For most observers, the Kremlin’s negotiations with representatives of Donald Trump’s team remain a black box. It is unclear on what terms Vladimir Putin would be prepared to conclude a peace agreement with Ukraine—or whether he would be prepared to do so at all in the coming years. Nor have the American side’s proposals been publicly spelled out.
Steve Witkoff has been making regular visits to Moscow for more than a year, and a year has passed since the Putin-Trump summit in Anchorage. Yet the talks have so far produced no visible result. Trump’s team tends to exaggerate its achievements, while the Kremlin’s silence only deepens the uncertainty and creates fertile ground for rumors.
“They’ll kill me”
Shortly after CIA Director John Ratcliffe arrived in Russia, and shortly before Trump aide Steve Witkoff and the US president’s son-in-law Jared Kushner visited Moscow and Kyiv, The Economist published a piece on the Russian president’s state of mind. According to the magazine’s sources in ruling circles, Putin is set on escalating the war against Ukraine. This chimes with his own statements and those of his representatives about achieving “the goals of the special military operation on the battlefield,” as well as with the intensification of strikes on Ukraine.
Most attention was drawn to a claim by a source close to Putin: the president would like to end the war but fears the anger of the population and the elites. According to the magazine’s interlocutor, Putin said that they would simply kill him. This passage prompted a range of interpretations—from suggestions of elite discontent and readiness to remove Putin to claims that continuing the war reflects the mood of society. Remarkably, the reliability of the information itself was barely questioned. The article suggests that Putin fears the elite groups above all. A year earlier, Reuters had reported similar information, saying that the president feared the wrath of “the army and the people.”
It would be rash to speak of an anti-war front within the elites or of large-scale protest in Russian society. But claims of a mass demand for the war’s continuation are not borne out either. According to polls, most citizens favor the start of peace talks. Some members of the elite—for example, Sberbank CEO German Gref—have spoken of war fatigue. Doubts about the war’s expediency have also been voiced by some military bloggers.
When circumstances demand it, Kremlin and the government take unpopular measures—such as the 2018 pension reform and the 2025 tax increases. Putin launched the war against Ukraine without public discussion or approval. More recently, he has also brushed aside discontent over the gasoline crisis, describing what is happening as “certain inconveniences” that people can put up with. Last year, Putin’s press secretary commented on the tax increases as follows: “Those who support President Putin—are they ready for some additional burden in the current circumstances? I have no doubt that they are.”
A picture for Trump
After publications like these, questions inevitably arise as to whether Western and Russia-focused independent media outlets that operate in exile really do have sources in ruling circles, and how well informed those sources are. Such doubts are reinforced by the intensification of repression and the growing influence of the security services, which are probably monitoring the conversations of elite representatives.
But it is unlikely that journalists at The Economist or Reuters would attribute statements about the president’s mood and personal plans to someone who does not know him and never meets him. A source can communicate with a journalist via a secure messaging app or meet them in another country, where Russian security services would find it harder to eavesdrop. Moreover, an official, businessman, or political technologist may receive authorization from the leadership to convey a particular line to Western media and experts.
Sources within the government may have different motives, which is why their words need to be checked against reality. The claim that Putin fears a population and elite determined to continue the war can be tested. There is no reason to believe that most Russians or members of the elite feel any such determination. Among the war’s beneficiaries there are influential people loyal to Putin, but if the war ended, new sources of income could be found for them in the Russian economy.
Judging by the chronology of the Economist and Reuters publications, sources close to the Russian president began linking his fears to the negotiations with Trump and his team. Talks that have been going on for almost two years without visible results suggest that Putin has no desire to stop the war. Such a position may seem irrational and incomprehensible to Trump, who thinks in terms of “good deals.” So that Putin does not appear to the American president to be a stubborn and unreliable partner, his entourage may explain his intransigence by citing external constraints. Fear of the elites and the population could serve precisely this function: Putin is supposedly ready for contacts but cannot make concessions.
One possible purveyor of this narrative is Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and the Kremlin’s chief negotiator with Trump’s team. An experienced business consultant with a flair for working with the media, he has floated various deal options with Russia to Trump’s circle and could have presented external constraints as an explanation for Putin’s position. Rumors of Putin’s fear may create the impression on the American side that the Russian president is interested in negotiations, even if he seeks to keep the “Ukraine question” and discussion of the war off the agenda. This version helps avoid disappointing Trump and preserves Dmitriev’s status as the main point of contact between the Kremlin and the White House.
Such a rumor may also help prolong the war and soften Trump’s attitude—and that of other world leaders—towards Putin, despite calls to halt the fighting. Leaks of this kind can mislead people about the Russian president’s motives. Despite the continuation of the war and his rejection of US proposals, Trump remains pleased with the dialogue and praises Putin for his desire to “make a deal.” The claim that the Russian economy has virtually inexhaustible resources may be manipulative too.
