Russia appears to have settled on its approach to the Middle Eastern crisis. It is partially freezing existing projects with Iran while preserving and even expanding military-technical cooperation. Moscow is trying to do two things at once: prop up a key partner and secure additional levers of influence across the region. Yet this balancing act carries risks. Ties with other Middle Eastern states could sour, and the overall direction of Russian policy in the region may become even harder to predict.
An Unexpected Windfall
The crisis surrounding Iran has already delivered Russia tangible dividends. The most immediate gains are in oil revenues. Surging global demand and sharply higher prices have nearly doubled earnings: in March Russia brought in $ 19.04 billion from crude exports — $ 9.7 billion more than in February. Sector analysts believe the positive effect on Russian hydrocarbon exports will not be short-lived.
Even if the worst-case scenario — large-scale destruction of Persian Gulf oil infrastructure — is avoided, the world will emerge from the crisis with depleted stockpiles, keeping prices elevated. The war is far from over. Strikes on Iranian or Arab energy facilities remain possible, as does a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, global gas prices are also rising on the back of Middle Eastern turmoil. All this means the crisis is already generating budget revenues for Russia that will not dry up in a month or two.
The Kremlin can draw further encouragement from the fertilizer market. Roughly 46 percent of global seaborne urea shipments and about 30 percent of ammonia pass through the Strait of Hormuz. As one of the world’s leading fertilizer exporters (annual sales around $ 13 billion), Russia stands to reap additional income. The knock-on effects on the global food market could prove even more durable. Russia remains a major player, especially in grains, and any gains here are likely to be more structural and lasting than the temporary windfall in oil and gas, which will eventually adjust to the new reality.
Finally, there is growing demand for alternative trade routes. Even after the crisis ends, the Strait of Hormuz will not soon be viewed as safe. Add to that the damaged reputation of the Suez Canal following repeated Houthi attacks on vessels (until recently the route carried 10−12 percent of global trade), and the result is a powerful boost for the Northern Sea Route. For Iran itself, the Caspian Sea may become one of the few remaining gateways to world markets. Both developments open fresh opportunities for Russia.
Slipping Control
For all these bonuses, the situation for Russia is far from straightforward. Above all, events are unfolding entirely beyond Moscow’s control. Russian attempts to join the diplomatic effort have so far yielded nothing: repeated offers to act as mediator have been politely ignored, as have proposals to remove Iran’s enriched uranium. The reason is simple — Moscow is not seen as a neutral player. Despite occasional friction in Russian-Iranian relations, outside observers view the Kremlin as Tehran’s close partner and Washington’s rival — in other words, a party with a stake in the outcome.
Yet a far more serious problem is the erosion of Russia’s broader Middle Eastern strategy. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when the West tried to isolate Moscow, the region’s importance to the Kremlin skyrocketed. Trade volumes with Middle Eastern countries rose sharply; they became vital channels for re-exports and parallel imports. Turkey, for instance, has consistently ranked among Russia’s top three trading partners since 2022, with turnover hovering around $ 50 billion. The UAE posted $ 12 billion in 2025, entering the top ten, while trade with Egypt reached $ 10.5 billion.
Iran was meant to be a key element of this strategy. The plan was to build the International North-South Transport Corridor through Iranian territory. Economically the project always looked questionable: the Eurasian Development Bank estimated that modernizing the necessary infrastructure by 2030 would cost $ 38 billion. Russian experts repeatedly highlighted the route’s high cost and logistical complexity. Still, for Moscow the corridor held strategic value — an insurance policy for goods transit if Turkey or China began enforcing Western sanctions. Iran, itself under sanctions, seemed a reliable partner that would not bow to U.S. or EU pressure.
The catch is that the project requires massive investment precisely in Iranian infrastructure. Russia had planned to finance and build the 160-kilometer Rasht-Astara railway linking the Russian and Iranian rail networks via Azerbaijan. But a single rail line is not enough; roads must be repaired, warehouses constructed, and Iranian ports upgraded. Against a backdrop of recurring protests, internet blackouts, Israeli-American strikes, and already damaged infrastructure, the prospect of completing a fully functional North-South Corridor looks increasingly unrealistic.
A similar fate has befallen the proposed gas hub in Iran. Moscow hoped the project would provide an additional export route for Russian gas — piped via Azerbaijan into Iran, then through Iranian networks to the Persian Gulf, where it would be liquefied and shipped to global markets. Profitability was uncertain, but under sanctions any diversification option was welcome. The problem is that Iran has no operational LNG terminals — they are still under construction. With Iranian infrastructure now in ruins and the Strait of Hormuz potentially blocked, the entire scheme has become virtually unworkable.
