Vladimir Putin met with heads and deputies of municipalities participating in the All-Russian Municipal Forum «Small Homeland — Russia’s Strength.» «Most of your colleagues are worthy, proactive people who work tirelessly in their roles, dedicating all their knowledge, strength, and experience to developing both small villages and large cities, striving for new achievements,» Putin encouraged the municipal leaders. In response, they spoke about their support for participants in the war with Ukraine, though their accounts mainly focused on regional personnel competitions. The heads also mentioned plebiscites held in their territories, where residents decide how to allocate small portions of local budgets.
The event was clearly orchestrated by the political wing of the Presidential Administration (AP), led by Sergey Kiriyenko. Municipal leaders promoted the Kremlin administrators’ projects to Putin. Irina Guseva, co-chair of the All-Russian Association of Local Self-Government and former Volgograd mayor, highlighted the «School of Mayors,» one of the AP’s personnel contests. She claimed that «of the 319 graduates from the first four cohorts, 77 were appointed to leadership positions.» Guseva did not specify which «leadership» roles these municipal officials assumed, likely not high-ranking positions in regional or municipal administrations. Moreover, some «School» graduates lose their «leadership roles.» For instance, after a conflict with the acting governor of Kursk Oblast, Alexander Khinshtein, Kursk’s mayor, Igor Kutsak, once considered a promising manager, resigned.
Contests for war participants are the AP’s main PR project, aimed primarily at Putin himself (with no real advancement of military personnel up the power vertical). Plebiscites for allocating minor budget funds are another tactic of Kremlin political administrators. For years, authorities’ political technologists have used this method during elections to boost turnout, holding plebiscites alongside voting for governors and deputies at the same polling stations. The political wing views these as a form of citizen feedback and a surrogate for real political life. Kiriyenko’s team encourages «social architects”—rebranded political technologists—to organize such plebiscites.
The municipal forum, alongside other AP events, aims to reinforce the list of AP projects in Putin’s mind, creating an illusion of their success and omnipresence in public life. Putin, judging by his speeches, buys into this narrative. At the forum, he again mused about «old» and «new» elites. He also praised the façade of active municipal life: «The local level of government, within the entire management system, is the front line. There’s no one behind you. That means you’re at the forefront. And this, as I’ve said before and as we understand, is the most complex part of the management system,» he declared.
This façade barely aligns with reality and, in the case of municipal policy, directly contradicts it. As Putin spoke, Russia is abolishing first-level municipalities (urban and rural settlements)—the very «front line» he praised. Guseva proudly reported to Putin that 17,000 municipal heads operate nationwide. However, next year, such figures will be impossible to present, as the number of municipalities will shrink drastically. Days after the grandiose Kremlin forum, Krasnoyarsk’s legislature reduced the region’s municipalities from 472 to 39—a tenfold cut. Naturally, no one at the Putin-attended event mentioned these «reforms,» which are sweeping most Russian regions and represent the primary issue in municipal governance today. Yet, engrossed in the war and U.S. negotiations, Putin likely isn’t deeply concerned about grassroots issues. He seems content with the comfortable façade, a simulation of reality featuring plebiscites and contests for war participants.
United Russia Primaries: Manipulating «Military» Numbers
This week marked the end of candidate registration for United Russia’s primaries for regional and municipal elections. For years, the ruling party has highlighted the number of war participants registering for its preliminary voting: this time, 464 «frontline fighters» submitted applications. The party doesn’t clarify how many current deputies or officials who announced they were heading to the trenches. Even if all war participants are genuine soldiers without elite backgrounds, their numbers pale compared to the mandates at stake. Regional elections distribute tens of thousands of mandates, with over 20,000 total primary applicants. Military candidates make up just 2−3%. It’s far from guaranteed that all will win primaries and subsequent elections. Last year, United Russia reported just over 300 military candidates succeeded. Likely, a similar number will become deputies this year. Notably, 16 «frontline fighters» who won United Russia mandates relinquished them to return to the front.
United Russia and the AP’s political wing emphasize impressive figures of military involvement in politics. The primaries are no exception, presented to Putin as a «personnel elevator.» The primaries’ former official role—testing and selecting the best candidates—has been sidelined. However, comparing military numbers to total participants and mandates reveals their minimal involvement. The system offers them legislative seats, but these seem to hold little appeal for «frontline fighters.» Most such positions are unpaid, serving either as a public burden for high-status state employees (like hospital or school directors) or as a tool for businessmen to monitor and allocate budget funds. Military candidates, aware of this, aren’t rushing to become deputies and sometimes relinquish won mandates, preferring higher wartime earnings. Still, this doesn’t stop United Russia and the AP from leveraging them. In a few weeks, the party will report that most registered «frontline fighters» won primaries, checking another box in their KPI for promoting the «new elite.»
