Since at least 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeated at least once a year that “BRICS is one of the key elements of the emerging multipolar world.” Sometimes he recycles the phrase verbatim, as in 2016 and 2024; sometimes he adds small flourishes—insisting, for instance, that a “just” multipolar order is being built on the basis of “constructive cooperation” among BRICS countries. In particularly difficult years, such as 2022, he stresses that the construction of a multipolar world and BRICS leadership are “more in demand than ever.” On other occasions he simply returns to the themes of his 2007 Munich speech, declaring the end of the unipolar moment and noting that the new world order is inevitable—and can only be discussed in the context of BRICS, as he did in 2025.
According to transcripts of summits, forums, press conferences, video addresses and bilateral meetings on the Kremlin’s official website, Putin’s public mentions of BRICS range from a dozen a year to several hundred (as in 2024, the year of Russia’s presidency).
Putin’s statements on BRICS are rarely consistent. They almost never set out clear success criteria for the organization or a concrete vision of the “just world” that is supposedly the end goal. The wording itself has barely changed for nearly fifteen years.
Nevertheless, three blocks of objectives that Putin rhetorically assigns to BRICS—especially after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine—can be identified, and their practical value to Moscow can be assessed. Putin himself defines them as “politics and security, economics and finance, and cultural-humanitarian contacts.”
What BRICS Should Deliver, according to Putin
The first block: politics and security
The most persistent—and the hardest to measure—objective is the construction of a multipolar world that is “truly just and based on international law, with full respect for the key principles of the UN Charter, including sovereign equality and the right of every nation to its own model of development.” Putin repeatedly emphasizes that the drive toward multipolarity meets “the aspirations of the bulk of the international community—the so-called Global Majority.” In this context he has consistently justified the expansion of BRICS.
What should this course look like in practice? At minimum, according to Putin’s statements, it means resisting “the practice of illegitimate sanctions and attempts to undermine traditional moral values.” The broader agenda includes conflict resolution, counter-terrorism, the fight against organized crime (including the criminal use of new technologies), climate change and the spread of dangerous infections. In short, BRICS is supposed to shape a multipolar world as Moscow imagines it and to respond to the sharpest challenges posed by “unfriendly countries,” above all sanctions.
Depending on the format of his remarks—and regardless of BRICS’ actual progress at the time—Putin alternates between declaring advances on these fronts and stressing the need for steady further movement toward the stated goals.
The second block—and the most important for Russia after 2022: economics and finance
The most obvious example is the push for de-dollarization, which Putin claims enhances the sovereignty and security of BRICS states: “increasing settlements in local currencies reduces debt-servicing costs, strengthens the financial independence of BRICS members, minimizes geopolitical risks as far as possible in today’s world, and frees economic development from politics.” He regularly repeats that “the dollar is being used as a weapon.”
To reduce those risks, Putin has consistently pressed for “an independent payment system immune to political pressure, abuse and external sanctions interference,” an expanded role for the New Development Bank (in effect an alternative to the World Bank), and the creation of a BRICS investment platform.
He has also floated more technical goals—cooperation on insurance, alternative credit-rating agencies—and almost abstract proposals such as energy cooperation and the development of transport corridors.
The main driver of Russia’s financial and economic agenda remains the need to mitigate the consequences of Western sanctions.
The third block: cultural and humanitarian contacts
This covers a whole range of events and formats in culture, sport and tourism—BRICS Games, culture and film festivals, the BRICS Youth Forum and similar initiatives.
Particular importance is attached to cooperation in science, innovation and AI, as well as ecology, climate, and inter-parliamentary and municipal ties.
In Putin’s words: “It is also important to advance the cultural and humanitarian agenda of BRICS in order to promote the harmonious coexistence of different civilizations.”
Justifying the value of these meetings and events, he argues that they help build mutual trust among representatives of BRICS countries, and that “trust is an essential foundation for economic cooperation and cooperation in the security sphere.”
