In his address to the Council of Legislators—which includes the leadership of the State Duma and the Federation Council as well as speakers of regional parliaments—Vladimir Putin referred to certain «bans» and urged parliamentarians not to «obsess» over them. State-run and Kremlin-loyal media quickly latched onto and amplified the phrasing. A superficial viewing of the clip might easily create the impression that the president was criticizing «bans» and placing responsibility for them on lawmakers. Against the backdrop of declining approval ratings, public discontent with the economic situation, rising prices and taxes, and internet blockades, such a message would have seemed like a logical attempt to redirect popular frustration toward deputies and senators. However, Putin was talking about an entirely different set of «bans.»
«The legislative process as a whole should be systematic and creative. It should aim not only at adapting to current challenges and risks—although at times they are undoubtedly unprecedented and it is important to overcome them effectively—but we should not obsess solely over bans, restrictions, measures or the development of new punitive sanctions for violators. Of course this is necessary to some extent; we need to protect consumer interests in every sense of the word. But fixating exclusively on this is counterproductive. Excessive barriers hinder development,”—Putin’s exact words.
It is obvious that he was referring to regulatory barriers and prohibitions imposed on business, ostensibly to protect «consumers”—that is, ordinary citizens. Internet blockades and censorship clearly do not belong in this category.
It stands to reason that the Presidential Administration’s political bloc, led by Sergey Kiriyenko and concerned about falling ratings ahead of the Duma elections, is attempting to soften the negative atmosphere and deflect dissatisfaction away from the head of state. This is why talking points about the «counterproductivity of bans» were inserted into the presidential speech. Putin himself continues to regard blockades and censorship as fully justified measures, forcing the Kremlin’s political and information managers to perform a delicate maneuver to portray him as a fighter against «bans.» The topic was packaged for Putin in a form he finds comfortable: the head of state frequently speaks about the need not to over-regulate business. The rest was a matter of technique. News headlines led with the «bans» theme, while few readers bother to parse the president’s rather convoluted reasoning.
Symptomatically, late last week Sergey Novikov—Kiriyenko’s closest associate and head of the Presidential Administration’s Directorate for Public Projects—spoke out against «prohibitionist rhetoric.» Taken together with Putin’s speech, this looks like a deliberate Kremlin effort to distance itself from the issue and shift responsibility onto other elements of the power vertical. Novikov named no culprits, but the hints were clearly planted in the president’s remarks.
This gambit is unlikely to succeed. Judging by social media posts, citizens primarily blame internet restrictions—the most painful and relevant «ban» right now—on Roskomnadzor, a government agency, rather than parliamentarians. More informed Russians know from independent media investigations that the FSB actively lobbies for these blockades. Moreover, Putin himself only recently personally justified the blockades on grounds of «security.»
The room for maneuver available to the Kremlin’s political managers and spin doctors is extremely narrow. They cannot afford to stoke discontent with Roskomnadzor, much less the FSB. In this context, parliamentarians remain the most convenient target: they inherently carry less bureaucratic weight than either the security services or executive-branch officials. Yet on the eve of State Duma elections, shifting blame onto deputies carries serious risks—primarily a drop in United Russia’s ratings, and possibly those of the LDPR, whose representatives have supported the blockades.
The political and information blocs of the Presidential Administration find themselves in one of the most awkward positions in recent years. Government ratings are declining at the worst possible moment—right before the federal parliamentary campaign. The real causes of public discontent (economic problems caused by the war and internet blockades driven by the FSB) cannot be resolved by civilian officials. All that remains is a placebo: Putin’s phrases yanked out of context and artfully presented, plus an attempt to redirect frustration toward parliamentarians. But while ordinary placebo is at least harmless, this one risks doing real damage.
Neither Putin nor even Novikov uttered a word about repealing or easing the existing restrictions that most concern society. Consequently, these abstract musings about «not obsessing over bans» will not alleviate discontent but will merely serve as yet another reminder of the irritating factors.
The country’s top leadership, which remains under strong influence from the siloviki, clearly has no intention of rolling back these «restrictions.»
Kadyrov’s Party
Ramzan Kadyrov, whose poor health has been the subject of regular media reports, met with Vladimir Putin and received his blessing to extend his term in office. Chechnya remains the only North Caucasus republic that holds direct elections for its head. The president publicly endorsed Kadyrov’s new candidacy and praised the republic’s high official birth rates and record number of local men participating in the war.
Kadyrov’s current mandate expires in September this year. He is determined to keep power within his clan and eventually transfer it to his sons, primarily Adam, who is still too young to serve as governor. For this to happen, Ramzan himself needs to remain at the helm for as long as possible.
This scenario does not suit some influential federal players. They would prefer to replace the republic’s leadership with more predictable and manageable figures, even if still connected to Kadyrov’s circle. For the Kremlin’s political bloc, the most preferable candidate was «Akhmat» commander Apti Alaudinov; for the FSB, it was State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov. Kadyrov himself, who maintains friendly ties with the clan of Rosgvardia head Viktor Zolotov, would prefer to hand temporary control to Magomed Daudov, who would most likely return power to the Kadyrov sons at the appropriate moment. As recently as late 2025, this option (Kadyrov’s departure and the installation of the fully loyal Daudov) appeared the most probable, although far from the most desirable from Ramzan’s own perspective.
Nevertheless, Kadyrov has once again managed to secure the scenario most favorable to himself. The formal expiration of his term provided a convenient pretext for his resignation—one that elites eager to oust him were clearly prepared to exploit. Prolonging his powers removes the immediate crisis and allows him to retain control in the near term.
Putin’s approval of Kadyrov’s participation in the elections can also be viewed as a victory for Zolotov’s group, which succeeded in preventing the region from falling into the hands of FSB «competitors.» It is no coincidence that during the meeting the Russian president mentioned a representative of this clan—Emergency Situations Minister Alexander Kurenkov—describing him as «a good friend of Kadyrov.» The Chechen leader and Zolotov’s group skillfully played on the president’s well-known cadre ultra-conservatism: his extreme reluctance to replace people he has known for a long time. Once again, their calculation proved entirely correct.
A New Varangian for Dagestan
Vladimir Putin has replaced the head of Dagestan. In place of former Internal Troops general Sergey Melikov, the republic will now be led by Fyodor Shchukin, chairman of Dagestan’s Supreme Court.
Prior to his appointment to the republican Supreme Court, Shchukin had no connection to the region, although local media noted his ties to a prominent Dagestani native—Magomed Magomedov, chairman of the Sixth Cassation Court. The post of prime minister went to Magomed Ramazanov, an FSB veteran who previously served as deputy presidential envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District. Notably, Russian business media had already been floating his name as a candidate for the top regional post.
Melikov had attempted to build relations with local elites through a hardline approach and did not shy away from public conflicts, yet the republic continued to be rocked by corruption scandals and protests. His position was significantly undermined by a long-standing feud with Rosgvardia head Viktor Zolotov. Rumors of Melikov’s dismissal had circulated even before the flooding, but criticism reached its peak during the natural disaster—including a high-profile appeal to Putin by blogger Victoria Bonya. It is reasonable to assume that this portion of the appeal was orchestrated by Melikov’s opponents. It achieved its goal.
Shchukin becomes the third «varangian» to head Dagestan after Melikov and Vladimir Vasilyev (now the leader of United Russia’s faction in the State Duma). The appointment of an FSB-linked judge as regional head and an FSB veteran as prime minister signals a clear hardening of the federal center’s approach toward local elites.
