Vladimir Putin has consistently pursued an ultra-conservative approach to personnel policy. Senior officials—notably Presidential Administration chief Anton Vaino—are setting records for longevity in office, while figures who have long seemed ready to move to quieter roles, such as Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, remain in their posts. Influential players with ambitions elsewhere—former president and Security Council deputy chairman Dmitry Medvedev, and Sergei Kiriyenko, who oversees the Presidential Administration’s domestic politics bloc—have yet to get the jobs they want.
In theory, natural “windows of opportunity” after federal elections—presidential and parliamentary—could break the personnel logjam. These are the moments when a new government and parliament are formed, and elite groups and individual figures begin competing for formally open positions. They signal their ambitions—as Medvedev once did—or wage media campaigns. Putin may also periodically make promises of future appointments to keep the elites loyal and on their toes.
Personnel changes were also expected after the parliamentary elections. State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin had completed his second term—a tenure traditionally seen as the limit for speakers of the lower house. Vitaly Savelyev, now deputy prime minister for transport, was on the United Russia party list, and his prospects in the Duma were clear from the outset: he was expected to become a deputy speaker, and he did. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin’s prominent place on the United Russia list hinted that he might move to another post—perhaps the premiership—which would, in turn, have opened up the mayoralty. But none of these post-election windows opened. Volodin remained speaker, breaking the record for time in the post. Savelyev’s former position remains vacant, despite rumors that Transport Minister Andrei Nikitin might be promoted to deputy prime minister. Sobyanin stayed in office, and Mikhail Mishustin kept the premiership, although his possible resignation was widely discussed in the politically engaged Russian Telegram sphere.
Putin once again demonstrated his personnel conservatism by approving Volodin’s reappointment as speaker. A familiar figure, Volodin is an experienced apparatchik with a feel for public politics and a talent for flattery—qualities that suit the system’s expectations of the Duma speaker. Putin’s preference for comfort and predictability also plays a role: he likes to see a familiar face in a particular chair, knowing in advance how that person will behave and what they will say. As for the vacant deputy premiership for transport, Putin is probably reluctant to disrupt the existing balance among elite groups or redistribute powers between them.
The Same Old Parliament
The ninth State Duma, elected in late September, has begun its work. The Kremlin and United Russia placed considerable emphasis on getting members of the “new, real elite”—several dozen participants in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine—elected to parliament. This may have created the impression that the arrival of military personnel in the lower house could affect how it operates, including the allocation of key posts and votes on legislation. The new Duma, however, has not become a “military parliament.”
It was clear as soon as the party lists were registered that relatively few people with direct combat experience had secured electable positions. Who qualifies as a genuine “veteran” or representative of the “new elite” remains contested, which accounts for the varying estimates. The authorities and political parties count among “participants in the special military operation” people who had long been part of elite circles: federal and regional lawmakers, officials, and major business figures. It is misleading to call them a “new elite” that will behave differently within the hierarchy. They understand how the system works and know how to operate within it. Some may have received military awards and may even have been near the front lines. But they should not be conflated with military personnel whose presence could in some way change how the power vertical functions.
Even using the most generous estimates, “veterans” make up only slightly more than 10 percent of the Duma. The Presidential Administration’s domestic politics bloc has made no secret of the fact that bringing a significant number of veterans into the lower house was never part of the Kremlin’s plan. Even this relatively small group has been diluted: parliamentary managers and leaders have taken care not to give “veterans” positions of authority.
The most prominent participant in the war against Ukraine in the Duma, Vladislav Golovin, was appointed to head the low-profile, weakly influential Committee on Youth Policy. None of the people who were directly in the trenches has become a deputy speaker or committee chair. Admiral Vladimir Kasatonov, who led the fleet’s headquarters and now heads the Defense Committee, almost certainly took part in meetings on strikes against Ukrainian cities and may even have been involved in decisions to carry them out. But by that logic, virtually any general or admiral could be called part of the “new elite” and a “veteran.” Kasatonov was appointed primarily as a system insider in uniform, acceptable to the current leadership of the Defense Ministry and representing its interests. Six military veterans from the trenches were assigned to the Committee on Youth Policy and another five to the Defense Committee. They still lack a decisive bloc in either body. The domestic politics team and Duma leadership can easily report to Putin that the “new elite” is represented in parliament while eliminating any risk that a “veterans’ faction” might, even in theory, escape control or wield influence.
The Duma’s leadership is strikingly conservative, in keeping with Putin’s broader ultra-conservative approach to personnel. Not only has Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin kept his post, but so have most deputy speakers and heads of key committees. Votes on legislation have shown that the chamber remains as unified as before, ready to approve without much debate any decision handed down by the Kremlin, the government, or the security services.
Governors Choose Their Representatives
There have been more changes among senators and regional parliamentary speakers, but most are tied to reshuffles among governors. New regional leaders want loyal speakers in their legislatures and loyal representatives in the Federation Council, which is supposed to function as a chamber of the regions. Increasingly, speakers are drawn from the bureaucracy, usually from a governor’s administration or its staff. In Kamchatka, for example, the regional legislature is now headed by former governor’s administration chief Sergei Merkulov; in Vologda, by Deputy Governor Sergei Sorokin; in Karelia, by republic government Deputy Prime Minister Larisa Podsadnik; and in Stavropol Krai, by former deputy head of the regional government staff Lyubov Makovskaya.
Among the new senators are Andrei Kelin, Russia’s former ambassador to the United Kingdom, representing Mordovia; Alexei Meshkov, former ambassador to France, representing Tver Region; and Sergei Melikov, former head of Dagestan, representing Bryansk Region. Some new Federation Council members moved there from the State Duma; others came from regional administrations and state bodies. The latter include Sergei Ponomarenko, former Krasnoyarsk Krai deputy governor for political affairs, and Alexei Puchnin, former head of the election commissions in St. Petersburg and Tambov.
Not a single “military” figure—not even a current member of the elite who had announced that he was going to war—has become a regional parliamentary speaker or senator this year. Ivan Boldyrev, a serviceman, initially sought the Tambov Region Senate seat. But the Kremlin chose to reward Puchnin with a place in the Federation Council. Puchnin had carried on Tambov’s tradition of electoral fraud and later helped turn opposition-minded St. Petersburg into a region where elections are entirely managed.
The State Duma, where ordinary lawmakers have little real power, has been the main venue for promoting the “new elite.” But regional assembly speakers, whose jobs require administrative and legal expertise and regular dealings with governors, are chosen from among experienced officials. The same applies to senators: they are the regions’ chief lobbyists in Moscow and maintain regular contact with regional leaders.