Information about a possible coup led by Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu does not look convincing either. His team has been weakened, and his closest associates are under arrest. Moreover, since leaving the post of defense minister, Shoigu has lost access to substantial financial resources. The army generals whom Shoigu was supposedly meant to lead have traditionally disliked the “civilian” minister. The aims of those spreading such information are not entirely clear. Perhaps they are linked to Shoigu’s opponents, who seek to weaken his position and strip him of what influence he has left.
Through Western media—onto Putin’s desk
Insider information can reflect moods within the Russian elites and provide early warning of unpopular Kremlin decisions. Sources still have opportunities to speak with journalists, and some make use of them. Those from economic ministries and the business community are especially candid, since they understand the cost of the war. German Gref has spoken of war fatigue. VTB head Andrei Kostin has said that Russia has “become carried away with the word sovereignty.” In May, Andrei Klepach, then chief economist at VEB, warned at an economic forum of the danger of a socio-economic crisis. A few months after his remarks were reported by independent media, he was dismissed. Businesspeople have long spoken of serious problems, even if they do not directly criticize the continuation of the war. The question of “ending the special military operation” was also raised during the State Duma campaign by Communists popular in their regions.
Putin adheres to optimistic assessments shared by some members of his entourage—above all, deputy head of the presidential administration Maxim Oreshkin and, to some extent, Sergei Kiriyenko, the Kremlin’s overseer of domestic politics. Officials who do not want to lose their posts cannot contradict the president and therefore publicly endorse the optimistic forecast. After Klepach’s dismissal, there are likely to be even fewer people willing to make gloomy predictions on domestic platforms. But the technocrats still have an interest in ensuring that Putin aligns his plans with reality rather than relying solely on official reports. It is the government that has to balance the military budget while preserving funding for the social sphere, and this is becoming harder with every passing month.
Unable to speak openly in Russian media, representatives of the civilian bureaucracy and business turn to Western and émigré outlets. Publications in the Western press probably end up in the monitoring reports prepared for the president, so information can reach him by this route. Some members of the Russian elite still want to share their own view of what is happening—and in that case, too, their only route is via Western and émigré media, which have carried both anonymous and even named articles by members of the elite. Insider information may also be shared by staff of the Kremlin’s political bloc, deputies, parliamentary staff, and security officials. Perhaps they hope their work will be noticed and appreciated, since internal channels for recognition are closed to them.
A useful source
Sources have their own interests, and the information they provide may be manipulative. Still, it should not be dismissed. One distinct category of insider information concerns personnel decisions and the timing of events, which appears in both Western and Russian media. Rumours of high-level reshuffles often fail to materialise: Putin dislikes it when decisions requiring his signature become known in advance. For example, this summer, elite circles and Telegram channels controlled by influential groups discussed the possible replacement of Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin with Defence Minister Andrei Belousov or Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin after the State Duma elections, as well as Kirill Dmitriev’s dismissal from the RDIF. Yet Mishustin remains in office, and Dmitriev’s mandate was recently extended by another five years.
Leaks can be part of bureaucratic infighting: publishing a planned decision can sometimes help derail it. The same applies to predictions about specific events and their timing, such as a possible mobilization. Officials may prepare for it without knowing whether Putin will actually take such a decision. In wartime and under sanctions, plans depend on many factors and remain merely plans until they are implemented.
Does this mean that insider information from Russia has no value whatsoever because it may be manipulation, an expression of discontent among civilian elites, or a description of scenarios that never come to pass? No. Even rumors about Putin’s fears, intended to keep Trump engaged in the negotiations, are revealing in themselves: they suggest that the Russian president and his entourage want to maintain contacts with the US president. At the same time, the content of such rumors should be assessed in light of the actual situation in society and among the elites.
Information about elite discontent is also important, especially when corroborated by public statements. Leaks about personnel decisions may indicate conflict within the elites, even if the decision is ultimately not taken. The scenarios under discussion offer a window into the mood in the Kremlin, the government and, possibly, Putin’s inner circle. Topics once considered marginal may, over time, become part of the public discussion.
Information from insiders should be treated with skepticism, with the sources’ interests taken into account and with the understanding that final decisions rest with Putin. Information can be harmful: for example, rumors that the president wants to end the war but fears the elites may encourage American and European authorities to keep talking to him in the hope of reaching an agreement. Insider information needs to be cross-checked against reality, and its possible political effects need to be considered. Rumors that Putin is ready to end the war but fears the elites may indicate the Kremlin’s reluctance to break off relations with the United States entirely. Leaks about reshuffles—whether or not they are confirmed—may point to struggles over positions and resources. Analyzing such information helps assess conflicts within the Russian elites and the personnel decisions being discussed behind closed doors. As Russian power becomes ever more opaque, even information circulated as part of information warfare should not be ignored when analyzing its decisions and anticipating its next moves.
