Last year, Ramzan Kadyrov carried out significant elite changes, including sidelining his previously public-facing daughters and even Adam Delimkhanov. The driving force behind these dramatic shifts appears to be his effort to install Adam Kadyrov as his successor—despite the fact that his third-eldest son would need to be nearly double his current age to realistically assume such a role under traditional expectations.
Less than a week into the new year, Kadyrov is already reshaping his elite structures to prioritize his most loyal supporters. The appointments of Akhmed Dudaev and Akhmat Kadyrov as vice-premiers are largely symbolic rather than substantive—particularly for the younger Kadyrov. The significance of these promotions differs markedly between the two officials: one rewards the regime’s chief propagandist, while the other seeks to provide greater security for Kadyrov’s son.
Akhmed Dudaev
The promotion of the long-serving Minister of National Policy, Foreign Affairs, Press, and Information is not particularly surprising. Despite his lengthy full title, Dudaev is best described as Kadyrov’s minister of propaganda—a role he has been groomed for since the early 2010s. While the new title of «vice-premier» changes little in terms of Dudaev’s actual power or influence, it nonetheless signals the growing importance of propaganda and narrative control for Kadyrov amid the current circumstances.
There is no doubt that Dudaev remains firmly within Kadyrov’s inner circle of trust. After reports surfaced that Kadyrov needed resuscitation during a work trip to Moscow, Kadyrov sat with Dudaev to mock the rumors about his health. This not only indicates that Dudaev has a clear understanding of Kadyrov’s true health status but also assigns him the crucial task of covering it up convincingly. Rapid and precise media management has become even more vital as federal officials opposed to his family’s rule have grown bolder in publicly expressing their opposition. Although the identities of these officials can only be surmised, their power, influence, and political tact require Kadyrov to devote full effort to countering them—and this responsibility falls squarely on Akhmed Dudaev.
What adds genuine intrigue to Dudaev’s promotion is its timing, which coincides with the equivalent promotion of Akhmat Kadyrov. Ramzan has made a habit of having senior regime members mentor his sons. Pairing his soft-spoken son with the public face of Kadyrovite propaganda would be a logical step as his eldest son’s career advances.
Akhmat Kadyrov
As the eldest son, Akhmat has spent the most time in government positions. However, the roles he has held have been less significant and/or less suitable for him compared to those of his brothers. His current posting as minister for physical culture and sport would surely suit Ali (Zelimkhan) better—the mixed martial arts and boxing enthusiast. Adam’s oversight of the security services further complicates Akhmat’s authority in this area, as the Kadyrov regime has worked to build a pipeline from fighting sports into the security services.
Akhmat’s initial professional path, which began when he was only sixteen, reflected an attempt to establish legitimacy as a leader from a young age. Such a move might make sense if the goal were to shift the fundamental basis of the Kadyrov family’s violence-based rule, but it is less ideal for those pursuing power through dominance over the means of violence.
Adam’s meteoric rise—with Ramzan reportedly even asking Putin to name Adam as the future head of Chechnya—has left Akhmat’s role in the succession contest and the hypothetical future of the Kadyrov regime unclear. For now, whatever that role may be, Akhmat appears publicly satisfied with it.
Promotions under pressure
The differing significance of the promotions for Dudaev and Akhmat Kadyrov stems from the evolving pressures on the Kadyrov regime. These dynamics mean the former’s promotion serves the regime as a whole, while the latter’s serves the individual.
Despite preserving federal subsidies to his budget long after other regions saw theirs reduced, the Kremlin’s funding for public employees is no longer as influential. This potentially undermines a key pillar of coerced support for the Kadyrov regime. Public employees (budzhetniki) form a crucial part of sustaining astroturfed activities that promote the regime, as well as contributing to the Akhmat Kadyrov Fund. Financial hardship for these employees will inevitably create greater stress among Kadyrov’s elites.
Public employees’ hardships generate additional pressure from below, while the succession contest creates pressure from above. As Kadyrov’s health troubles have become more serious and harder to conceal, officials opposed to his rule have begun taking steps to prevent his family’s dynasty from extending to a third ruler. It is probable that this faction helped promote the narrative that Apti Alaudinov—a then-disgraced former Kadyrovite commander who returned to embarrass those responsible for the failed March 2023 assault on Kyiv, and who holds no real stake in Chechen power—is the most likely successor to Kadyrov. Despite how unrealistic such a plan appears, it has persisted in the media. With Kadyrov’s health reportedly deteriorating further, leaks about it and promotions of potential successors are certain to intensify.
As the chief propagandist, Dudaev was elevated to vice-premier to help manage the increasingly public narrative conflict surrounding the succession. Akhmat, however, was made a vice-premier as part of a plan to integrate him more closely into power structures—the motivation being that this apparent elevation mitigates the threat of his potential removal.
Elites to watch
These appointments—so early in the new year—make it essential to identify other likely actors to monitor closely in the coming months. Adam Kadyrov is the most obvious figure to watch this year, having recently become an adult and logically positioned as the next son to be elevated to a senior political role. Ali Kadyrov, Ramzan’s second-eldest, should also be monitored, though he has maintained a minimal official presence and continues to serve in two boxing-focused positions.
Among Ramzan’s other close relatives, his daughters have been sidelined, and Khamzat Kadyrov has been largely removed from official business. Grozny mayor Khas-Magomed Kadyrov is worth observing, having rebounded after being punished for excessive ambition a few years ago. Seemingly restored to good graces, his leadership on Grozny’s «Putin» mikroraion has frequently appeared on Kadyrov’s Telegram channel.
Dudaev’s elevated status suggests that Chingiz Akhmadov—his successor at ChGTRK «Groznyi”—may also gain in importance, as Kadyrov’s manipulation of propaganda becomes more broadly relevant during the succession contest.
Finally, Magomed Daudov, who became Kadyrov’s prime minister in 2024, merits close attention. Despite many Kremlin officials previously distrusting a man so closely tied to extreme violence, the once loose cannon has appeared to moderate his inflammatory statements since assuming his new position. This rhetorical shift, combined with Adam Delimkhanov’s apparent fall from favor, makes Magomed Daudov significantly more important this year.
Kadyrov’s regime is evolving rapidly and demands close scrutiny. Elite cycles appear no longer tied primarily to control over existing pillars of stability and power, which increases the likelihood of chaos in the region—especially under Kadyrov’s influence. Rearranging elites, including senior members, to redirect resources toward his children risks fracturing the key alliances that brought Kadyrov to power, potentially leading to elite defections if Ramzan is perceived as sufficiently weak.
