Over the weekend, United Russia held its pre-election congress and approved its candidate list for the State Duma. Party chairman, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council, and former president Dmitry Medvedev was once again left off the list.
Unlike the previous electoral cycle, when Medvedev expected to head the list almost automatically by virtue of his position in the party, this time both he and his circle made a visible effort to secure his inclusion. Leaks about possible configurations for the federal portion of the list — whether the top five or top three — repeatedly featured his name. The party leader took an active part in public events and prepared to present a strategic manifesto at the congress.
His hopes were not fulfilled. Since the final decision on the federal part of the list rests with Vladimir Putin, it is clear that the president deliberately blocked Medvedev’s career ambitions. Inclusion on the list was essential for Medvedev if he hoped to claim the speakership of the State Duma and thereby escape his current, rather ill-defined role as deputy chairman of the Security Council. The parliamentary speakership would have given him lobbying channels, a guaranteed public platform with regular media opportunities, and room for informal diplomacy.
Putin, it appears, has no interest in that scenario. He prefers to keep his long-time ally — the same man who in 2012 stepped aside without visible resistance to return the presidency to him — in a secondary position. The reasons can only be guessed at. One possibility is that Putin does not want to trigger a premature succession race at a time when his age and the current political setup make such a contest increasingly inevitable. Another is that the president has never fully forgiven Medvedev for even the cautious desire to remain in the top job in 2011−2012, nor for the image of a “liberal” politician and supporter of a “reset” in relations with the West that Medvedev projected at the time.
In reaching this decision, Putin was clearly assisted by recommendations from Sergei Kirienko, who heads the domestic policy bloc in the Presidential Administration. With the authorities’ ratings under pressure, an unpopular figure like Medvedev on the list would have required the political machine to make considerable effort to achieve an acceptable result. At the same time, keeping the former president out of the campaign allows United Russia to be positioned more cleanly as “Putin’s party.”
By removing Medvedev from the list, the current Duma speaker, Vyacheslav Volodin, has significantly strengthened his own chances of retaining the post. In the end, Medvedev found no allies willing to back his nomination, while the number of influential opponents — including the president himself — proved too large.
The top five on United Russia’s list follows a design broadly similar to the 2021 slate. It is headed by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, followed by Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin in second place. Third is Vladislav Golovin, head of the Yunarmiya headquarters and a participant in the war against Ukraine. Fourth is Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova. The list is closed by war correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny.
The formula remains familiar: two well-known federal heavyweights, the children’s ombudsman (a post held in 2021 by Anna Kuznetsova, who was also on the party list), and two figures largely unknown to the wider public who embody the issues the authorities currently wish to highlight. In 2021 these were doctors who worked during the COVID-19 pandemic; today they are people directly tied to the war.
This composition fits United Russia’s strategy of presenting itself as “Putin’s party,” with the top five framed as his personal team. How effective this positioning will be in lifting the party’s ratings, however, remains an open question. The dominant word currently associated with United Russia’s campaign is still “uncertainty.”
Several weeks ago, United Russia postponed the adoption of its election program until the end of August, citing the rapidly shifting situation in the country. The unveiling of a “strategic manifesto” covering the next decade was supposed to at least partly offset the ruling party’s lack of a concrete platform. Speaking about the future in the broadest possible terms would have allowed the party to avoid specific commitments. The document never appeared. It is now promised for December—possibly because Dmitry Medvedev, who was dropped from the candidate list, was involved in the drafting, or perhaps because United Russia simply did not dare to publish such an ambitious text amid mounting economic and social difficulties.
As a result, the ruling party is running most of its campaign without either a tactical program containing concrete promises or a broader strategy that offers a vision of the future. Its central message remains its identification with “Putin’s party.” Meanwhile, the president’s own approval ratings continue to slide, and his recent public appearances have only accelerated the decline. After the party congress, Vladimir Putin gave an interview to Pavel Zarubin. The appearance could have partially compensated for the absence of a program: the president might have floated new social pledges or dropped hints about possible peace talks. Instead, he read from a teleprompter the names of settlements allegedly captured by Russian forces—some of which are not in fact under Russian control—outlined plans for further advances, and openly admitted that he had rejected Vladimir Zelensky’s proposal for a mutual halt to drone and missile strikes on rear-area targets in both countries.
A society already exhausted by the war and directly affected by strikes on oil refineries finds such statements grating. The president has effectively taken personal responsibility for prolonging the conflict and its attendant problems. He appears to be operating under the mistaken assumption that the war enjoys unconditional public support and that the population is prepared to endure hardships in the name of “victory”—a view publicly articulated by presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov. The longer the war continues, however, the wider the gap between Putin’s assumptions and actual public sentiment becomes.
In the spring, the presidential administration reportedly discussed the idea of a “therapeutic campaign” that would address the fatigue and restrictions felt by much of the population. Putin’s latest statements have effectively buried that approach.
New People: Roots Cut Off
On July 1, the New People party—created with direct backing from the Kremlin’s political bloc—also held its congress. VTsIOM data show the party’s ratings rising, and some polls even place it in second place nationally.
New People offer cautious criticism of excessive restrictions and try to present themselves as a voice of “common sense.” The uptick in support might have encouraged the leadership to field a stronger slate and adopt sharper slogans on immediate issues such as the gasoline shortage. Instead, the party predictably chose the safe, conservative route.
All twelve sitting New People deputies were placed in winnable positions: three—Alexei Nechaev, Vladislav Davankov, and Sardana Avksentyeva—in the federal section of the list, and nine in safe regional groups. The list contains 37 groups in total.
A striking feature is the large number of outsiders placed at the head of these groups. Party leaders have been moving their politicians from region to region, preventing them from putting down roots or building genuine local structures. Ksenia Goryacheva, originally from Tyumen, had already become a recognizable figure in St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast; she could have anchored a strong regional branch there. She has instead been reassigned to a group of Central Russian regions. Roza Chemeris, who has built real resources and name recognition in Primorsky Krai, was placed in the Northwest group. Popular KVN performer Sagandzhi Tarbaev from Kalmykia is running in Bashkiria.
New People are, in effect, blocking the emergence of stable regional branches led by politicians who are already known and accepted locally. This suggests that both the party leadership and the Kremlin overseers have no interest in allowing New People to develop into a genuine political party. Any figure who begins to build independent popularity remains firmly tethered to the central apparatus.
Particular note should be taken of the administrative candidates the party prefers not to advertise. Heading the safe Samara group is Sergei Gorkov, head of Rosgeology and former chairman of VEB. In the group covering Tyumen Oblast and the oil-producing districts, the top slot went to Elena Panova, former deputy governor of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, who now runs the staff of the State Duma’s Natural Resources Committee—chaired by former Yamalo-Nenets governor and United Russia member Dmitry Kobylkin.
The St. Petersburg group is led by Pavel Korytnikov, director of the Sokolniki Repair Plant, a Moscow city-owned enterprise that maintains the capital’s transport fleet. Before his nomination, Korytnikov had no connection to St. Petersburg. Another notable administrative figure is Darya Kislitsina of the Kremlin-linked EISI research center, placed first in Kirov Oblast.
The heavy presence of such candidates underscores the party’s complete dependence on and controllability from the Kremlin. To soften this image, New People handed party cards to several well-known public figures. The most prominent was rapper Guf. He was not, however, included on the State Duma candidate list.
