A Russian national, Marat Kambolov — until recently the general director of the Kurchatov Institute — has been appointed acting president of South Ossetia. Until a few months ago, he had no connection to the unrecognized republic, apart from being born in neighboring North Ossetia, which is part of Russia.
In late May, Kambolov was named advisor to South Ossetian leader Alan Gagloev. In mid-June he was appointed prime minister, and after Gagloev’s resignation he automatically became acting president. This maneuver was made possible by the agreement “On Deepening Allied Interaction between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia,” signed on May 9. The document allows Russian citizens to hold state and municipal posts in South Ossetia, and vice versa.
Thanks to the agreement, not only could Kambolov take the top job in South Ossetia, but Gagloev himself received a compensatory post as advisor to Vladimir Putin. The appointment of a Russian “outsider” to the highest office in the republic clearly signals a new level of integration with Russia. It is no longer out of the question that South Ossetia — which remains part of Georgia under international law — could join the Russia-Belarus Union State or be formally annexed by Russia.
In his farewell address to the people, Gagloev wrote: “Today our task is to make our cherished dream come true — to overcome the fate of a divided people and reunite with North Ossetia, to reunite with Great Russia.” He explicitly described the May agreement as a “step” toward that goal.
Following this unusually direct statement, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov issued an official denial. Yet the very fact that a Russian citizen has been installed as head of the unrecognized republic indicates that its status is unlikely to remain unchanged. Attempts to bring South Ossetia into Russia have been made before.
In May 2022, Gagloev’s predecessor Anatoly Bibilov signed a decree calling a referendum on joining Russia. Gagloev postponed the vote at the end of May. The timeline is telling: in mid-May the Russian army was still advancing, and the Kremlin was preparing to annex occupied Ukrainian territories. The Ossetian referendum could have served as a convenient “add-on.” By the end of the month, however, it had become clear that the blitzkrieg had failed, and the “vote” was quietly shelved. After Ukraine’s September 2022 counteroffensive, the annexation of Ukrainian regions was rushed through, while the South Ossetian question was put on the back burner.
South Ossetia continues to function as a convenient “gray zone” for various financial schemes. For some Russian security officials and bureaucrats, the full incorporation of such an enclave would create additional headaches. Recent developments, however, suggest that the question of annexation has returned to the Kremlin’s agenda.
Against the backdrop of problems on the Ukrainian front, economic difficulties, and fuel shortages, the acquisition of “new territory” may be viewed by the Russian leadership as a useful domestic consolation prize. It is no coincidence that talk of unification has intensified on the eve of State Duma elections that, for the first time in the Putin era, are taking place under openly crisis conditions for the Kremlin. The effectiveness of such a move in boosting the authorities’ ratings is highly doubtful. For some ultra-patriots who are gradually losing faith in Putin’s actions, it might still resonate. For many loyalists, however, the incorporation of another Caucasian territory is more likely to provoke irritation and bewilderment. The same “Russian Community” that campaigns against labor migrants is also hostile to residents of Russia’s North Caucasian republics.
For Putin himself — whose personal preferences shape the entire power vertical — acquiring “new territory” would carry clear positive value. The president takes territorial questions seriously and has consistently collected fragments of the former Soviet Union. South Ossetia fits neatly into this “collecting” logic.
It is telling that the process has been entrusted to Marat Kambolov, an experienced official who has recently worked closely with the influential Kovalchuk clan. Sergei Kirienko, the Kremlin’s curator for South Ossetia, also belongs to this circle of influence.
Judging by Kirienko’s usual style, the integration (or possibly full annexation) of South Ossetia could become a new priority political project for the Kremlin — provided, of course, that Kirienko retains control over the domestic political bloc after the Duma elections. Technological support for a possible referendum might fall to Vyacheslav Gladkov, the former governor of Belgorod region who was recently appointed ambassador to Abkhazia (his candidacy was advanced by the same political bloc despite some resistance from the Foreign Ministry).
At the same time, this “territorial gift” to Putin could create serious complications elsewhere. In Abkhazia, both the population and the local elites are keen to preserve maximum autonomy and view any attempt by Moscow to tighten control with deep suspicion. Annexing South Ossetia would inevitably prompt Abkhaz leaders to ask whether the Kremlin is preparing a similar scenario for them.
Formal annexation of the unrecognized republic would also sharply worsen relations with Georgia, of which South Ossetia remains de jure a part. The ruling Georgian Dream party maintains a relatively loyal stance toward Russia while continuing to insist on the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Annexation would almost certainly cost Moscow its last relatively cooperative partner in the Caucasus.
Because the move would involve not just joining Russia but reuniting with North Ossetia, the formation of a new administration would almost inevitably trigger clan conflicts and struggles over resources and positions. Finally, annexation would trigger a new round of Western sanctions.
Members of Russia’s power vertical understand the full weight of these guaranteed consequences. Under the current bureaucratic logic, however, immediate accommodation of the president’s wishes is considered more advantageous than long-term strategic considerations. Tactically, the incorporation of South Ossetia could also provide a convenient formal pretext for postponing the State Duma elections — on the grounds that residents of the “new region” should be allowed to participate.
Zyuganov-Style Concessions
The Communists held their pre-election congress and approved their candidate list for the State Duma. Until then, Gennady Zyuganov and his party had been playing a complicated game: publicly criticizing the presidential administration’s political bloc, raising real social problems (including public fatigue with the war), and hinting at the possible inclusion of figures inconvenient for the Kremlin. In particular, the media actively discussed the chances that former presidential candidate Pavel Grudinin and popular blogger Nikolai Bondarenko might appear on the federal part of the list.
In the final version, however, neither Bondarenko nor Grudinin made the cut. The federal portion of the list consists mainly of aging nomenklatura figures (Zyuganov himself, Ivan Melnikov, Vladimir Kashin, and others) and younger party functionaries (Yuri Afonin, Dmitry Novikov). It also includes little-known Central Committee secretary Maria Drobot.
Grudinin’s name does not appear even in the regional groups. Bondarenko was nominated in regional sections for territories with which he has no connection (Udmurtia and Perm Krai). In addition, the CPRF declined to nominate most of its stronger single-mandate candidates.
The list sends an unambiguous signal that the Communists have made concessions to the Kremlin — most likely in exchange for the presidential administration dropping plans to push the party out of second place. Whether the Kremlin will honor this understanding remains an open question. Zyuganov’s own radical statements — for example, on seizing citizens’ bank deposits and business funds — only damage the party’s ratings. It is possible that, out of fear of completely ruining relations with the authorities, the Communists will also withdraw the few remaining strong single-mandate candidates. In that case, complaints against the Kremlin would become pointless, because the Communists would have deprived themselves of second place with their own hands.
