All of Russia’s “satellites of influence” were caught off guard by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, including Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria. Located almost 1,000 km from Russia’s borders, the region was suddenly cut off from its main patron. Situated along the Dniester River and close to Ukraine’s strategic port city of Odesa, Transnistria quickly became a potential target for Ukrainian retaliation. To avoid a scenario similar to the AFU invasion of Kursk Oblast, the leadership of the separatist region has taken a demonstratively restrained position toward Ukraine. The Transnistrian political and economic elite, refraining from any hostile steps, has focused its efforts on surviving and adapting to the new reality.
The restrictions imposed by Ukraine and the West on Russia quickly affected the breakaway region. Trade and transportation were the first sectors hit, followed by energy. Ukraine’s complete closure of the Transnistrian segment of the border severely damaged Transnistria’s commercial links with Russia. Moldova’s alignment with the EU sanctions regime against Russia further aimed to block any circumvention of those sanctions. In addition, legal and technical barriers to financial transactions with Russia made it increasingly difficult for Transnistria to receive traditional Russian social payments that had long supplemented local pensions.
Energy supplies, another area heavily dependent on Russia, were also disrupted. In January 2025, Ukraine declined to extend its gas transit contract with Russia, cutting off gas supplies to Transnistria as well. This marked a turning point: the region was forced to rely far more heavily on Moldovan authorities for gas than it ever had for trade. Even though Russia continued to pay for the gas delivered to Transnistria, this could only happen with Chisinau’s political consent.
In short, between 2022 and 2026 Russia’s position in Transnistria weakened considerably as trade and energy links eroded. At the same time, the region gradually shifted its previously Russia-centered dependencies toward Moldova. Since 2024, Transnistria has complied with Moldova’s new customs rules while refusing to discuss reintegration and continuing to call for the resumption of the “5+2” negotiation format. The local political-economic elites accepted a controlled form of integration into Moldova’s trade and customs system, driven by the urgent need to access the only available EU markets. In doing so, they sought to prevent an economic collapse that could trigger social unrest or even the implosion of the separatist regime. As the war increasingly affected Russia itself through Ukrainian drone strikes on oil infrastructure, Transnistria adjusted to prolonged geopolitical uncertainty and bought time.
“Sealed borders”
Commercial flows have long been a key pillar of Transnistria’s ties with Russia. Although Ukraine had already been monitoring cross-border movement of people and goods along the Transnistrian segment since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the borders were fully closed immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. Already on February 28 — four days after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion — the Ukrainian authorities closed all checkpoints on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border (while the Transnistrian administration kept its own checkpoints open).
These early wartime measures aimed to prevent potential Russian attacks launched from Transnistrian territory. Four years later, in March 2026, Ukraine took more radical steps by installing mine barriers and “Egoza” razor-wire fences along the border in the Tulchinsky and Mogilev-Podolsky districts of Vinnytsia region. Transnistria’s military noted the fortifications but took no countermeasures. The measures were intended to deter any Russian use of forces based in Transnistria, drawing on the precedent of Russian military activity in Belarus.
Prior to the war, in 2018, Ukraine and Moldova had begun establishing joint checkpoints along the Transnistrian segment to facilitate the movement of people and goods. This process was completely abandoned after the invasion. Until the war ends, the three road checkpoints (Khrustovaya-Bolgan, Novye Goyany-Platonovo, and Pervomaysk-Kuchurgan) and the rail link via Tiraspol remain closed and closely monitored by Ukraine. Without these crossings, Transnistrian exports have no land route to the Russian market.
Despite the border closure, Transnistria became one of the routes used by Ukrainian men seeking to evade conscription. In the first two years of the war, an estimated 44,000 Ukrainian men fled through Romania, Moldova, and Slovakia. Those who chose the Transnistrian route reportedly paid up to USD 8,000.
Russia’s military presence in Transnistria has heightened Ukraine’s threat perception. As a Russia-controlled territory, Transnistria became a potential target for Ukrainian preventive measures. The fortification of the border is the clearest sign of militarization along this segment. Ukraine’s broader goal is to prevent Russia from opening a “second front” toward Odesa.
