Russia is placing a serious bet on developing ties with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The United Arab Emirates remains the clear flagship of this cooperation, but positive trade trends are also visible with the other countries of the region. Western sanctions and political pressure have slowed the process to some extent, yet they have genuinely blocked cooperation only in a limited number of the most sensitive areas.
Saudi Arabia at SPIEF
The 29th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum was not particularly well-attended by international standards. Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia’s appearance as the official guest country stood out as a significant development — especially since the “pivot to the East” has become one of the central themes of Russian foreign policy since 2022.
Unsurprisingly, Riyadh’s participation did not produce any major breakthrough in bilateral relations. As is typical at such events, the main results were a series of protocol memoranda of understanding — 30 documents in total — and standard declarations of friendship and partnership. Saudi Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources Bandar al-Khuraif, for example, stated that his country was counting on cooperation with Russia “for the next hundred years.”
One of the more substantive agreements involved cooperation between the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), the Natsproektstroy group, and the Saudi company Lamar Arabia Holding W.L.L. in infrastructure and energy projects. Even here, however, details on volumes, timelines, and implementation mechanisms remain scarce.
Looking beyond this year’s forum to previous editions reveals a clear pattern: the Middle East has grown markedly more important for Moscow. Over the past six years, five Arab countries have served as the forum’s guest of honor: Qatar (2021), Egypt (2022), the UAE (2023), Oman (2024), and Saudi Arabia (2026).
In short, it appears that in the much-discussed “pivot to the East,” Moscow has placed one of its biggest economic bets on the Persian Gulf states. The situation on the ground is, of course, more complicated, but Russia continues to deepen its engagement with the region, even if the pace is not always as rapid as Moscow would like.
Uneven Investment Flows
One of the main hopes in recent years has been investment from the Gulf monarchies into the Russian economy. With large budget surpluses, these oil-rich states seemed like a natural source of capital, particularly given their interest in diversifying their portfolios.
In 2015, the RDIF and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) agreed on a partnership under which Riyadh was to invest $ 10 billion in the Russian economy over four to five years. At the time, the deal generated considerable optimism. The funds were expected to go into infrastructure, agriculture, healthcare, logistics, retail, and real estate.
In the end, Saudi Arabia invested only about a quarter of the planned amount within the original timeframe. Leaks in the Western press spoke of Russian disappointment with the results. Nevertheless, the full $ 10 billion was eventually deployed, albeit over a much longer period. In 2023, the RDIF reported that since 2015 Saudi partners had invested roughly 1 trillion rubles across 40 joint projects — a figure broadly in line with the original targets.
Separately, in 2022 the Saudi conglomerate Kingdom Holding Co. invested $ 500 million in shares of Russia’s three largest oil and gas companies: Gazprom ($ 364 million), Lukoil ($ 110 million), and Rosneft ($ 52 million). The decision was taken just before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in anticipation of high dividend yields. That bet did not pay off due to Western sanctions and the deterioration of Russian companies’ financial performance amid the war. As a result, Saudi investors became noticeably more cautious about new commitments in Russia.
In subsequent years, Russian officials repeatedly expressed hopes for fresh inflows from Riyadh. In 2023 the RDIF spoke of another trillion rubles arriving soon; those forecasts never materialized. In 2025 the Russian government reported that Saudi investment had grown by just 11 percent. Money continues to arrive, but the volumes remain well below Moscow’s initial expectations.
Instead, the Saudi side has recently been promoting a different model: rather than direct investment into Russia, it favors the creation of joint ventures with production located on Saudi territory. It is difficult to assess how effective this approach has been, as both sides have become reluctant to disclose details for fear of attracting Western attention and secondary sanctions. Russian businesspeople working in Saudi Arabia privately note that only a handful of Russian companies are currently active there, mainly in agricultural exports and infrastructure construction.
By comparison, Qatar — despite having smaller resources — has invested more in the Russian economy than Saudi Arabia. Total Qatari investment is estimated at $ 13 billion, directed primarily into Rosneft (18.9 percent stake), the construction of a high-speed highway in St. Petersburg, and stakes in Pulkovo and Vnukovo airports. Almost all of these investments were made before the full-scale war in Ukraine. Since 2022 Qatar has not rushed to exit these assets, but it has also made almost no new large-scale investments. Some revival occurred in 2025, when Russia and Qatar agreed to establish a $ 2 billion joint investment platform focused on technology, mining, and healthcare. As a result, Qatar entered the top five foreign investors in the Russian economy in 2025.
A Quiet Haven for Russian Business
The real flagship of investment cooperation for Russia has been the United Arab Emirates. This case differs from Saudi Arabia and Qatar in two important respects. First, investment flows are mutual, with Russian investment in the UAE significantly exceeding Emirati investment in Russia — by a factor of roughly 1.5. Total Russian investment in the Emirates is estimated at $ 25 billion, compared with around $ 17 billion in direct Emirati investment in Russia. Second, the full-scale war and Western sanctions did not slow the process; they actually accelerated it. By the end of 2025, more than 13,500 Russian companies were registered in the UAE.
