At the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, few expected Moscow to devote as much attention to the African continent as it has since 2022. On the eve of February 2022, the Kremlin seemed fixated on Ukraine and Europe, and to a lesser extent on the Middle East. Of course, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group was already present in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali and Sudan, but these remained ambiguous projects that the Russian government kept at a distance — at least in public.
Today, the picture is entirely different. Due to its proximity and strategic weight, the Middle East remains essential to Moscow, but sub-Saharan Africa has received more attention from the Kremlin than most observers expected in 2022. The number of embassies has risen from 40 to 49 (including those announced), trade with the continent continues to grow (from a low base), and the number of known Russian military deployments keeps increasing, potentially reaching up to nine countries.
The scope of the Kremlin’s African footprint remains ambiguous. On the one hand, while locked in war, Moscow’s most consequential partners have been China, Iran and North Korea, which have supplied vital military inputs to sustain its war of aggression against Ukraine. Only one African government (Eritrea) expressed outright support for Moscow’s war, and that was back in 2022. Trade, though growing, remains limited and mostly one-sided: African economies are small, niche buyers of Russian goods, while African exports to Russia are roughly ten times smaller than imports from Russia. Due to re-export schemes, accurate figures are hard to establish, but the Russian government put total trade with the continent in 2024 (the latest available data) at $ 28 billion. As a large resource exporter, Russia’s economy is not complementary to most African countries.
On the other hand, Russian efforts point to a continued interest in maintaining a wide-ranging presence across the continent. Russian diplomats have become significantly more active in engaging local media in their host countries since 2022 and have maintained that visibility. While military missions attract global attention, the Russia House network of “cultural diplomacy” organisations has expanded to an estimated 22 branches by the end of 2025. Moreover, leaked internal documents show that Russian intelligence agencies have continued investing in the propaganda and disinformation efforts previously run by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Taken together, the Kremlin has devoted substantial resources to spreading its message across the continent. To describe the variety of tools it employs — diplomacy, summits, trade events, war propaganda, social media disinformation, and others — one could use the NATO term “strategic communications.” The closest equivalent in Russian strategic thinking is “informational influence” (informatsionnye vozdeystviya), also sometimes translated as “information impact,” “effect,” or “exposure.”
This concept is broad. Russian researchers use it to analyse how information shapes people’s behaviour. It is often discussed in relation to perceived U.S. influence in mass and social media, and is therefore frequently deployed defensively. For example, the Kremlin’s 2024 State Strategy on Cultural Policy uses the phrase repeatedly (sometimes as “informational-psychological influence”) in the context of national security. In that framework, information security covers all aspects of social life, from values and religion to education and access to information.
This expansive understanding of influence is reflected in the wide range of channels Moscow uses to build its position globally, including in Africa.
What goals in Africa?
In recent years, Russia’s foreign policy has been driven by what can be described as an ideological agenda or grand strategy aimed at asserting major-power status and building a multipolar world order. This agenda is visible in Moscow’s African engagements, where the Kremlin presents its mission as helping Africa become its own power pole in an emerging polycentric international system. These have been Russia’s strategic goals on the continent at least since the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit.
Additional, more operational goals have gained importance since 2022, mainly to support other foreign policy objectives. These include finding ways to evade sanctions and recruiting personnel for Russia’s armed forces and defence industry. Reliable figures are scarce, but estimates compiled by the Ukrainian NGO Truth Hounds put the number of African recruits to the Russian armed forces at between 1,700 and 4,000. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (GI-TOC) suggests that several hundred people joined Russia’s defence industry in 2025, mainly through the Alabuga Start programme. Sustaining operations in northern, western and central Africa after the Wagner Group’s departure is also becoming increasingly demanding. Although a complex task, support for the Africa Corps mission provides a vehicle for Russian influence across the continent.
While these strategic and operational goals are disparate, they share one central focus: the foreign policies of African states. It is African governments that decide whether to align with Moscow’s messaging, host Russian military forces, or participate in other Kremlin schemes. Therefore, the Kremlin’s key objective in Africa is to persuade policymakers to cooperate with Russia.
The channels of persuasion
Embassies. Russian embassies in Africa used to be relatively unappealing postings for young, ambitious diplomats. The heavy focus on state-to-state relations also made them quiet postings with modest public diplomacy efforts. This has changed. The reduction of Moscow’s diplomatic presence in Europe — due to postings being used as intelligence covers — has forced African missions to take on more work. Russian ambassadors across the continent are now active in the media, appearing on local broadcasts, speaking at events, and publishing op-eds under their own names. Recent revelations about Russian recruitment of African fighters, for example, prompted media responses from several Russian embassies.
Charm offensives. High-level delegations have become routine in Russia-Africa relations. In 2022 and 2023 the pace was intense, with Foreign Minister Lavrov visiting dozens of African countries, largely to secure strong participation at the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit. The upcoming 2026 Summit is also receiving attention, though other diplomats, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Borisenko, are now playing a larger role. High-level African delegations, in turn, receive significant attention; Tanzania, for instance, was the guest of honor at the 2026 St Petersburg International Economic Forum.
State-controlled media. After being pushed out of Europe, RT and Sputnik adapted their approach. In Africa, RT has struggled to secure broadcast slots, with only a few local TV channels carrying its content. As a result, both outlets have established content-sharing agreements with African media — what Maxime Audinet and Colin Gerard describe as the “clandestinization” of Russian state-controlled media. In parallel, the 2023 launch of African Initiative, a Moscow-based news agency with offices in Bamako, Malabo and other cities, has further expanded the Kremlin’s reach. It also marked the shift from Prigozhin’s free-wheeling model to a more centrally controlled system overseen by Russian intelligence.
