During Vladimir Putin’s visit to China, Deputy Prime Minister for Industry and de facto crown prince of «Greater Rostec» Denis Manturov declared that the Chinese car industry must not be allowed to compete with AvtoVAZ. In his view, the Chinese should offer Russians only more expensive premium vehicles — electric cars and hybrids, for example.
In 2024, during Putin’s previous trip to China, the head of Rostec, Sergei Chemezov, had made almost identical remarks, calling for restrictions on Chinese car sales. This rhetoric has become the calling card of the «Rostec clan.» Its members pick the most convenient PR moment to spell out their vision of Russia’s relationship with Beijing.
The Chinese car industry really is Rostec’s biggest headache. The corporation owns the country’s largest car plants, and sales of both AvtoVAZ and KamAZ are falling — partly because of competition from Chinese brands and partly because of the general economic climate. The state corporation’s managers understand that further decline will raise awkward questions at the very top.
Chemezov and his circle were originally wary of the rapprochement with China. Rostec preferred to work with European and American partners in both the automotive and aviation sectors. The sanctions imposed after 2022 cut off that cooperation and dealt the corporation a heavy blow.
The consistency of the Rostec team’s position suggests they have Putin’s blessing to voice these views publicly. The president himself does not appear to share their skepticism, but he is willing to give his long-time ally a certain freedom of speech. The criticism of an excessively sharp «turn to the East» coming from Manturov and Chemezov shows that even on a question so central to state policy there is still no full consensus within the Russian elite.
Change in Methodology
For several weeks the state polling agency VTsIOM had been recording a decline in Vladimir Putin’s and United Russia’s ratings. Then it stopped publishing survey data for two weeks — and changed its methodology. Having previously relied exclusively on telephone interviews, it has now begun «diluting» them with face-to-face, door-to-door polling.
On its website VTsIOM explained the decision as follows: «In recent times the conditions for conducting surveys have changed substantially. Restrictions on communications, the spread of anti-spam filters and the rise in telephone fraud have made Russians far more wary of speaking to strangers. This trend has affected older age groups in particular — the most active voters. In the current environment telephone polls can no longer guarantee proper coverage of this important electoral segment.»
Reading between the lines is not difficult: when the authorities’ ratings are falling, priority is given to the older generation — the most loyal part of the electorate. Pensioners are easier to find at home, and door-to-door polling removes any anonymity. Asking people face-to-face about their support for the government increases the likelihood of socially desirable answers, even among younger respondents.
The new method has indeed helped massage the figures. Approval of Vladimir Putin’s performance rose by a modest 1.2 percentage points (from 65.6% in April to 66.8% in mid-May), while trust increased by 1.1 points. United Russia’s support, however, jumped 3.5 points (from 27.7% to 31.2%). The «New People» party lost 4.3 points in the same period and dropped from second to fourth place. CPRF and LDPR saw only marginal gains. The adjustment was clearly made in favor of the ruling party.
New Hunting Season on the CPRF
Security services have resumed pressure on the Communist Party’s regional activists. The latest blow has fallen on Altai Krai — a traditional stronghold for the party. Vitaly Buldakov, secretary of the regional committee, and Natalia Chistokletova, former chief accountant of the local branch, have been detained on fraud charges. Earlier, Altai Krai Legislative Assembly deputies Andrei Chernobay, Yuri Kropotin and Lyudmila Klyushnikova, along with several parliamentary aides, were also arrested.
In Omsk and Orenburg regions, prominent Communists are being fined under Article 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences («Propaganda of Nazi or extremist symbols»). Omsk regional deputy Vladimir Vinnichenko and second secretary of the regional committee Ivan Fedin were punished for images of the logos of Meta, the social-media company designated extremist in Russia. Orenburg deputies Nurlan Munzhasarov and Vladimir Gudomarov were penalized for posts criticizing Alexei Navalny.
All three regions will hold not only State Duma elections this autumn but also elections to their local legislative assemblies.