Military operations have not yet brought down the Islamic Republic, but virtually every major Russian project in Iran is now at risk. The Bushehr nuclear power plant, built by Rosatom, is a telling example: it has been hit at least four times during the current war. Work has been suspended and nearly all Russian personnel evacuated. The same pattern is evident at the under-construction Sirik thermal power station and at the projects of ZN Vostok, which is involved in developing at least five Iranian oil fields. No strikes on those sites have been reported, but keeping staff there has become dangerously impractical.
The problems are not confined to Iran alone. The situation with the United Arab Emirates, for example, remains uncertain. Since 2022, the Emirates have served as a major conduit for parallel imports to Russia — including chips and microcircuits — while overall bilateral trade turnover has more than doubled. That channel is now under threat.
Moreover, these developments are creating a highly unwelcome precedent: Moscow’s position in the Middle East is being disregarded even when Russian projects and citizens come under direct attack. Diplomatic facilities in Isfahan, the Russian Orthodox Church building in Tehran, the port of Enzeli (a key hub for Russian-Iranian trade), and the already-mentioned Bushehr nuclear power plant have all been struck. Some of the hits may have been accidental. Yet the repeated strikes on Bushehr and the attack on the Caspian port show that Washington and Tel Aviv are paying no attention whatsoever to Moscow’s protests and expressions of outrage. This cannot but alarm the Kremlin, whose diplomats have tried in vain to persuade Israel and the United States to stop such actions.
All-In Gamble
Under current conditions, it is logical for Moscow to seek genuine leverage over the course of events. Certain steps in this direction are already being taken. According to available information, Russia may have begun supplying Tehran with Geran strike drones since March — a modernized version of the Iranian Shahed-136.
If confirmed, this marks an important shift in approach. Since 2022, Moscow has started delivering new types of weapons to Iran: Yak-130 trainer aircraft, Mi-28 attack helicopters, Spartak armored vehicles, and small arms. None of these systems, however, were suited for strikes against Israel or the United States and were more likely intended for use against rebels or protesters. Agreements on the delivery of Su-35 fighters and Verba MANPADS have so far remained mere promises. The modernized Shaheds represent the first instance in recent years of Russia providing Iran with weapons capable of striking U.S. forces, Israel, or other actors in the region.
In addition to the kamikaze drones, Moscow has taken another significant step signaling a transformation in its policy: it is now supplying Iran with targeting intelligence for missiles and drones. This military-technical asset offers Russia several immediate advantages: it can stoke instability in the Persian Gulf, gain additional bargaining chips in negotiations with the United States over Ukraine, and stake a claim to a role in resolving the Middle Eastern crisis.
Yet this carries a serious risk. In effect, Russia has already become a party to the conflict by supplying weapons that Iran is actively employing today. Tehran’s military adversaries are not limited to Israel and the United States; they also include the Arab states of the Persian Gulf — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar among them. Even if these countries were drawn into the confrontation reluctantly, their relations with Iran will never be the same after the exchange of strikes. Consequently, any further deepening of military-technical support for Tehran threatens to create new problems for the Kremlin and further complicate its broader Middle East strategy.
The Kremlin’s Dilemma
In the Middle East, Russia now faces a difficult choice. A low-intensity conflict around Iran broadly serves its interests, albeit with important reservations. However, events are unfolding rapidly, and their outcome remains unpredictable. As a result, the Kremlin is attempting to move from the category of observers to that of genuine actors capable of influencing the situation. For now, the only tool available for this purpose is enhanced military-technical support for Iran. Yet pursuing this course more deeply risks worsening Moscow’s position across the region.
This dilemma runs deeper than it first appears. For Russia, the importance of Iran does not outweigh the combined potential of the Persian Gulf states. Trade turnover with the UAE alone is more than double that with Iran. Moreover, relations with Saudi Arabia have been gradually warming in recent years — the two sides recently agreed on a visa-free regime starting in 2026.
Thus, despite the tactical advantages of the conflict surrounding Iran, it poses serious strategic challenges for Moscow. It disrupts the Kremlin’s regional strategy and is forcing it to make risky decisions that could significantly complicate relations with a substantial portion of its Middle Eastern partners.