Despite Western pressure, the Emirates have remained relatively open to Russian business. Russians have invested across a wide range of sectors, including IT, food retail, real estate, and finance. Major Russian companies — Yandex, 1C, Kaspersky Lab, VkusVill, Novikov Group, Dodo Pizza, and several developers including Knight Frank, Integral, and Pioneer — have opened offices in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Since 2022, Russians have consistently ranked among the top three buyers of real estate in the Emirates.
Initially, the Emirates reacted to news of sanctions against Russia with caution. In 2022, the sovereign wealth fund Mubadala suspended new investments in Russia. At the time, it held stakes in more than 50 Russian projects, including Gazpromneft-Vostok, AliExpress Russia, Sibur, UC Rusal, and Eurosibenergo. Mubadala did not sell its Russian assets, however, and Emirati investment continued in subsequent years, albeit in a much less transparent manner. New investments have been reported in the oil sector and in projects linked to the Northern Sea Route. According to Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development, the bulk of Emirati investment has gone into manufacturing, transport, logistics, trade, and services.
Grain and Diesel
Trade between Russia and the Persian Gulf countries has shown steady growth across almost all categories since 2022. The UAE remains the undisputed leader. Bilateral trade rose from $ 5.3 billion in 2021 to $ 12 billion in 2025. Trade with Saudi Arabia increased from $ 2.2 billion to $ 4 billion, and with Oman from $ 171 million to $ 345 million. The only exception was Qatar, where trade fell from $ 175 million in 2021 to $ 78 million in 2024 (2025 figures have not yet been published). Trade with all these countries remains heavily skewed in Russia’s favor, with Russian exports accounting for around 90 percent of turnover on average.
The structure of Russian exports to these countries is broadly similar. Agricultural products play the leading role. Deliveries of agricultural goods to Saudi Arabia reached approximately $ 1 billion, accounting for about a quarter of total trade turnover. A similar picture is seen in Oman (25−30 percent). In 2024, Russian agricultural products made up around 80 percent of trade with Qatar. In trade with the UAE the share of agricultural goods is smaller ($ 400 million in 2025), reflecting both the larger overall volume and greater diversification of exports.
In most cases, grain dominates Russian exports. Notably, the Gulf states buy Russian agricultural products not only for domestic consumption but also for re-export to Africa and other regional markets, including Kuwait and Bahrain.
Oil products have also become an important component of Russian exports in recent years. After the European Union imposed an embargo on Russian oil products in February 2023, Asia and the Middle East became the main markets for Russian fuel oil and gasoil. Saudi Arabia and the UAE — despite having substantial refining capacity of their own — have been among the buyers. Since 2022 a pattern has emerged in which Russian oil products are purchased at relatively low prices for domestic use (primarily power generation), while the Gulf states export their own refined products. Specific figures are rarely disclosed for fear of secondary Western sanctions. In 2025, Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin stated that deliveries of fuel oil and vacuum gasoil to Saudi Arabia had increased more than sixfold over four years.
A notable development has been the export of precious metals to the UAE. In 2022 Russia became the largest supplier of gold to the Emirates (imports of precious metals from Russia reached 96.4 tons). This was a direct consequence of Western restrictions that closed the traditional London market. After stricter enforcement of sanctions, Russia stopped publishing data on gold exports. Experts believe that significant volumes of Russian gold continue to flow to the UAE, although the peak was most likely in 2022. Trade in services should not be overlooked either. Trade in services between Russia and the UAE is estimated at $ 14 billion — higher than goods trade between the two countries. The Emirates have become a key partner for Russia in cross-border payments, a major global transport and logistics hub, and one of the main locations for the Russian IT sector. Tourism has also grown substantially: in 2025 around 2 million Russians visited the UAE, while approximately 70,000 Emirati citizens visited Russia.
Channels of Integration
Tourism has become one of the most effective drivers of economic ties. It generates direct revenue across multiple sectors — hospitality, retail, transport, and services — while creating a significant multiplier effect for related industries.
Relations between Russia and the Middle East illustrate another important feature of tourism: it frequently serves as a foundation for business contacts. Some visitors do not limit themselves to leisure but actively seek partners and investment opportunities. Tellingly, after 2022 the main trading partners of Russia in the region have been precisely those countries that receive the largest numbers of Russian tourists: Turkey, the UAE, and Egypt.
Russian authorities appear to understand this dynamic and are using visa-free regimes as a tool for further rapprochement. Moscow has turned the Persian Gulf into an almost entirely visa-free zone. Visa-free travel with the UAE has been in place since 2019, with Qatar since 2020, with Oman since 2025, and with Saudi Arabia since 11 May 2026. Among the Arab monarchies of the region, only Kuwait and Bahrain still require visas, and Russia hopes to conclude visa-free agreements with both.
