The head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), Kirill Dmitriev, continues to solidify his image as someone very close to Vladimir Putin. Last week, Dmitriev traveled to the United States for talks with Donald Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff. Dmitriev’s visit was preceded by critical remarks from Trump about the progress of negotiations between the White House and the Kremlin, with the U.S. president even threatening Russia with new sanctions. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, in official comments made before the RDIF head’s trip, effectively confirmed that Moscow was unwilling to «accept as is» the proposals from the U.S.
Dmitriev himself emphasizes that he is conducting negotiations «on behalf of» Vladimir Putin. According to him, he is engaged in a «challenging dialogue» and is trying to convey Russia’s position. The outlet Agency reported that two distinct groups are negotiating on behalf of the Kremlin. The first includes Dmitriev himself, while the second comprises official diplomats (Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Putin’s aide Sergey Ushakov, and Senator Grigory Karasin) and security officials (head of the FSB’s 5th Service, Sergey Beseda). Trump’s team finds Dmitriev familiar, convenient, and understandable—qualities not necessarily shared by other Russian negotiators. The RDIF head handles the economic aspects that are pleasant and comprehensible to American authorities: he offers the U.S. opportunities to participate in developing Russia’s natural resources and exploring the Arctic, and he attempts to connect Roscosmos with Elon Musk. These topics are of interest to Vladimir Putin as well, making successful contact with the American side in this area a real possibility.
Diplomats and security officials, on the other hand, handle the aspects of negotiations that are unpleasant for the U.S. Putin seeks recognition of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine as Russian territory, as well as the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from these areas (despite the fact that significant parts of Donetsk and large portions of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson remain under Ukrainian Armed Forces control). These demands are unlikely to be met, but Russia’s leader has no intention of backing down, and his subordinates are compelled to relay his stance. In this regard, the negotiations are stalling, and the Russian participants are facing setbacks, as they have so far failed to achieve the goals set by Putin.
Judging by Dmitriev’s posts, he understands that he is in a more advantageous position. He cannot exactly be called Russia’s «good cop.» As an investor and manager, the RDIF head has chosen a promising direction for himself where failure is unlikely. If the negotiations reach a deadlock and Putin and Trump begin to clash, it will be attributed to disagreements over the war. However, if cooperation persists in the business sphere, Dmitriev will claim it as his achievement. The negotiations have become a stepping stone for his public career. He actively manages his social media presence (on Telegram and X), creates news hooks, and underscores his proximity to the president. Dmitriev’s style on social media resembles that of Donald Trump and his circle: he highlights successes and achievements, attempts to engage with figures of interest to him, and naturally glosses over failures. For Dmitriev, this is a kind of investment in the future. He is campaigning among Russian elites, presenting himself as a skilled negotiator capable of finding topics of mutual interest while remaining a close and loyal ally to the president. Thus, the negotiations have allowed Dmitriev to subtly position himself among the potential «princes”—possible successors to Vladimir Putin.
A Prize for Governors
Vladimir Putin has increased payments to governors, bringing their salaries up to the level of deputy prime ministers. Previously, regional heads officially earned relatively modest sums—150,000 to 200,000 rubles per month. With bonuses, this could rise to 250,000−300,000 rubles. Deputy prime ministers, by contrast, earn over a million rubles. For an official responsible for a region with hundreds of thousands or even millions of residents, a salary of a few hundred thousand rubles could be considered low—comparable to what a mid-level corporate manager might easily earn. However, for a long time, the salary was far from the main perk of being a governor. The position offered opportunities to employ one’s team and bring friendly businesses into the region. Naturally, such income streams often skirted or crossed the line of legality (hence the numerous criminal cases against regional officials), but for many Russian bureaucrats, the game was worth the candle. This was appealing only in the context of well-funded budgets and a clear, predictable economic situation.
Before the full-scale war, governors had enough money for self-promotion and to direct budget flows toward friendly businesses. After February 2022, regional budget expenditures began to rise while revenues fell. New responsibilities, such as recruiting volunteers for the front, required additional funds. The dangerous game ceased to be worth the effort. The governorship has long been losing its appeal: the central government has consistently stripped regions of funds and authority, and the war has only worsened an already unenviable situation. Luring a bureaucrat or a representative of an influential group to a region has become exceedingly difficult. It could reach a paradoxical point where an elite group might be interested in a certain territory, but no one within that group is willing to take charge of it. The practice of «successors”—appointing subordinates of governors who have been promoted—is becoming increasingly common.
Deputy prime ministerial salaries might attract young careerists who either don’t know how or don’t want to rely on corrupt schemes. The question, however, is whether the system is ready to accept such figures and entrust them with regions. The salary increase is more likely a perk for the current cohort of technocratic governors from Sergey Kiriyenko’s first wave. These are former federal government employees who went to the regions hoping for further career advancement. Predictably, there weren’t enough ministerial seats for all the «technocrats,» so many are now heading into a second term. Deputy prime ministerial salaries will help sweeten another five years of work for these officials.
Expulsion of the Traders
The State Duma stripped LDPR faction member Yuri Napso of his mandate. Napso, a businessman, was considered one of the Liberal Democratic Party’s sponsors, supporting the party in exchange for parliamentary status. Before Napso, another LDPR member, St. Petersburg construction businessman Boris Paykin, also lost his mandate. Both former parliamentarians are accused of chronic absenteeism. The expulsion of Napso and Paykin reflects the stance of the presidential administration’s political bloc toward entrepreneurs obtaining State Duma seats. Kremlin managers would prefer to see career party members and bureaucrats in parliament rather than businessmen who financially backed parties in exchange for mandates. The presence of such business figures allowed systemic structures to maintain some independence from the Kremlin and negotiate with it. Now, any businessman will think twice about whether a mandate is worth it if it can be so easily revoked for absenteeism. This further increases the systemic opposition’s dependence on the Kremlin and its goodwill.