Further decline in trade
Moldova’s alignment with EU sanctions against Russia, combined with the full sealing of the border with Ukraine (including loss of access to the port of Odesa), severely complicated Transnistria’s trade with Russia. Sanctions targeted dual-use goods that could be used in jet and missile production, affecting factories such as Moldavizolit, Electromash, and Potential. Two years into the war, Moldovan authorities began regulating Transnistrian exports and revoked export permits on security grounds. As part of efforts to stop sanctions circumvention, some companies were forced to close, including Electromash, which had been listed in 2020 as a Russian import-substitution enterprise.
The decline in trade with Russia was inevitable. Exports fell from € 252.9 million in 2008 to just € 21.4 million in 2024. However, war and sanctions were not the only factors. Transnistrian exporters had already begun reorienting their trade as early as 2006−2007. Romania and Bulgaria’s EU accession in 2007, followed by Moldova’s Autonomous Trade Preferences (later replaced by the DCFTA in 2014−2016), opened the door to much greater trade with the EU. In 2021, Russia’s share of Transnistrian exports was a modest 14%. The war accelerated this process. By July 2026, this figure had fallen to 8.4%, while the EU became the dominant market, accounting for 77% of all exports. Imports from the EU rose from € 32.7 million in 2006 to € 380 million in 2023. At the beginning of 2026, the EU accounted for 41.5% of Transnistria’s imports, compared with Russia’s 3.3%. In the first half of 2026, more than 80% of Transnistrian exports and 66% of its imports depended on Moldova and the EU.
At the same time, Transnistrian companies have continued registering with Moldova’s Public Service Agency to gain access to EU markets — 2,478 enterprises had done so by July 2026.
Russia’s natural gas “life jacket”
Gas supplies have long been one of Russia’s most powerful levers over Transnistria’s economy and political elite. Unable to force the region to pay, Transnistria accumulated a debt exceeding USD 10 billion. When Ukraine decided not to renew the gas transit contract with Russia at the end of 2024, it became clear that no Russian gas could reach Transnistria through Ukrainian territory.
Between January and February 2025, Transnistria exhausted the remaining gas in the pipelines and sharply reduced electricity consumption, which had previously relied heavily on Russian gas. In January 2025, Russia officially committed to providing Transnistria with “humanitarian gas,” framed symbolically as aid for the Transnistrian population. However, the route for delivering this gas remained uncertain.
During the first phase of the gas crisis in January 2025, Transnistria used its anthracite coal reserves to generate electricity. The nearest source of this high-quality coal is in Ukraine’s Donbas region, where fighting has continued since 2014. Without gas or anthracite, Transnistria’s main power plant could not operate.
To avert a humanitarian crisis in winter, the Moldovan government offered 3 million m³ of gas on credit in early February 2025 to maintain pressure in the network. Transnistria’s de facto leader, Vadim Krasnoselsky, described the Moldovan gas as “technical” gas while still waiting for the promised “humanitarian” supplies from Moscow. In the end, gas was purchased on the European market with a € 20 million EU grant intended to meet the basic needs of Transnistria’s population.
Later, the European Union offered Transnistria additional assistance of 60 million euros for the purchase of gas, but at the same time put forward commercial conditions (an increase in tariffs for consumers) and political requirements related to the observance of human rights. The Transnistrian elites rejected the EU’s proposal, preferring to return to supplies coordinated by Russia.
Russia’s emergency solution was to deliver gas through the Hungarian company MET and Energy Marketing AG. Payment was routed through the Dubai-based intermediary JNX General Trading L.L.C. Only after payment was completed could the gas transit Romania, enter Moldova’s network, and reach Transnistria. This complex scheme allowed Russia to support Transnistria while circumventing EU sanctions.
In October 2025, Moldovagaz (50% owned by Gazprom) confirmed that Transnistria was again receiving the full contractual volume of 1.5 billion m³ per year under the 2021 Moldova-Russia agreement. Daily deliveries rose to approximately 5.7 million m³, after having been limited to roughly one-third of that volume in the first months of the Hungarian intermediary scheme. By the end of December 2025, Transnistria was receiving about 3 million m³ per day — enough for households and the social sector. In total, Russia supplied 690 million m³ to Transnistria in 2025 (one-third of pre-2025 volumes) at a cost of USD 290 million.
