Vladimir Putin continues a series of working visits to Siberia and the Far East. Last week he travelled to Buryatia, Novosibirsk Region and Sakhalin Region (including the Kuril Islands). In late July he was in Omsk and Irkutsk regions; in early August, in Krasnoyarsk Krai.
Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin has sharply reduced his regional travel, preferring the heavily protected residences at Valdai and in the Moscow region. The Siberian-Far Eastern tour has broken that long pause. The timing is no coincidence: the State Duma campaign is under way, and United Russia consistently presents itself as the president’s party — or “team.” These visits are intended to shore up support for his political clients. United Russia’s rating as the party of power remains directly dependent on Putin’s personal popularity.
The president is seeking to show that he has not forgotten the regions and is prepared to deal with their problems. He meets governors who head United Russia’s territorial groups, listens to their reports and requests. With the party program still unadopted, the tour itself has become one of the central elements of United Russia’s campaign. For the moment the party of power can offer the electorate little beyond the president solving individual, narrowly defined problems.
The choice of regions is unlikely to be accidental. Ukrainian drones and missiles do not reach Siberian cities (the sole exception being the strike on Omsk) and certainly do not reach the Far East. Putin can therefore travel there without serious concern for his own security. It is also well known that he traditionally prefers to spend the summer in Siberia, particularly in Altai. Practical convenience reinforces the security logic: the destinations lie relatively close to his usual holiday locations.
The specific list of regions is equally coherent. Krasnoyarsk Krai and Novosibirsk Region are comparatively populous and prosperous. Buryatia has significant defense importance (it hosts major defense-industry plants). Omsk Region, with its million-plus capital, carries electoral weight. On Sakhalin, Putin made a pointed visit to the Kuril Islands — a gesture designed to revive the theme of confrontation with Japan and thereby strengthen the ultra-patriotic strand of United Russia’s campaign. He also appeared in military uniform on board a Pacific Fleet vessel, another clear signal to the militarist and pro-war segment of the electorate.
The tour is likely to continue. Notable regions still available include Kemerovo Region and Altai, Primorye and Khabarovsk Krai. A visit to Primorye is certain: the Eastern Economic Forum is scheduled for Vladivostok in early September.
Part of the loyalist electorate will no doubt be reassured by this activity. It will see the president travelling to the regions, making promises, appearing in public and working “on the ground” rather than remaining exclusively in his office. Yet concentrating the trips in one part of the country also carries clear drawbacks. Residents of regions outside Siberia and the Far East will inevitably feel overlooked. The president is effectively signaling that some territories are priorities while others remain peripheral — and the latter form the clear majority.
Little time remains before voting day, and early September is already reserved for the Eastern Economic Forum. At best, Putin may manage a handful of visits to western regions, if he decides to make them at all. Among the more reflective part of even the loyal electorate, the thought may arise that the head of state is simply avoiding Ukrainian attacks. Such perceptions are unlikely to strengthen his rating — or that of United Russia.
Putin continues to speak of confrontation with the West and to insist on taking the “special military operation” to some form of victory. This stance diverges sharply from the mood of a significant part of society that is tired of the war and ready for negotiations. Meanwhile the president himself is neither on the front lines nor even in the relatively nearby capital, but in the secure east of the country.
The substance of the visits raises further questions. For years, Putin’s pre-election trips have been organized primarily for his own entertainment. Hence the ostensibly spontaneous meetings with carefully pre-selected groups of residents, photographs, conversations with children. Officials invariably thank the president for every minor gesture — and even for projects that remain unrealized and whose origins date back to Soviet times. Putin almost never issues concrete promises; he merely listens to reports that diverge from reality. Citizens notice the discrepancy.
The problems he addresses (for example, promising a new ambulance to a hospital in the Kurils) are more appropriate for a United Russia candidate running in a single-mandate district for a regional legislature than for a head of state seeking votes for the federal party list. The tour is already generating irony and open irritation among residents of the regions visited. People complain about road closures for the presidential motorcade and joke about how petrol prices drop sharply on the day of the visit, only to rise again the moment Putin leaves.
The tour also has its bureaucratic beneficiaries: the governors of the regions visited and the presidential envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District, Yury Trutnev. Rumors about Trutnev’s future are already circulating in elite circles. As the “master” of the territory who accompanies the president, he is being mentioned both as a possible head of the presidential administration and as a potential prime minister.
A Parade of Disqualifications
Acting on a suit filed by Rodina, the Supreme Court has removed Yabloko — the party that campaigns “for peace and freedom” — from the State Duma race. Numerous versions circulate about the registration process and the reasons for the party’s removal, ranging from an elaborate Kremlin plan to rivalry between different “towers” inside the presidential administration. After the disqualification, the most plausible explanation is that the administration had no special designs on Yabloko. Refusing registration to a party exempt from signature collection would have produced no less of a scandal than removing it by court decision. Temporary admission allowed the authorities to observe the behavior of the party itself, the non-systemic opposition and the anti-war segment of society. Once Yabloko’s rating began to rise, the party was predictably removed.
This does not mean that the political bloc of the presidential administration under Sergei Kiriyenko fully controls the electoral process, or that the authorities fear nothing and can engineer any result. The Kremlin was hardly afraid of a Yabloko victory — under the current electoral architecture such an outcome is simply impossible. Yet the risk of disrupting the pre-programmed campaign scenario clearly existed, and that risk should not be underestimated. The removal of Yabloko is a marker of the Kremlin’s uncertainty and of the broader atmosphere of turbulence in which a party with long-standing low ratings becomes a focal point for protest activity.
The same uncertainty is visible in the treatment of popular single-mandate candidates in the regions. A Samara court has removed the Communist Mikhail Matveyev, who defeated a United Russia candidate in competitive conditions at the previous election. Complaints have also been filed against Oleg Mikhailov, head of the CPRF branch in Komi and another strong single-mandate contender. The presidential administration had earlier signaled to the Communists that such figures should not be nominated; in several cases (Altai Krai and Yakutia among them) the party leadership complied. Declining to run Matveyev and Mikhailov would have damaged the CPRF’s standing in their regions. The authorities nevertheless achieved their objective by eliminating them through the courts.
The clearing of competitive single-mandate candidates reflects the same insecurity: the Kremlin is hedging its bets and effectively reserving almost all districts for United Russia in order to guarantee the party of power a super-constitutional majority even if the party-list result continues to weaken.
