Even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the state corporation Rostec—originally established as Rostekhnologii—and its long-time CEO Sergei Chemezov had emerged as one of the most powerful factions within Russia’s elite. The conglomerate effectively controlled key segments of the government’s industrial and trade portfolio, oversaw its vast network of military and civilian enterprises, and exerted influence over several strategic regions. Chemezov himself cultivated an image as a pragmatic moderate with technocratic leanings. Rostec maintained partnerships with leading global firms in automotive and aviation sectors.
Since the war began, the corporation has secured substantial new defense contracts funded by the state budget, but it has suffered significant losses in international markets, severing ties with Western partners. The group has achieved notable successes in personnel placements, cultivating a cadre of potential successors to Vladimir Putin across different age groups. Its lobbying efforts for civilian products have generally proven effective. However, the longer the war drags on, and the deeper Russia’s economic challenges become, the more difficult it is for Rostec and Chemezov to sustain their entrenched positions.
The Technocratic Security Veteran
Sergei Chemezov, head of Rostec, served alongside Vladimir Putin in the KGB’s Dresden residency during the Soviet era. From the late 1990s, following Putin’s rise to power, he managed defense export affairs, becoming CEO of the state enterprise Rosoboronexport in 2004. Since 2007, Chemezov has led Rostec, which has consolidated hundreds of defense plants and major civilian industrial assets under its umbrella. It dominates Russia’s automotive sector through control of AvtoVAZ and Kamaz, and aviation through stakes in key manufacturers. In 2012, Denis Manturov, a close associate of Chemezov, was appointed minister of industry and trade, bringing Rostec’s oversight ministry effectively under the corporation’s influence—allowing it to regulate itself while monitoring competitors.
From the outset, Chemezov and his network extended their reach into regions where Rostec assets are concentrated. Vladimir Artykov, a Chemezov ally, governed Samara Region—home to AvtoVAZ—from 2007 to 2012. Rostec affiliates also vied for governorships in Irkutsk Region and Krasnoyarsk Territory.
Pre-war Rostec positioned itself as a modern, market-oriented entity exporting advanced weaponry and partnering with global leaders in automotive and aviation. AvtoVAZ collaborated with Renault-Nissan; Kamaz incorporated European and American components; and aircraft from the United Aircraft Corporation, such as the Superjet and the then-developing MC-21, relied on Western technology. «By 2035, Rostec aims to become a global player, catching up with companies like GE and Siemens, and leading in at least two or three segments,» Chemezov boasted in 2015. That year, he noted the corporation’s arms export order portfolio stood at $ 45 billion. As early as the mid-2000s, Rostec’s head actively commented on political matters—for instance, reflecting on the Kremlin-backed candidate’s loss in the Irkutsk gubernatorial election, where Sergey Eroshenko, supported by Chemezov himself (his native region), fell short: «Eroshenko’s problem was his lack of electoral experience. In May 2015, his rating in the region was around 65%. He figured that was enough, no need for further effort, and went on vacation. Meanwhile, his rivals campaigned vigorously. In the end, he lost by a narrow margin.»
By then, Sergey Chemezov fully grasped that the rules of the game within the power vertical were shifting. The era of «collective Putin» in the early 2010s gave way to sole leadership by Vladimir Putin. His inner circle could attempt to persuade the president on certain decisions, but even hinting at collective governance became risky. «How could I advise the president? Who am I? I’m just the head of a production conglomerate,» Chemezov quipped at a time when Rosneft’s Igor Sechin or Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev sought to underscore their influence. Rostec’s leader understood the value of public relations—when innovation was in vogue, he promoted the Yotaphone; later, after absorbing the United Aircraft Corporation, the Superjet became Rostec’s flagship project. Much of this PR targeted Russia’s top leadership. Chemezov adeptly leveraged Vladimir Putin’s drive toward militarization—his structure became the primary beneficiary of the Russian army’s rearmament policy.
Building Greater Rostec
By the late 2010s, Sergey Chemezov’s state corporation had grown substantially. It absorbed the United Aircraft Corporation, Uralvagonzavod, and hundreds of smaller factories. Among Rostec’s assets were pharmaceutical productions and even the amber combine. This enabled not only expanded budget flows but also denser contacts between the corporation’s leadership and Vladimir Putin. The roster of governors from Chemezov’s clan expanded as well. In 2017, Deputy Industry Minister Anton Alikhanov assumed leadership of Kaliningrad region (site of the amber combine). Another Manturov deputy, Gleb Nikitin, took over the more attractive Nizhny Novgorod region.
Lobbying, particularly at the regional level, was not always successful. For instance, Rostec failed to install Chemezov’s advisor Sergey Sokol as governor—he ran unsuccessfully for Irkutsk region (twice), Krasnoyarsk krai, and then Khakassia. Another former Chemezov advisor, Vladimir Gutenev, also did not secure a regional post. However, since 2021, he has chaired the State Duma’s industry committee.
