Prosecutor General Alexander Gutsan, appointed just last year, delivered his report to the Federation Council. These appearances are normally routine bureaucratic affairs, but Gutsan’s speech turned into a genuine news event. Several of its key passages were clearly crafted for maximum resonance and aimed at different target audiences.
One section was aimed squarely at Vladimir Putin himself: the part devoted to participants in the war against Ukraine. «Once the goals of the special military operation—which will undoubtedly be achieved—are met, thousands of servicemen will return home. It is extremely important that this moment not be marred by anything. We must begin creating the necessary conditions right now. Unfortunately, there is still no unified system for registering these individuals or helping them adapt to civilian life,» Gutsan complained. He went on to list concrete failures: retraining former soldiers in «unneeded specialties» and officials’ indifference to their health. Speaking in the familiar tone of systemic-party politicians, he said his office had «demanded that the Minister of Labor and Social Development improve the effectiveness of the relevant programs» for veterans’ reintegration.
Addressed to Putin and the entire security bloc was Gutsan’s proposal to let law-enforcement agencies access the contents of citizens’ mobile phones and tablets without a court warrant. After the obligatory nod to constitutional rights, he justified the measure as essential in the fight against «criminals.» The suggestion should be read against the background of a possible criminal ban on VPN services—which could lead to widespread street-level phone checks. Both the State Duma and the Interior Ministry publicly reject such ideas, but the prosecutor general has already given them the green light in advance.
For a wider audience, Gutsan floated the idea of a lifetime ban on government service for anyone convicted of corruption. He noted that courts, acting on prosecutors’ lawsuits, have already reclassified the dismissals of 300 officials as «loss of trust,» yet there is still no law preventing them from returning to public office. «I believe this loophole must be closed,» he declared.
All of these points carry a distinctly political charge. Gutsan is deliberately inserting himself into the war and postwar-veteran agenda, signaling his readiness to tighten the screws on ordinary citizens even further, and casting himself as a tireless crusader against corruption.
When the 65-year-old Gutsan—a veteran prosecutor and former presidential envoy to the Northwestern Federal District—was appointed, many saw him as the polar opposite of his predecessor, the young and publicity-hungry Igor Krasnov. Gutsan had a reputation as one of the most low-profile and invisible envoys. The assumption was that he would remain equally invisible as prosecutor general. Instead, he has chosen a different path. Like Krasnov, he clearly wants to be a political prosecutor general.
In building this new persona he appears to be getting help from the political team he brought with him from the Northwestern envoy’s office, which is run by deputy envoy Lyubov Sovershayeva, a longtime ally of the Kovalchuk brothers. The outlines of the image are already clear: a vocal supporter of repression and «tightening the screws,» while for the general public he also plays the role of «enemy of the corrupt.» In some respects the positioning recalls the public persona of the late Vladimir Zhirinovsky.
Gutsan’s benefit performance in the Federation Council suggests that both the prosecutor general and his backers consider this image a winning one for the country’s foreseeable future.
Signals from VCIOM
Against a backdrop of rising anger over prices, war fatigue, and—since the start of the year—regular shutdowns of mobile internet and popular messaging apps, the authorities’ ratings are falling even in polls conducted by Kremlin-friendly sociological centers.
According to VCIOM, approval of Vladimir Putin’s performance has dropped from 74.8 percent in early February to 66.7 percent. Trust in the president has fallen by 6.5 percentage points over the same period (from 78.5 to 72 percent). Disapproval has risen from 14.6 to 22.9 percent and distrust from 16.7 to 22.8 percent. United Russia’s already modest rating has slid from 33.8 to 27.3 percent. Putin’s rating is now approaching its pre-war level (64.3 percent), while United Russia’s support is dangerously close to its all-time low of August 2021, when only 26.4 percent of respondents backed the party.
Needless to say, in wartime, under conditions of censorship and criminal penalties for criticizing the authorities, all polls must be treated with caution. Even so, the comparative movement in the numbers remains a useful indicator.
The slide in the authorities’ ratings is confirmed by the rising support for systemic opposition parties. VCIOM shows New People confidently in second place—if elections were held this coming Sunday, 12.4 percent would vote for them—thanks in large part to their vocal criticism of the internet blockages. The Communist Party has also gained some ground with its protest-oriented rhetoric (10.9 percent).
Publishing data that reflects badly on the authorities is becoming an increasingly awkward task for the pollsters. Both VCIOM and FOM have begun releasing their weekly surveys noticeably later than usual, and VCIOM’s latest report was quickly removed from the homepage. Most likely these publications function as an early-warning system: civilian agencies (above all the political bloc inside the Presidential Administration) are using them to quietly alert the top leadership to the growing unpopularity of the current course. The same signaling channel includes criticism of internet blockages from within the systemic parties. The biggest winner from this has been New People, which is building its public brand on opposition to the shutdowns.
Vladimir Putin, who clearly intends to keep fighting the war, and the FSB, which has been handed oversight of the internet, are unlikely to pay much attention to these timid signals.
In 2021 the Kremlin’s political team and the election commissions were able to manufacture the required results for United Russia even when its ratings were relatively low. Back then, however, the bar for the ruling party was lower and the economy was in far better shape. The official 49-percent result was attributed to an energetic campaign and successful voter mobilization. In reality the mobilization was administrative-corporate: the authorities and loyal businesses simply brought their controlled voters to the polls, supplemented by electronic voting and outright fraud. The relatively calm public mood, combined with intensifying repression, allowed the Kremlin to avoid any serious protests.
The situation today is different. Citizens have a clear list of grievances against the authorities, and everyday hardships are only getting worse. An official election result that bears no relation to actual public sentiment will be met with open hostility. Under these conditions the upcoming State Duma campaign will be purely formal, stripped of any real legitimizing elements. That, in turn, creates additional risks for the regime.
