The story of preparing negotiations between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin began to rapidly unfold a few weeks ago. Observers, and even members of the leaders’ inner circles, expected that they might meet as early as late February or March. However, the time and even the location of the meeting remain undecided, although not long ago few doubted that the presidents would meet in Riyadh.
A peculiar market has formed around the presumed negotiation venue: Turkey is inviting Trump and Putin to hold talks there, and Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko is also showing hospitality. Kremlin officials say they have no concrete plans for a peace agreement, only some «drafts.» The American side is also in no hurry to announce the terms it proposes for peace—most likely because they, too, exist only as separate proposals and sketches. Even special representatives for the negotiations have not yet been appointed. It seems Donald Trump intended to conduct a blitzkrieg and impose terms on Ukraine and Russia that the global audience would perceive as a flawed but acceptable peace. Such terms could include freezing the conflict along the line of combat contact and a ceasefire tied to a significant date—Easter (this year celebrated on the same day by Orthodox and Catholic Christians) or Victory Day. However, these conditions suit neither Ukraine, where authorities fear the Russian army would use the respite to regroup and launch another offensive, nor Vladimir Putin, who wants to seize more Ukrainian territory. The longer the negotiations stall, the wider the gap grows between Trump’s proposals and reality.
European leaders have already wedged themselves into this gap: UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Germany’s prospective Chancellor Friedrich Merz. They promise to ramp up support for Ukraine and criticize the U.S. administration for playing into Russia’s hands. Trump has halted arms deliveries to the Ukrainian army and even the exchange of intelligence data. This is likely an attempt to pressure Ukraine’s leadership into dialogue, albeit a clumsy one, but it is perceived as a gesture toward the Kremlin and an aid to Russia. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have begun seizing the initiative from the Russian army and reclaiming occupied territories.
The situation around the potential talks changes daily, with new actors and conditions emerging, which clearly does not facilitate a swift resolution of the conflict. The Kremlin expects the U.S. authorities to take the initiative, believing Trump will eventually handle Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders. Russian leadership has long considered both Ukraine and Europe to lack «agency,» effectively controlled by the United States. Vladimir Putin is unprepared to play a more complex game involving concessions, trade-offs, and strategic long-term moves. The only thing he is capable of is exploiting weaknesses, creating chaos, and extracting benefits from it. Right now, chaos is working against both Putin and Trump. The American president’s blitzkrieg appears almost derailed at this point; his sprint has turned into an obstacle marathon. Peace is not particularly appealing to Putin—he will wait for advantageous offers from Trump until the Russian army faces serious setbacks on the front or the economic problems currently plaguing the country grow even more severe.
«One Hundred Veterans in the Duma»
The presidential administration and United Russia want to allocate up to one hundred seats in the State Duma to «participants of the Special Military Operation (SVO).» The political bloc led by Sergey Kiriyenko is indeed fond of round numbers and records because Vladimir Putin, on whom the career prospects of Russia’s top bureaucracy depend, loves them. The «One Hundred Veterans in the Duma» program fits perfectly into Kiriyenko’s management style, which has introduced corporate schemes with a touch of the Soviet Gosplan into Russian politics. The plan to place veterans in the Duma will be fairly easy to implement. First, participants of the war include federal parliament deputies who announced they were heading to the front as part of the «Kaskad» Deputy Battalion—there are already several dozen of them. In each region, there are a few high-ranking officials or parliamentarians who went to war, and the regional bureaucracy and deputy corps are a familiar source of personnel for the State Duma. Thus, the Kremlin can easily recruit «veterans» familiar with the system into parliament. Even real military personnel will find a place among the deputies—a few dozen «SVO participants» among hundreds of parliamentarians integrated into the power vertical won’t make a significant difference, especially since Duma members do not personally control major financial flows or make managerial decisions. Vladimir Putin continues to show attention to the military, calling them «my guys,» and the system, catering to his wishes, dresses up existing elites in uniforms while giving real frontline soldiers what it doesn’t mind parting with.
Rituals from the Past
United Russia has announced the start of its primaries for regional elections. Preliminary voting was added to the party’s charter back in 2009 and had real practical significance at the time. First, it gave United Russia a head start in campaigning and spending electoral funds, which are limited by law. They showcased their candidates early, advertising them on billboards and TV spots, reinforcing the party brand, all while formally avoiding accusations of jumping the campaign gun. United Russia’s opponents lacked the resources for such primaries—a long campaign marathon was only feasible for the ruling party. Back then, these crutches were important for the Kremlin, as its ability to rig elections was significantly limited. At that time, the procedure was largely formal; candidates were supposedly «selected» by party members (in reality, all lists were pre-approved by the Kremlin and regional administrations). A few years later, primaries increasingly shifted to an «open» model, allowing anyone to vote for potential candidates. This shift was deliberate. It allowed the authorities to test their ability to mobilize dependent voters and support groups for specific candidates, filtering out the least successful nominees after these trials. Now, the situation has changed. Over the past decade, the Kremlin has refined its corporate mobilization techniques, introduced three-day voting, and is pushing to expand electronic voting. Against this backdrop, an extra few weeks of campaigning seem negligible. There’s no longer a need to test administrative resources: the dependent «electorate» has been counted and digitized during corporate mobilization efforts in past elections (both federal and regional). Nevertheless, the ruling party maintains this outdated and useless ritual. Primaries persist because Vladimir Putin, who clings to familiar figures, organizations, and procedures, has grown accustomed to them (this is also why, for example, the largely forgotten All-Russia People’s Front still exists). Moreover, keeping primaries is directly profitable for United Russia. Millions of rubles are spent on preliminary voting—contracts for printing flyers and newspapers, producing and placing ads, go to the right people. Teams of political strategists friendly to the Kremlin and United Russia’s leadership can profit from organizing this unnecessary ceremony. Putin’s conservatism and United Russia’s desire to maximize earnings converge at a single point called primaries, ensuring that next year we’ll hear about United Russia’s preliminary voting again, this time on a federal scale.
