On October 23, 2026, the foreign ministers of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Batumi. One of the main topics was the Middle Corridor: the development of transport infrastructure, the digitalization of freight movements, and the simplification of transit across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus. Just eight days earlier, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan launched a 380-kilometer fiber-optic cable between Aktau and Sumgait, laid along the bed of the Caspian Sea. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called it the “digital embodiment of the Middle Corridor.” Since 2022, projects of this kind have gained momentum amid the war and the region’s desire to reduce dependence on Russian transit routes.
Yet attempts to establish horizontal ties between the former Soviet republics—without tying them to Moscow—began as early as the 1990s. Over the past three decades, some projects have faded away, others have endured, and still others are experiencing a revival. The most durable initiatives have generally been those based on concrete economic and infrastructural interests.
TRACECA
At the time of the USSR collapse, the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia were part of a single Soviet economic and transport system oriented primarily toward links within the Union. After 1991, the newly independent states gradually gained alternative trading partners and the opportunity to develop routes to Europe and Asia that bypassed Russian territory.
One of the earliest such initiatives was the TRACECA program (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia), launched by the European Commission in 1993 with the participation of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the five Central Asian states. Its purpose was to develop a route from Europe to Central Asia via the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Caspian. Ukraine and Moldova joined the program in 1996−1998.
Initially, TRACECA was an EU technical assistance program: European funding went toward research and project preparation in ports, railways, and other forms of transport, as well as toward improving transport and customs procedures. Over time, the program acquired its own intergovernmental institutional structure. In 1998, twelve countries signed the Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for the Europe-Caucasus-Asia corridor in Baku. The TRACECA Intergovernmental Commission began operating in 2000, and its permanent secretariat opened in Baku a year later. Russia did not join the program and gradually came to view it as a competitor to its own transit routes.
TRACECA did not create a single transport corridor. But the initiative linked individual sections of the route and laid the groundwork for its further development. The European Union funded a number of infrastructure projects: the repair of railways and bridges in Azerbaijan and Georgia, the modernization of ferry terminals in Aktau, Kazakhstan, and Illichivsk, Ukraine (now Chornomorsk), and the equipping of ports and railway networks across the region. Most EU funds went to technical assistance, which helped attract loans from international banks to the region. The participating countries also developed a common legal framework and permanent institutions for coordinating freight movements. Building on this legacy, a more commercially oriented project—the Middle Corridor—began to develop in the 2010s.
TRACECA itself continues to operate. It now includes fourteen states, and its main agenda has shifted toward the digitalization of freight, the simplification of transit, and the harmonization of rules among countries. Ukraine remains a participant. In May 2026, it joined an agreement on a unified electronic transit permit, and in September it discussed the restoration of Ukrainian ports and railways as a Black Sea link in freight movements between the Caucasus and Europe.
The Middle Corridor
In 2013−2014, railway companies, ports, and shipping companies from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia created a mechanism to coordinate freight movements across the Caspian Sea. In 2017, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) association—better known as the Middle Corridor—was established. Its main tasks were to harmonize tariffs and schedules, reduce administrative barriers, and improve the efficiency of the route as a single logistics chain. That same year, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway opened, linking the South Caucasus with Türkiye. After freight traffic through the Marmaray tunnel beneath the Bosphorus began in 2019, the corridor also gained access to the European railway network.
The Middle Corridor differed from TRACECA in its underlying logic. Whereas TRACECA created a broad intergovernmental framework for transport links between Europe, the Caucasus, and Asia, TITR brought specific sections together into a single route: from China through Kazakhstan and the Caspian to Azerbaijan and Georgia, and from there—via Türkiye or Black Sea ports—to Europe.
In its early years, freight volumes remained modest. In 2017, roughly 9,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units) were transported along TITR; in 2019, 26,000; and in 2021, about 25,000. By comparison, around 176,000 TEU passed along the main northern route through Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus in 2017, and approximately 547,000 TEU in 2020.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, interest in the Middle Corridor rose sharply. Sanctions-related and political risks pushed companies to seek routes bypassing Russia. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye accelerated the corridor’s development, and in November 2022 they adopted a roadmap to increase its capacity and eliminate bottlenecks. In 2023, the railway companies of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia established the joint operator Middle Corridor Multimodal to integrate individual sections of the route into a single logistics service. At the same time, the EU and international financial institutions increased investment in the region’s transport infrastructure.
The growth in freight volumes was noticeable: whereas about 25,000 TEU passed through the Middle Corridor in 2021, the figure reached roughly 77,000 TEU in 2025—almost three times higher. The gap with the northern route nevertheless remains substantial: in 2025, UTLC ERA alone transported approximately 311,000 TEU between China and the EU via Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus.
The gap between the Middle Corridor and the northern route is explained primarily by the former’s technical and organizational condition. On the Caspian, containers must be transferred from trains to ships and back again, while the capacity of ports and the ferry fleet remains limited. Differences in customs procedures and transport documentation among countries create additional delays. On the western section, much of the burden still falls on Georgia: its ports are approaching capacity limits, and construction of the deep-water port at Anaklia has been delayed. In the longer term, the continuing decline in the Caspian Sea’s water level may become another constraining factor; it is already complicating the operation of some ferry lines.
The war has sharply increased demand for the route, but its future development depends on the participating countries’ willingness to improve its efficiency and remove bottlenecks.
