The «Notebook of Civic Education» published an article by Alexander Kharichev, head of the Kremlin’s social process monitoring department, titled «Civilization ‘Russia.’» The journal is published by the «Knowledge» society, whose supervisory board is chaired by Kharichev’s direct superior in the presidential administration, Sergey Kiriyenko. The Kremlin’s political bloc has long been engaged in ideological studies, a practice that occurred under its previous leaders, Vladislav Surkov and Vyacheslav Volodin. However, these efforts never progressed beyond creating complex and obscure constructs like «sovereign democracy,» which were largely incomprehensible to ordinary citizens.
This is not Kharichev’s first foray into ideological work. In 2022, alongside a group of authors (including another Kiriyenko ally, political strategist and current RANEPA vice-rector Andrey Polosin), he published a text about the «pentabasis.» The authors claimed that the main factors influencing Russia’s development were «the individual,» «family,» «society,» «state,» and «country.» These categories could apply to any state, leaving it unclear what distinguishes Russia in this context or how this framework relates to ideology. Despite being written during wartime, the article’s content was relatively benign. Later, in the text «Russia’s DNA,» Kharichev and Polosin introduced the concept of «service» but without detailed explanation.
Kharichev’s new article offers a clearer ideological framework, describing relationships both among citizens and between society and the state. In the best traditions of Soviet humanities, which heavily cited Marxist-Leninist classics, Kharichev generously references Vladimir Putin’s statements and decrees. He mentions «collectivism,» measures to boost birth rates, and the «civilizational character» of the Russian state. Some of these ideological concepts were developed within the political bloc, taking into account Putin’s interests. For example, the term «state-civilization» draws on the teachings of historian Lev Gumilev, a favorite of the Russian president.
Kharichev paints a portrait of the ideal citizen and society. He claims that Russians have a «special relationship» with the state, characterized by «paternalism, orientation toward autocracy, and the personification and sacralization of power.» The head of a key Kremlin department writes about a «civilizational code,» or beliefs supposedly predetermined by the country’s history. According to Kharichev, Russians are passive, expect benefits from the state, strive for autocracy (implying democracy is alien to them), and endow power with sacred qualities. He asserts that Russians prioritize «faith» over rational reason, place «moral norms» and the «spirit of the law» above its letter, and adhere to «family values.» «For us, spiritual values are more important than material wealth—we need a higher-level, sometimes unattainable goal. We choose faith, prioritizing spirituality. Our value orientations are service, humanism, and sacrifice. We think in images—‘Russia cannot be known by the mind.’ At times we build a heavenly kingdom on earth, at others communism, or a Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok,» Kharichev muses.
The concept of service reappears in this text, now with more detailed explanations: «We [Russians] more readily give our lives for lofty goals,» preferring «sacrificial devotion» to comfort. «Collectivism,» which Kharichev claims is inherent to Russians (despite polls suggesting otherwise), is repackaged with trendier slogans like the «WE principle» and «teamwork.» This principle is positioned as a counter to the West’s supposedly corrosive influence, which seeks to destroy Russia’s «civilizational code.» The article also touches on Putin’s relatively new focus on increasing birth rates, with Kharichev calling large families a «social norm» and viewing the family’s role as «biological» population reproduction.
A psychologist by training, Kharichev employs neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) techniques, saturating the text with terms dear to Putin: «collectivism,» «family values,» «state-civilization,» and «sacrifice.» Putin himself frequently speaks on these themes. Kharichev references the war («on the front and in the rear, we hear: we are one big family»), recognizing Putin’s current preoccupation with it. The «sacralization» and «personification» of power are also likely to resonate with the president, who believes in the sacred nature of authority and his own lofty mission. After reading this text, Russia’s top leadership should have no doubt that the political bloc is actively and successfully working on the ideological front.
The text also reflects the corporate ideology promoted by Kiriyenko himself, hence the emphasis on «teamwork» (a modern alternative to «collectivism») and the «WE principle.»
Kharichev’s article could easily find its way into the curriculum of courses like «Fundamentals of Russian Statehood» or even school lessons on «Important Conversations.» It will likely be quoted in speeches by officials and deputies at various levels to demonstrate loyalty to the political bloc. However, the danger of Kharichev’s text lies not in this. Its NLP could push Russia’s leader to take increasingly reckless and absurd steps: prolonging the war, declaring mobilization, or further damaging the economy. After all, Russians are supposedly willing to endure anything, as «sacrifice» and the «sacralization of power» are embedded in them.
Arrest with Delayed Effect
Law enforcement arrested Alexey Smirnov, the former head of the Kursk region. He is suspected of fraud related to the construction of the region’s defensive structures, which were breached by the Ukrainian army in August (Ukrainian forces still control parts of the region). Smirnov was appointed acting governor after his predecessor, Roman Starovoit, was promoted to federal transport minister. Like several other regional leaders, Starovoit was allowed to name a successor, typically a deputy, and Smirnov was his choice. Both Smirnov and the Kremlin likely expected routine work in a politically manageable region. The Ukrainian invasion changed everything, dealing a blow to the authorities’ ratings: polls show a sharp rise in public anxiety. Despite the extraordinary situation, the Kremlin did not cancel the planned elections or replace Smirnov with a figure better suited to the new reality. Smirnov, a bureaucratic manager with no political or crisis management experience, also did not step down. Ultimately, he failed to handle the political crisis: residents of Ukrainian-occupied districts protested, demanding compensation for lost property and housing certificates. Federal officials, including Deputy Prime Minister for Construction Marat Khusnullin and Starovoit himself, had to step in to quell the unrest. Smirnov’s weakness was not forgiven—he was sacked, and Alexander Khinshtein, an experienced public politician and State Duma deputy from United Russia, was appointed acting governor.
Late last year, law enforcement opened a criminal case against Vladimir Lukin, head of Kursk’s «Development Corporation,» suspected of embezzlement in the construction of defensive structures. Rumors that Smirnov himself could face prosecution surfaced then, but the case was paused, possibly due to intervention by his patrons (e.g., his former boss, Transport Minister Starovoit). This immunity was short-lived, and the ex-governor was arrested. After Ukrainian forces were pushed out of most occupied territories, the authorities needed scapegoats for the invasion. Smirnov, a civilian, appears to have been chosen. The public will be presented with a simple narrative: «The governor and his subordinates stole funds meant for defensive infrastructure, allowing Ukrainian forces to invade unimpeded.» Civilian officials, especially those in border or occupied territories, will find it psychologically harder to work after Smirnov’s arrest, as they are once again reminded that they will be blamed for the security forces’ failures. The newspaper Kommersant, citing investigators, reports that the «dragon’s teeth» (concrete structures meant to stop Ukrainian tanks) crumbled under rain and snow due to poor-quality materials. Notably, the charges against Smirnov relate not to his time as governor but to his earlier role as deputy head of the region. This suggests that the case could eventually reach Roman Starovoit, as the Ukrainian invasion was a painful blow to Vladimir Putin, and a search is underway for high-profile figures to take the blame.
