, the war has upended logistics.
Normally, 90% of Russian grain exports pass through the ports of the Azov and Black Sea basin. Novorossiysk alone, Russia’s largest commercial port on the Black Sea, accounts for up to a third of all shipments. Yet in July, Ukrainian drone attacks brought operations in the Azov ports to a virtual halt. Reports that they might resume shipments only emerged in late October. Afterwards, infrastructure in Taman was disrupted. In August, it was the turn of the terminals in Novorossiysk.
In the first quarter of the 2026−2027 marketing year, from July through September, Russia’s grain exports totaled 8.5 million tonnes—a 1.6-fold drop compared with the same period last year, according to ProZerno, an agricultural consultancy. Wheat shipments plummeted from 10.6 million to 4.8 million tonnes, more than halving.
Shipments can be rerouted, but only partially. Russian exporters have turned to the Baltic Sea ports of Ust-Luga and Vysotsk, as well as Astrakhan and Makhachkala on the Caspian Sea. Beyond Russia’s own Baltic outlets, wheat is also moving through the ports of neighboring countries, primarily Latvia. In the absence of sanctions, nothing stands in the way. According to a report by the Latvian Ministry of Transport, blocking transit would inflict € 290 million in damages on ports, carriers, and related businesses. Nevertheless, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have urged European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in a joint letter, to introduce a formal EU-wide ban on Russian grain imports across the bloc.
Yet in September, these alternative routes handled only about a tenth of the volume previously carried via the Black Sea—just 800,000 tonnes in total. Moreover, making room for grain shipments has forced cuts to other key export commodities, such as fertilizers and coal. In October, the Abkhazian port of Ochamchira was pressed into service for wheat and other agricultural goods, though its handling capacity remains negligible.
Consequently, if operations at the Azov and Black Sea ports are not restored, industry experts estimate that Russia will be able to supply only about 39 million tonnes of grain to the global market by the end of the current marketing year—the lowest volume in five years. Even if shipping in the Black Sea is successfully restored, exports may reach only roughly 45 million tonnes. Completely compensating for the losses already incurred is impossible, as grain terminals operate near capacity during the autumn months anyway.
The Cost of War
Grain that cannot be exported will mostly have to be dumped onto the domestic market at prices below production costs. Meanwhile, expenditures—above all on diesel fuel, which powers agricultural machinery—continue to rise. According to industry estimates, about 40% of market participants are currently operating at a loss. This will inevitably lead to reduced acreage and a smaller harvest in the next agricultural year.
Ukrainian grain exports will suffer far heavier losses than Russia’s due to Russian attacks on the ports of Greater Odesa. According to calculations by Forbes Ukraine, the country will be unable to export roughly 24 million tonnes of grain. Given agriculture’s weight in the Ukrainian economy—accounting for 10% of GDP before the war and roughly 7.5% after its onset—the fallout could prove catastrophic. Oxford Economics estimates that the collapse in agricultural exports will shave 1.8% off GDP in 2026 and another 2.1% in 2027.
The Kremlin’s reluctance to negotiate a Black Sea truce with Ukraine is likely driven precisely by a desire to inflict further damage on the Ukrainian economy. The authorities evidently consider the damage to domestic producers an acceptable price to pay. Moscow may well be calculating that Ukraine will ultimately be the one forced to abandon attacks on port infrastructure. Vladimir Putin recently proposed that the US increase purchases of Russian fertilizers. Should such a deal become the subject of substantive talks, it is logical to expect Russia to try to link it to pressure on Kyiv; otherwise, ramping up supplies simply will not be feasible.
The Middle East and North Africa are most heavily dependent on grain supplies from Russia and Ukraine, above all Egypt and Libya, which cover about 80% of their needs through imports from the two countries. Kenya sources roughly two-thirds of its grain imports from Russia. In addition, Tunisia and Algeria are accustomed to buying substantial volumes.
For now, most importers are taking a wait-and-see approach. Before long, however, they will be forced to seek alternative suppliers. Egypt has already announced a pivot toward France and other European exporters. This is not the first time in recent years that it has had to do so; in 2023, the trigger was Russia’s attempts to dictate its own pricing terms. Meanwhile, Egypt remains Russia’s chief partner in Africa, accounting for roughly 39% of all Russia-Africa trade in 2025, and is essentially the continent’s only nation with which Moscow has built multifaceted ties.
Sooner or later, the export gateways will reopen. However, a return to previous shipment levels is by no means guaranteed. Unlike the oil market, the grain market is relatively flexible: competitors can ramp up production, while major consumers—above all China—have already spent recent years pursuing import substitution. Market positions will not be lost overnight. Yet over time, African countries will also boost output. As a result of the war, Russia has already lost its old “silent weapon”—gas exports. Now, trouble has beset the new one as well.