It is clear that, on Kremlin orders, the security services have begun using against the CPRF the same tactics previously perfected on Yabloko. A conviction under Article 20.3 automatically bars a person from running for office. It was precisely through a combination of various criminal and administrative articles plus «foreign agent» labels that the most prominent Yabloko figures were gradually squeezed out of politics. The aim is to force the Communists to abandon the idea of fielding a full party list in the State Duma election. Without recognizable names, that list would consist largely of political unknowns.
Against the backdrop of growing problems in the country, the CPRF’s rating has been creeping up. Unlike the «New People,» the Communists show greater independence and boldness. Their ranks still contain many experienced regional politicians who have a good feel for public sentiment.
For instance, CPRF State Duma deputy Renat Suleymanov told a Siberian outlet that Russia needs the «earliest possible end» to the war in Ukraine because the economy cannot sustain a long conflict. Although the statement was not made from the Duma rostrum but in reply to a regional journalist, it was telling: the Communists are ready to fight for voters’ support.
The authorities are responding with a well-rehearsed technology. They knock locally known politicians off the lists and, in the case of Altai Krai, are also trying to paralyze the regional party apparatus. Such pressure pushes the CPRF in the eyes of regional officials into the category of an almost «non-systemic» opposition.
Most likely, the Kremlin’s political bloc and the security services hope to make the Communist Party more pliable and controllable. The result, however, could be the opposite. The image of a persecuted party could earn the CPRF extra points in the federal elections. Even so, the party’s regional campaigns will still suffer serious damage.
Neverov’s Demarche
Sergei Neverov — former secretary of United Russia’s General Council, ex-leader of its Duma faction and former deputy speaker of the lower house — caused a scandal during the party’s primaries in Smolensk Region. He submitted documents to run in the preliminary vote, then abruptly withdrew his candidacy and publicly called on voters to support a participant in the war in Ukraine, Smolensk city council deputy Artyom Kornyuchenkov. Kornyuchenkov in turn quickly withdrew as well, saying he wanted to focus on his municipal work.
The constituency in Smolensk Region had already been quietly reserved by the Kremlin for a high-profile «Just Russia» candidate — businessman and State Duma deputy speaker Alexander Babakov. «A Just Russia» faces an uncertain future even getting onto the party-list ballot, while victory in a pre-cleared single-mandate district virtually guarantees a seat. In such cases United Russia usually fields a technical nobody who mounts no real campaign. That was what was supposed to happen this time, but Neverov’s demarche shattered the agreement. As a seasoned United Russia insider he knew perfectly well that the seat had been reserved, yet he deliberately went into open conflict. His participation in the primaries upset all the calculations, and his subsequent endorsement of an «SVO veteran» (who had clearly been placed on the ballot merely as filler) added extra chaos.
«The opinion of Smolensk residents interests no one, and the results of United Russia’s preliminary vote in Smolensk Region are now of no importance to anyone,» Neverov wrote on his Telegram channel.
In recent years Neverov has been steadily losing ground. In 2023 he fell out with his chief patron, Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, and was effectively sidelined. There was no place for him in the new parliamentary convocation. The veteran politician found a way to exact revenge by exploiting a vulnerability in the system: any party member can register for the primaries. That is exactly what Neverov did — to inflict maximum damage on the procedure, the party leadership and the Kremlin’s political bloc.
His withdrawal has already triggered a scandal, and the switch of support to a military man has poured more fuel on the fire. Vladimir Putin demands the promotion of a «new elite,» yet the system resists. Neverov struck precisely at this sore spot. The politician presumably understands that the doors to the system are now closed to him forever. Nevertheless, he has managed to slam them shut with style.
United Russia will most likely tighten the rules for registering in the primaries — for example, by introducing a pre-filter through some kind of commission. Neverov’s demarche is yet another sign of the nervous, tense atmosphere inside the power vertical. Systemic players who know all the rules perfectly well are now deliberately breaking them, sensing that «this is now allowed.»