Russia House. Under the Russian MFA, the international cooperation agency Rossotrudnichestvo has rapidly expanded its presence through the Russia House network, intended as the Russian equivalent of the Institut français or British Council. Under the cover of cultural and humanitarian cooperation, Russia House branches often facilitate activities by RT, Sputnik and African Initiative, including screening propaganda films and exhibiting photos from the war in Ukraine presented as evidence of Ukrainian attacks. There is also evidence that some Russia House offices have served as cover for intelligence officers, including for recruitment purposes.
Orthodoxy. As during the Cold War, the Moscow Patriarchate works in tandem with the Kremlin to extend Russian influence. In Africa, this has involved co-opting Eastern Orthodox parishes (as opposed to Oriental Orthodox ones in Eritrea and Ethiopia) previously under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Alexandria, as well as some other Christian communities by offering financial resources, scholarships and communications support. Moscow Patriarchate claims to have established parishes across nearly every African country (in February 2026, the Patriarchal Exarch of Africa, Metropolitan Konstantin of Cairo and North Africa, reported on the Church’s activities already underway in 36 countries). These parishes are also alleged to have been involved in recruiting Africans for Russia’s war effort.
Work with local players. Moscow has revived an old Soviet practice of inviting foreign journalists and content creators on all-expenses-paid trips to Russia and occupied Ukraine. These are typically propaganda tours presented as capacity-building exercises. Local media outlets and influencers are courted or sometimes directly contracted to promote Kremlin talking points about Russia, the war, or other policy issues. Beyond media, Russia has built a network of sympathetic politicians across the continent, particularly those aligned with the Sahel juntas. Jonathan Guiffard has described these allies, sustained by direct Russian support and front organizations, as a modern-day “African Comintern.”
Social media manipulation. With rising smartphone, internet and social media penetration across Africa, Russian disinformation can now reach ordinary people directly on Facebook, TikTok, YouTube and closed WhatsApp groups. African Initiative, for example, has contracted companies to run social media campaigns targeting France and the UK through African and diaspora audiences. Russian embassies have also revived and integrated their social media presence into the Kremlin’s broader war propaganda and disinformation efforts.
Coercion. Intimidation remains part of the toolkit. The unlawful detention and torture of aid worker Joseph Figueira by Wagner forces in the Central African Republic illustrates the violence used to control the narrative. Other targets have included the pro-democracy network Tournons la page (active in 16 countries). In 2023, its operations in Niger were infiltrated by an alleged Russian intelligence asset to spread pro-junta messaging, undermining the group’s original purpose. Where direct physical access is not possible, Russia uses transnational repression methods, including cyberbullying.
Impact and limitations
Despite their diversity, these information channels do not reflect a plurality of African or Russian views. Common narratives include the supposed malevolence of the West and Russia’s innocence and benevolence. Operationally, they are tightly controlled by the Kremlin, with Russian intelligence services playing a coordinating role. Leaks received by The Continent and analyzed by a journalistic consortium show that the SVR has invested considerable resources in instrumentalizing all the channels described above. Moscow regularly conducts opinion polls (often through proxies) in target countries to measure the effectiveness of its narratives. Without access to this data, the precise impact of these campaigns is difficult to assess.
For Russian specialists, a key indicator of success is the voting behavior of African states at the United Nations. In 2022, only Eritrea voted against condemning Russia’s war. In 2026, six African states voted against the annual resolution (A/ES-11/L.17), “On Supporting a Lasting Peace in Ukraine”, rejecting any claims by Russia to the annexation of territories (19 abstained compared with 17 in 2022). As Sonia Le Gouriellec noted in 2022, however, African positions on the war largely reflect structural factors in the international system rather than genuine pro-Russian sentiment. UN votes are therefore a limited measure of Moscow’s influence.
In terms of broader image-building, Russia has achieved only moderate success. The latest Afrobarometer survey across 38 countries (2024/2025) found Russia to be the least popular major power, with 36% of respondents expressing favorable views — behind India (39%) and former colonial powers (41%). A 2023 Ipsos poll in six African countries showed nuanced views: little support for Russia’s war of aggression, but a preference for neutrality in the conflict. The backlash against Russian recruitment efforts in several countries also suggests that Moscow does not have a free hand on the continent.
The main limitation remains credibility. Russia-Africa trade and investment remain far smaller than those of most European countries, let alone the United States or China. Outside a few niches (energy, fertilizers, grains and security services), Russian companies struggle to expand their presence. Recent moves into nuclear power have produced many non-binding memoranda of understanding but few concrete financing or implementation details. Despite setbacks in Mali, Russian military missions retain some credibility as an alternative to other security providers. The interest shown by several African governments in joining BRICS also bolsters Moscow’s standing, particularly after it positioned itself as a champion of the group’s enlargement in 2023.
The Kremlin’s current “anti-(neo)colonial” narrative also has limits. As Gustavo de Carvalho and Xiang Chen observed in 2024, Russia’s reliance on Soviet legacy and anti-colonial rhetoric is increasingly out of step with the continent’s more urgent developmental priorities. More broadly, as Maxime Audinet, Maxime Daniélou and Marlene Laruelle wrote in 2026, the Kremlin’s messaging appeals mainly to those seeking to escape Western economic and geopolitical dominance, but less so to those who wish to do so while upholding liberal and democratic values. Afrobarometer data from 2024/2025 shows resilient support for civic freedoms across 28 African countries, with 72% of respondents across 38 countries expressing positive views of journalism that exposes corruption and government mistakes.
In short, propaganda will remain the Kremlin’s main instrument of influence in Africa. The outlook points to continued expansion of media operations, local co-option and coercion, with growing emphasis on shaping perceptions through intermediaries and directly via social media. While credibility gaps persist, Russia will continue trying to convert its military assertiveness and opposition to the West into assets that lend weight to its messaging on the continent.