Central Asia
Alongside the development of the Middle Corridor, the political organization of one of its key links—Central Asia—has also been changing. The first attempts to create an independent center of integration in the region date back to the 1990s. In 1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan established the Central Asian Economic Union, later joined by Tajikistan. Much of the plan for a common economic space was never realized, and in 2005 the organization merged with the Eurasian Economic Community. More durable mechanisms of cooperation began to emerge later, along two parallel tracks.
In 2009, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Türkiye created the Turkic Council. Uzbekistan joined in 2019, and in 2021 the organization was transformed into the Organization of Turkic States. The OTS has gradually developed concrete instruments of cooperation, from regular summits and a permanent secretariat to customs and transport mechanisms. In 2022, its members signed an agreement on a simplified customs corridor intended to facilitate trade along the Middle Corridor. In 2023, they signed an agreement establishing the Turkic Investment Fund, whose capital stood at $ 600 million as of 2026.
At the same time, the Central Asian states began building their own regional dialogue. At Uzbekistan’s initiative, the first Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in thirteen years took place in Astana in March 2018; it subsequently became an annual event. The format was deliberately kept flexible: rather than creating a new supranational organization, the leaders regularly discussed trade, transport, water, energy, security, and border issues.
The development of intra-regional dialogue was accompanied by the gradual normalization of relations among the Central Asian states. Between 2022 and 2025, Kyrgyzstan settled key border disputes with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, while the three countries also agreed on the point where their borders meet. In 2025, the format expanded beyond the region: Azerbaijan became a full participant in the Consultative Meetings, and regional security became a more prominent item on the agenda. In 2026, all five Central Asian states signed a Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation.
As a result, rather than attempting to build a single integration bloc quickly, Central Asia has developed several complementary mechanisms. The OTS formalizes the region’s economic and transport ties with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, while the Consultative Meetings provide a standing platform for addressing shared problems among neighboring states.
Political Integration Projects
After Georgia’s Rose Revolution and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, relations between Kyiv and Tbilisi warmed considerably. The governments of Mikheil Saakashvili and Viktor Yushchenko openly sought closer ties with the EU and Euro-Atlantic institutions and tried to build broader regional cooperation around this agenda. In August 2005, Yushchenko and Saakashvili signed the Borjomi Declaration, proposing the creation of a Community of Democratic Choice for the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region.
The founding forum of the Community of Democratic Choice took place in Kyiv in December 2005. The declaration was signed by the presidents of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia, and Macedonia. Other countries of the region, as well as the United States and the OSCE, were also represented at the meeting. The organization, which was meant to promote democracy, regional stability, and closer ties with Europe, ultimately never developed a clear operating mechanism. After two meetings in 2006, the initiative effectively fizzled out, owing to weak institutional support from the EU and NATO and insufficient effort by Kyiv to sustain the format.
The Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), created in 1997 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, proved more durable. Uzbekistan was also a member from 1999 to 2005. The 2001 Yalta Charter established a broad agenda, ranging from sovereignty and territorial integrity to trade and transport. Over time, political coordination around the conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan became more visible. In 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions concerning Azerbaijan’s territories and the return of refugees to Abkhazia. Moscow viewed such activity skeptically: in 2006, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Denisov publicly questioned GUAM’s effectiveness, although he did not call it an anti-Russian organization.
Russia’s war against Georgia in August 2008 was a serious test for the organization. Ukraine, under Viktor Yushchenko, openly supported Georgia, while Moldova and Azerbaijan took a more cautious position. GUAM had no collective security mechanisms, and no presidential summits were held after 2008. The organization’s political role then declined under President Viktor Yanukovych, when Kyiv focused more on direct negotiations with Moscow and Brussels. After 2014, Ukraine attempted to revive the format. Three meetings of heads of government took place in Kyiv and Chișinău between 2017 and 2019, focusing on transport, trade, and customs cooperation. By then, however, GUAM played a secondary role compared with the other integration tracks pursued by its members.
The organization continues to operate: it has a secretariat, national coordinators, and sectoral working groups. In 2022, its members agreed on rules of origin for goods under their free trade agreement, which had originally been concluded in 2002. Yet the foreign policy trajectories of its members are increasingly diverging: Ukraine and Moldova are oriented toward EU accession; Georgia’s accession process has been effectively stalled since 2024; and Azerbaijan is developing ever closer ties with Türkiye and Central Asia.
As a result, GUAM never became a durable political bloc. Shared positions on sovereignty and territorial integrity proved insufficient for sustained foreign policy coordination—especially as members’ relations with Russia, economic interests, and foreign policy priorities began to diverge.
Conclusion
The durability of regional integration projects in the post-Soviet space initiated without Russia’s participation has depended less on a shared foreign policy orientation among participants than on the presence of practical interests. Transport routes, trade, border issues, and joint infrastructure have created reasons to preserve cooperation even as governments change and the international environment shifts. External partners—above all the EU and Türkiye—have been able to accelerate this process through resources, market access, and technical assistance.
The alternative to the Russian center has not been a new unified bloc of countries nominally “united against Russia,” but a network of overlapping formats with different memberships and purposes. Some connect Central Asia with the Caucasus and Europe through transport routes; others provide regional states with platforms for foreign policy dialogue; still others survive as narrower structures for coordinating positions and interests.
The experience of GUAM and the Community of Democratic Choice shows that political alignment alone is not enough for successful integration. The main factors behind the success of such projects are economic incentives, external support, and—above all—the strategic interest of partner states in cooperation and a shared understanding of its goals.