Beyond technical and financial issues, a legal constraint remains: the 2021 gas contract between Moldova and Gazprom expires in autumn 2026. Although renewal is considered unlikely, in June 2026 the Moldovan energy regulator extended Moldovagaz’s license to supply gas to Transnistria until the end of 2026. The short remaining duration of both the contract and the license shows that Russia’s natural gas “life jacket” for Transnistria is not sustainable even in the short term.
Domestic politics: survival logic and resistance
Amid the ongoing crisis — from the war in Ukraine to the reconfiguration of energy supplies — Transnistria’s elites have remained largely loyal to Moscow. De facto leader Vadim Krasnoselsky and foreign affairs chief Vitaly Ignatiev have continued to portray Russia as the region’s economic saviour through “humanitarian gas” and as its security guarantor through the presence of “peacekeepers.”
In the Supreme Council elections held on 30 November 2025, the pro-Russian “Obnovlenie” party retained a strong majority, winning 22 of 33 seats. The result was helped by very low turnout — only 26% of registered voters (102,655 people) — roughly half the turnout recorded in the 2015 election (48.3%).
“Obnovlenie” is closely linked to local oligarch Victor Gushan, estimated to control assets worth around € 2.4 billion. His economic dominance through the Sheriff holding is guaranteed by Krasnoselsky. This arrangement suits Russia, as it keeps the political situation under control. During the gas crisis, some observers hoped the elites might turn against Moscow and open the door to EU-backed reintegration with Moldova.
The July 2023 assassination of Oleg Horjan — the only prominent opposition figure, head of the Communist Party, and former Supreme Council member — carried clear political overtones. Horjan had begun engaging with Moldovan political parties (including former president Igor Dodon) and enjoyed support from communist parties in Moldova, Belarus, and Russia after his 2018 imprisonment. During a visit to Moscow in March 2023, he gave an interview to the newspaper Pravda, in which he called the executive authorities of Transnistria “puppet” and stated that the oligarch Gushan “doesn’t give a damn about what they say from Moscow.” Just four months later, on the night of 16−17 July, Khorzhan was killed.
Russia has little choice but to work with the existing political configuration in Transnistria. In exchange for loyalty, the local oligarch — a former KGB officer — serves as a reliable intermediary for maintaining political control amid instability. At the same time, to ensure the region’s economic survival, Russia long ago gave local elites the green light to operate in European markets. Moscow understands that key figures — including Vadim Krasnoselsky, Vitaly Ignatiev, and Victor Gushan — hold Ukrainian passports or conduct business in Europe, making them vulnerable to pressure from Ukraine and the EU. Moldovan authorities have also begun revoking citizenship from Transnistrian residents involved in the region’s military and intelligence structures (consistent with the European Court of Human Rights’ 2001 ruling that the region remains under Russia’s effective control).
Until the political landscape in Transnistria changes, Russia will continue working with whoever is available. From 2022 to 2026, the Krasnoselsky-Ignatiev tandem advanced Russia’s agenda by defending its reputation in the region and its positions on conflict settlement and the status of the Operational Group of Russian Forces (responsible for guarding the ammunition depot at Cobasna). The future of the “5+2” negotiation format hinges on this. Although the format had been stalled since 2019, the war in Ukraine effectively ended it. It remains the only remaining negotiation platform for Russia in the post-Soviet space where it still retains some leverage thanks to the loyalty of Transnistria’s elites.
Conclusion
Throughout 2022−2026, Russia’s relations with Transnistria remained largely predictable. Despite EU sanctions and Ukraine’s border restrictions aimed at preventing a potential “second front” toward Odesa, Russia found ways to support Transnistria’s political and economic elites. To maintain some appeal among the population, Russia continued offering fast-track citizenship to Transnistrian residents — a policy linked to its updated military doctrine allowing intervention to protect Russian citizens abroad.
Although Russia has tried to project strength in Transnistria to offset the vulnerabilities exposed by Ukraine’s drone campaign, the breakaway region will continue to gravitate toward Moscow as long as the benefits of its relationship with Russia outweigh those it could obtain from the West. This is why Russian gas continues to flow to the region — to preserve the fragile status quo until the war ends. Should an energy or economic crisis trigger a collapse, the separatist regime could become more open to reintegration proposals from Moldova, supported by Ukraine and the EU.