Gradually, Sergey Chemezov constructed a «Greater Rostec,» whose boundaries far exceed those of the corporation proper. It forms a closed system encompassing the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Duma industry committee under Gutenev, and a powerful PR machine. Recently, it incorporated the Presidential Administration’s defense complex department, led by former Deputy Industry Minister Viktor Yevtukhov. Chemezov’s expansion can be termed defensive, gradually placed loyalists in structures meant to oversee Rostec. Today, it is an impregnable fortress shielded from outsiders. Within Greater Rostec, a distinctive cadre mobility prevails: ministry and corporation staff become regional heads, then may return to parent structures—as with Anton Alikhanov and Vladimir Artyakov. Over time, Rostec ranks produced potential Putin successors, nurtured by every clan. For Chemezov’s group, these include Denis Manturov, the mid-generation «prince» Gleb Nikitin, and the younger «prince» Anton Alikhanov.
Unlike most oligarchs and senior officials in Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, Sergey Chemezov embraced publicity, actively leveraging it. Rostec’s and its head’s PR is handled by Vasily Brovko, director for special assignments and husband of TV host Tina Kandelaki. Before the war, he preferred portraying a figure with democratic leanings—and Chemezov may indeed hold such views to some extent. In a 2019 RBC interview on Moscow protests, he remarked: «A sensible opposition benefits any body, representative assembly, and ultimately the state—there needs to be an alternative force offering insights and signals. The president has said this repeatedly. If everything is always fine, we risk sliding into stagnation. We’ve been there before.»
He deemed opposition candidates’ entry into the Moscow City Duma «useful.» Media reported that Chemezov associates supported Novaya Gazeta, a key opposition outlet. The Rostec-affiliated RTVI channel sought a balanced information policy, inviting prominent professional journalists—former editor-in-chief included TV journalist Alexey Pivovarov. Of course, Chemezov’s «liberalism» has clear limits and is hardly genuine. In the early 2020s, Rostec’s team aggressively expanded into Telegram, leading to arrests of many popular channel administrators based on corporation staff complaints. Thus, Chemezov’s clan cleared and tailored the market to its needs.
Deceptive Growth and Adversaries
The war’s start placed Rostec and its leader in an ambivalent position. On one hand, the defense sector—largely Rostec—received boosted state funding and grew. On the other, civilian enterprises faced severe difficulties. Aviators lost access to imported engines due to sanctions, delaying MS-21’s entry into service and forcing an import-substituted Superjet. Renault-Nissan’s exit from AvtoVAZ stripped modern technologies, shifting focus to purely domestic vehicles unpopular among motorists due to quality issues disproportionate to price. Defense production suffered from the same sanctions, severely restricting Rostec’s arms market access.
When the war began, he remained visible publicly but began emphasizing the corporation’s products’ frontline importance and supposed superiority. These signals primarily target Vladimir Putin—and, judging by personnel successes, they land well. Denis Manturov became the sole first deputy prime minister, with Anton Alikhanov succeeding him at the Industry Ministry. Greater Rostec retained Kaliningrad control under former deputy minister Alexey Besprozvannykh. United Aircraft Corporation head Yuri Slyusar took over Rostov region—a large, populous area with developed industry and agriculture. For now, Rostec conducts successful lobbying: the State Duma passed taxi localization legislation benefiting AvtoVAZ, and the government-imposed scrap fees on imported cars. Nationalized enterprises also flow to the corporation. Chemezov openly criticizes Chinese product influx into Russia (Chinese equipment, especially vehicles, genuinely hampers his corporation), and Putin evidently permits this.
These gains do not offset mounting problems. Indirect signs suggest budget deficits are straining defense funding. Enterprises may soon operate on credit, as in the 1990s. Rostec’s civilian sector faces serious troubles: new aircraft introductions are delayed. Economic hardships have hit KAMAZ with declining truck demand and AvtoVAZ similarly (though the latter ties to the product’s image among Russian drivers). Denis Manturov has repeatedly justified himself to Vladimir Putin, and such instances will likely increase—especially given Rostec’s influential enemies. Chemezov must stress his equipment’s frontline use, as his team has little else to boast.
Chief among foes are the Kovalchuk brothers; their media outlets now openly criticize Rostec units, highlighting problems and failures. Blows target the clan’s media empire—one major political Telegram channel, Brief (now Daily), was labeled a foreign agent. As competition for budget resources intensifies, infighting among Putin’s influential groups will inevitably sharpen, inviting new attacks on Sergey Chemezov’s substantial and powerful clan. Especially since Greater Rostec harbors figures seen as potential Putin successors. Chemezov’s stance against unchecked partnership with China projects a certain future vision and agenda, further heightening risks for his group.
For now, Rostec holds firm, unhesitatingly backing its team—even personally accompanying them to Putin (as with Denis Manturov). Most likely, Sergey Chemezov’s clan will retain its positions in the near term and perhaps seek to strengthen them.