How Key BRICS Members View Putin’s Goals
India remains the most cautious member. Its politicians regularly and insistently stress that India is a non-Western but not an anti-Western country, and that Russia’s aggressive post-2022 rhetoric does not resonate in New Delhi. Indian experts writing after Russia’s year as BRICS chair have stated outright that the goals formulated by Moscow may not align with India’s long-term national interests.
The clearest comment on Russia’s key economic proposals came in 2024 from the then-governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Shaktikanta Das, who said that de-dollarization is simply not on India’s agenda and that the country will continue to use the dollar both for trade and for reserves. The idea of a common currency was rejected outright by India. In 2025 Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar stated that India has absolutely no interest in undermining the dollar’s global role.
Brazil’s position is closest to India’s. Brasília is wary of the “anti-Western tilt of Russia and China” and has no intention of abandoning its non-aligned policy. For the Brazilian leadership, interest in BRICS is limited to a desire for soft reform of international institutions—something that sits uneasily with the agenda Moscow is promoting. At the same time, Brazil has been relatively open to Russian ideas not only on national-currency settlements but also on alternative payment systems.
South Africa, more than any other member, openly prioritizes the advancement of the African agenda and shows little enthusiasm for Russian geopolitical constructs. Pretoria has made clear to the United States that it does not share the anti-Americanism Russia seeks to inject into BRICS. Russian economic proposals occupy a secondary place in South African discourse on the grouping; the focus remains on regional rather than global problems relevant to South Africa.
China is by far the most supportive of Russian rhetoric. Even so, like India, it emphasizes that BRICS is a non-Western, not an anti-Western, grouping. On the broad tenets of the multipolar-world agenda, China remains Moscow’s most important partner. It responds particularly strongly to Russian protests against unilateral sanctions and the Western concept of a “rules-based order.” China and Russia effectively jointly pushed the expansion agenda that drew criticism from other members. It is worth noting, however, that for Beijing BRICS is only one instrument of foreign policy—and by no means the most important. On economics and finance, China is a firm supporter of the shift to national currencies (from which the yuan always benefits) and of expanding the work of the New Development Bank.
These diverging interests explain why Russian priorities are systematically diluted to the most general formulations in final BRICS documents, and why any attempt to create collective anti-sanctions mechanisms is blocked.
What Russia Has Achieved
Politics and security
The most obvious success of Russian policy within BRICS has been the organization’s expansion to include Egypt, Iran, the UAE, Ethiopia and Indonesia. Relations with three of the new members are developing dynamically: Iran remains a strategic partner; since 2022 the UAE has become one of the most important channels for sanctions circumvention and parallel imports (trade with Russia has tripled); and Egypt increasingly serves as a “gateway to Africa.” Moscow’s surge of interest in these countries came after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the expansion itself took place in 2024−2025. The Russian interest was driven primarily by the consequences of the war, not by any “geopolitical vision of a new world order.” There is little doubt that even if BRICS had never existed, Russia’s policy toward these states would have changed little. Expansion therefore functions as a narrative rather than an institutional success.
Nevertheless, Moscow can point to the readiness of a new group of countries to join a project in which it sees itself as one of the principal participants—despite Western pressure and sanctions. The enlargement of BRICS, like the refusal of member states to join the sanctions regime against Moscow, undercuts the claim that Russia is isolated.
Measurable progress can also be claimed in the institutionalization of working groups on terrorism, cybersecurity and climate. Yet truly tangible results of this cooperation are still hard to identify.
Even in joint declarations, “multipolarity” appears only in the most general terms—not as an inevitable future, nor even as an “emerging” state of the world order, but merely as a possibility. In 2024: “We note the emergence of new centers of power, political decision-making and economic growth, which can lay the foundations for a more just, democratic and balanced multipolar world order.” In 2025: “We recognize that multipolarity can expand the opportunities of developing countries and emerging-market economies to unlock their constructive potential and ensure mutually beneficial, inclusive and just economic globalization and cooperation.” The BRICS countries have not even discussed a common plan for building an alternative infrastructure of international relations.
Since the start of the war, Russia has failed to secure agreement on a single mechanism of collective resistance to Western sanctions. Russian anti-Western rhetoric does not find its way into the organization’s key documents. The core members do not share Russia’s interpretation of the war in Ukraine and do not recognize the Russian occupation.
