United Russia has nominated Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov for another term. Among the North Caucasus republics, only Chechnya’s head is chosen through direct elections. Rumors of Kadyrov’s impending departure have long been a fixture of Russian regional politics; the latest round surfaced just recently, after he was not placed at the head of a territorial group on United Russia’s State Duma party list.
Kadyrov is the longest-serving member of Russia’s gubernatorial corps, having led Chechnya since 2007. Unlike most regional leaders, he enjoys direct access to Vladimir Putin. A similar level of personal contact with the president is maintained by Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov, and Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov. Yet while those experienced bureaucrats communicate with the government and the Kremlin in the same professional language, Kadyrov operates differently: when problems arise, he secures a personal meeting with the president through blackmail.
The federal center—civilian officials and a significant portion of the security services (with the clear exception of Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov, who continues to protect Kadyrov)—would clearly prefer a more predictable and manageable figure in charge of Chechnya. Names frequently mentioned include Apti Alaudinov, commander of the Akhmat battalion, and presidential aide Ruslan Edelgeriev.
Kadyrov’s tenure has included several visible crises: he has staged mass rallies in his own support and released information about a supposed meeting with Putin before the Kremlin had confirmed it (the meeting may never have taken place). Nevertheless, the Russian president has consistently backed the Chechen leader.
Kadyrov, whose health has visibly deteriorated in recent years, is clearly focused on securing a transfer of power and has been actively preparing his son Adam for the role. Adam has been receiving increasingly prominent positions in Chechnya’s power vertical. Russian law, however, sets a minimum age of 30 for governors, and Adam Kadyrov is currently only 18. Kadyrov himself once faced the same obstacle and served as prime minister while formal presidents held office until he turned 30. But he only needed to wait a couple of years; for Adam the wait would exceed a decade. Moreover, it is now highly unlikely that anyone would agree to serve as a nominal president only to step aside later. Even close members of the Kadyrov clan—State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov and Chechen government head Magomed Daudov—are unlikely to accept a purely transitional role. If either were installed as head of the republic, they would almost certainly move quickly to consolidate real power in their own hands.
This is why extending Ramzan Kadyrov’s own mandate was essential. As long as he remains in office, his children retain a realistic prospect of succeeding him. Having himself risen as a designated successor, Kadyrov appears to be drawing lessons from Middle Eastern monarchies, with whose leaders he maintains close ties. Russian law, however, blocks formal dynastic succession. It leaves him with only one practical option for keeping power inside the family: staying in office himself for as long as possible (governors face no term limits).
Kadyrov’s fresh nomination shows that he still commands influence with Vladimir Putin and has successfully pushed back against those who wanted him removed. The extension of his powers gives him additional protection from his opponents. At the same time, whether he will ultimately manage to hand power to his son remains an open question. Given his health, it is unlikely he could govern effectively for another twelve years. The Kremlin shows no sign of changing federal legislation to accommodate one regional leader. Most probably, the new nomination serves first and foremost to reassure Kadyrov himself, who extracted the desired result from an aging president.
A List with Insurance
The A Just Russia party, created in 2007 with Kremlin support as a left-wing project based on the Rodina and Party of Life movements, has approved its candidate list for the State Duma. They held their pre-election congress later than other parties, on July 4.
The list itself is largely predictable. The main point of interest is that, despite the party’s strong public support for the war in Ukraine, only one combat veteran appears in the federal section on a conditionally winnable spot: Oleg Chernyshev, commander of a regiment that Just Russia “patronizes.” The rest of the federal “top four” consists of party leader Sergei Mironov, State Duma Deputy Speaker Alexander Babakov (one of the party’s key financial backers), and television presenter and sitting deputy Marina Kim.
The Presidential Administration has allocated Just Russia four “agreed” single-mandate districts in which deliberately weak United Russia candidates—ones running low-key campaigns—have been nominated against them. These districts have gone to Alexander Babakov, Competition Protection Committee Chairman Valery Gartung (another major party sponsor), Financial Market Committee Chairman Anatoly Aksakov, and Construction Committee Deputy Chairman Alexander Aksenenko (one of the Duma’s most effective lobbyists, who has long chaired the relevant committee and works closely with federal authorities).
Given that Just Russia’s polling hovers around the 5% threshold and the risk of missing the barrier remains real, reserving guaranteed districts for high-profile figures such as Gartung, Aksakov, and Babakov is a logical precaution. It suggests that both party leaders and the Kremlin are preparing for the possibility that Just Russia may fail to enter the Duma on the party list. In that scenario, key sponsors and useful lobbyists for the government and Presidential Administration would still secure seats through single-mandate districts. This is why Chernyshev’s position is described as only conditionally winnable.
The picture in the 37 regional groups is even less certain for their leaders—among them Sergei Mironov’s niece Nadezhda Tikhonova and deputies Dmitry Gusev and Anatoly Greshnevnikov—since it is difficult to identify districts where the party can count on a strong result. One notable name among the regional group heads is Sergei Arbuzov, former First Deputy Prime Minister and former head of Ukraine’s National Bank. Arbuzov is linked to Viktor Medvedchuk, frequently described as a godfather of Putin’s daughter. It is possible that Medvedchuk served as one of the party’s informal backers and placed his representative through it. If Just Russia performs well, Arbuzov would be positioned to advance Medvedchuk’s interests inside the Russian parliament.
Should the authorities’ ratings continue to slide and public fatigue with the war increase, the pro-war Just Russia could lose their already slim chances of retaining parliamentary-party status. In that case, questions about Sergei Mironov’s own future would inevitably arise. The system, however, will most likely find a solution for him.
As early as 2014, Vladimir Putin introduced legislation creating a “presidential quota” allowing the head of state to appoint 10% of Federation Council members (17 seats). The quota was originally expected to serve as a landing spot for prominent retirees and aging leaders of parliamentary parties, including Gennady Zyuganov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Sergei Mironov. Over the past twelve years Putin has never used it for this purpose. For an old ally, however, an exception remains possible. If necessary, Mironov could also be placed in the Federation Council from one of the regions with relatively little difficulty.