In addition, Russia is seeking to deepen cooperation through economic integration agreements. The most tangible results have again been achieved with the UAE. In 2025 the two countries signed an agreement on the mutual liberalization of access to services markets. It significantly expanded opportunities for Russian business by opening access to 64 sectors of the Emirati economy, including research and development, repair of sea and aircraft, railway transport, integrated engineering services, and passenger sea transport. In return, Emirati companies gained the right to 100 percent ownership in Russian companies providing healthcare and education services, as well as the right to open branches in retail, hotels, and restaurants. An important provision also committed both sides not to impose restrictions on financial transfers — particularly relevant given the banking difficulties faced by Russian businesses in the UAE due to Western pressure.
In 2026, an agreement on a free-trade zone between the UAE and the Eurasian Economic Union was ratified. It provides for zero duties on 85 percent of traded goods, including agricultural products, oil products, timber products, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals. Similar free-trade agreements with the EAEU already exist with Vietnam, Serbia, Singapore, and Iran. The goal is to create a broader space of economic integration around Russia.
Political Constraints
Developments in the conflict between Israel, the United States, and Iran could significantly affect Russia’s policy in the region. The main risks concern the security of Russian investments and logistics routes passing through the UAE and other Gulf states. Regional instability could damage both the investment climate and the overall stability of the Gulf monarchies. However, if the United States and Iran manage to achieve at least a partial normalization and keep the Strait of Hormuz open, the situation could stabilize.
Additional complications arise from Russia’s relations with Iran. Of particular concern is information suggesting that Moscow may have begun supplying components for drones that could potentially be used against Gulf states. So far, this appears to be largely symbolic support that does not fundamentally alter the regional balance of power.
From an economic standpoint, cooperation with the Arab Gulf monarchies is far more important for Russia than its relationship with Iran. Trade turnover with Tehran fluctuates around $ 4−5 billion. Russia’s ability to supply drones for the war in Ukraine has largely been exhausted, and prospects for major Russian projects — the North-South transport corridor and a gas hub — look increasingly uncertain following the outbreak of war in the Middle East and amid Iran’s economic difficulties.
The Gulf states, for their part, not only maintain substantial trade volumes but also show positive momentum. They have taken a restrained approach to anti-Russian sanctions, are increasingly exploring investment opportunities in Russia (and in the case of the UAE are already executing them), and play a noticeable role in circumventing restrictions. Since 2022, significant volumes of electronics, cars, and other goods have been routed through the UAE. While each channel faces difficulties — Western countries are trying to restrict electronics supplies, and car exports have been temporarily affected by regional military developments — the Arab monarchies remain one of the few viable channels for parallel imports, something Iran cannot currently provide under present conditions.
For obvious reasons, Moscow seeks to maintain workable relations with both Iran and the Gulf monarchies. At the same time, ties with the Gulf states clearly constrain the scale of Russia’s military-technical cooperation with Tehran. Despite the Gulf states’ pro-Western orientation, engagement with them delivers far more tangible benefits to Russia than its relationship with the Islamic Republic. It is telling that Russia still has no visa-free regime with Iran, even though Tehran has repeatedly called for one.
Overall, Russia’s relations with the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf represent a fairly successful example of pragmatic economic cooperation under sanctions pressure. Hopes for large-scale investment from Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been only partially realized, but even there gradual progress is visible. Cooperation with the UAE has developed most successfully, both in investment and trade. The two sides are actively signing agreements that lay the groundwork for further deepening of ties. A growing tourist flow provides an additional boost. In 2025 Saudi Arabia entered the top three countries by number of tourists visiting Russia for the first time.
The main constraining factors remain Western sanctions and the financial uncertainty inside Russia linked to the war. In some areas, Western restrictions have created nearly insurmountable barriers — most notably, the Gulf monarchies have refrained from new contracts for Russian arms supplies since 2022, although such deals had previously been concluded with both the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In finance and trade, sanctions slow the development of relations and force partners to act more cautiously, but they do not block cooperation entirely. At the same time, certain areas remain difficult to replace — above all, imports of agricultural products.
In the economic sphere, Russia can therefore expect further rapprochement with the Persian Gulf states. Relations with the UAE have already proven their effectiveness. Cooperation with Saudi Arabia is developing more slowly but still shows positive momentum. Qatar remains the most cautious, yet it has not withdrawn its existing investments from Russia. Trade with Oman is also growing, although in absolute terms it still lags behind the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
In the political sphere, Moscow and the Arab monarchies continue to follow a pragmatic approach and are prepared to cooperate where it benefits both sides. Despite its isolation from the West, Moscow is still viewed in the region as a legitimate player. Even the deterioration of relations between the Arab monarchies and Iran has not reversed this vector of pragmatic rapprochement.