Expansion has indeed given Moscow the ability to point to the project’s “relevance.” But it has created no new mechanism of collective support for Russia. The new members joined an existing organization, not a Russian anti-sanctions project.
Economics and finance
The most tangible progress over the past four years has been the growth of settlements in national currencies. This is not genuine de-dollarization: with the exception of Russia, China and Iran, BRICS members continue to hold their reserves in dollars. Yet trade with Russia is indeed increasingly conducted without the dollar. According to Russian statements, 90 per cent of trade with BRICS countries now bypasses the dollar, and with China the figure is almost 99 per cent in national currencies. This shift substantially reduces sanctions risks—for Russia. The progress, however, is almost entirely confined to Russian trade with the other members. The rest of the group is moving far more slowly: trade between Brazil and China, for example, is only about 30 per cent denominated in yuan and reais.
The New Development Bank has also recorded noticeable success. By the end of 2025 it had approved $ 42.9 billion in financing for 139 projects. Against the background of the war in Ukraine, however, the NDB completely suspended approval of new projects involving Russia.
Progress on a full-fledged payment system has been far weaker. It remains at the planning and testing stage; even the most optimistic estimates put a possible launch no earlier than 2030. The idea of a common currency was abandoned in 2025. Investment platforms and technical proposals such as alternative rating agencies remain at the level of political statements.
The most valuable economic support from BRICS countries—their willingness to buy Russian exports and supply a wide range of goods to the Russian market—takes place entirely outside the grouping’s collective mechanisms, on a purely bilateral basis.
Cultural and humanitarian contacts
Here BRICS genuinely succeeds in delivering what Putin asks of it. The BRICS Games, culture and film festivals, numerous forums and events on science and innovation take place regularly. On Russia’s initiative, for example, a BRICS Alliance of Folk and Dance Culture was established.
Many other formats—on ecology, climate, inter-parliamentary and municipal ties—exist but remain fragmentary and have not produced durable institutions.
It is precisely the symbolic nature of this track that makes it the only one in which Russia can confidently claim the fulfilment of its own goals. Unlike politics and economics, there are no hard interests of other members that have to be overcome. The humanitarian track therefore functions as a showcase and as a means of maintaining a sense of constant forward movement.
Conclusion
Four years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, BRICS has not become for Moscow the instrument Vladimir Putin has been describing for more than a decade. The organization has not turned into “a key element of the emerging multipolar world” in the form the Kremlin imagines. It has created no alternative infrastructure of global governance, produced no collective mechanisms for countering sanctions, and forced none of its key members to adopt Russia’s interpretation of the war or of the world order.
The most visible successes have been either symbolic or bilateral. Expansion allowed Moscow to demonstrate the project’s “relevance” and to rebut claims of isolation. The rise in national-currency settlements and the readiness of individual countries to buy Russian exports and supply goods to the Russian market softened some of the economic consequences of sanctions. Cultural and humanitarian formats performed their symbolic function and sustained the appearance of movement “in the right direction.” Almost everything of real value, however, took place outside BRICS’ collective mechanisms—through direct arrangements with China, India, the UAE, Iran, Egypt and other members.
The positions of the key members—above all India, Brazil and South Africa—explain this outcome. Their principled refusal to embrace an anti-Western tilt, their unwillingness to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of the Russian agenda, and their wary attitude toward any attempt to turn BRICS into an instrument of pressure on the dollar or the West systematically diluted Russian initiatives to the most general formulations. Even China, the member closest to Moscow in rhetoric, treated the grouping as merely one of many foreign-policy tools rather than a priority project.
In the end, after 2022 BRICS has served Russia primarily in a narrative and image-building capacity. It has given the Kremlin a platform from which to speak in the name of the “Global Majority,” to record formal successes and to maintain the appearance of progress toward multipolarity. Institutional value—the ability to reduce Russia’s geopolitical and economic risks at the collective level—has not materialized. And as long as the interests of India, Brazil and other participants continue to diverge from those of Russia, the gap between Putin’s rhetoric and BRICS practice is likely to persist.
