Russia’s foreign policy is most often explained through the lens of multipolarity—a term that features in nearly every official statement as the vision of a desired global order. In the Russian interpretation, multipolarity is the conviction that political agency must inevitably be distributed fairly among the major centers of power, reflecting their actual economic and military weight in a world that has moved beyond unipolar dominance.
This framework, which assigns Russia a special role, sets the broad parameters of its foreign policy. Yet it does not account for Moscow’s concrete actions over the past four years, particularly in the context of the full-scale war in Ukraine. Russian foreign-policy thinking has another, more operational concept that has gained de-facto prominence since the late 2010s: the «Chaos Theory.» Developed primarily by experts associated with the Valdai Discussion Club, it is regularly elaborated in their reports, which underline both the concept’s evolution and its critical importance for Russia’s current strategy.
The Essence of Chaos
According to Valdai scholars, chaos in international relations is a natural and inevitable phase that follows the collapse of established «centers of gravity,» before a new, stable system of alliances, institutions, and norms has emerged. The anticipated new bipolarity (or «soft bipolarity,» as some Russian analysts once called it) never materialized, and the proclaimed multipolar order has yet to produce universally accepted rules of the game. «The evolution of the international environment is leading toward a different pattern—one that has so far remained on the periphery of discussion: a world without poles, a chaotic and rapidly changing order, a war of all against all that goes hand in hand with the decline of traditional institutions (from the sovereign nation-state to classical capitalism). This is a scenario of acute crisis that leads not so much to a new balance of power as to a complete reboot,» the authors of the Valdai report Living in a Crumbling World argue.
The architects of the Chaos Theory emphasize the scale of the ongoing transformation. They speak variously of the final collapse of the unipolar world, the end of the post-Yalta order, or even the termination of the post-Westphalian system altogether: «The old order no longer exists. There is no new one, and it is not even clear what it should look like.»
The Five Postulates
From this diagnosis flows the five core postulates of the Chaos Theory.
First: the old world cannot be restored. Those who try to preserve it—above all the West—are doomed to recognize the futility of their efforts. Sooner or later, Valdai experts contend, this will force them to negotiate new rules and formats of interaction, both with Russia and with the rest of the non-Western world. The authors do not explicitly call for the accelerated destruction of the remaining structures of the old order, but they note that «efforts to achieve global order have failed, and attempts at stabilization have turned into a series of tactical measures that often exacerbated rather than resolved problems.» In short, the more stubbornly the defenders of the status quo cling to it, the faster it collapses.
Second: chaos is fundamentally unmanageable. «The world has moved in a different direction. It has slipped into an era of unilateral decisions—an objective trend that cannot be controlled, only understood in its consequences,» the Valdai scholars write. This uncontrollability shifts the focus from attempts to restore global governance to questions of survival and adaptation. «Variability, flexibility, and situational responses have become the defining features of international politics. Those who react faster and more accurately can profit from the turmoil». Victory belongs not to those who try to restore lost manageability, but to those who can swiftly recalibrate policy, find creative solutions, and flexibly bypass or rewrite individual norms to suit their interests. «The foreground is no longer occupied by ‘restoring manageability’ but by ‘safety techniques’ for states,» the Valdai experts conclude.
Third: every actor is ultimately on its own. «The rigid „us-versus-them“ schemes are receding into the past; the principle of „every man for himself“ implies not only all-round defense but also the possibility of rapid partner-switching». Seen through this lens, Russia’s foreign policy in recent years appears entirely consistent. If supporting Bashar al-Assad is advantageous today, it must be done without hesitation. If circumstances change, previous commitments are discarded, and Moscow seeks dialogue with new Syrian players. If escalation between Israel and Iran runs counter to Russian interests, assistance to Tehran is minimized and the conflict is waited out at a safe distance. If the strategic situation demands closer ties with North Korea, a near-alliance treaty is signed with Pyongyang. The key is absolute situationalism. Permanent alliances and iron-clad obligations of the NATO Article 5 variety are impossible. Any position can be revised the moment the balance of costs and benefits shifts. Action is justified only if it yields dividends; any commitment threatening losses can be abandoned.
The fourth postulate of the «Chaos Theory» proceeds from the premise that «universalism and justice are dead.» It is this assertion that underpins Moscow’s readiness to offer unflinching support to the most brutal dictators or to systematically destroy civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. The Valdai theorists maintain that morality and ethics no longer have a place in politics: «Ethical considerations have finally ceased to serve as a criterion for political decision-making.» The «Chaos Theory» justifies any authoritarian practices inside the country under the banner of «stabilization» and denies the very possibility of universal standards of «correctness.» As one of the reports puts it, «the defining feature of the emerging world will be the absence of universal ethical notions of justice (‘correctness’) in the organization of individual states and the legitimacy of their rulers.»
The «Chaos Theory» fundamentally rejects the very idea that there can be a «right side of history.» Its authors argue that «the competition to be on the ‘right side of history’ will lose all meaning (…) there simply will be no ‘right side‘.» Such a stance completely removes any moral or normative constraints that previously, even if only to a minimal degree, influenced the choice of domestic and foreign policy. From now on, any action can be justified by national interest, while any restrictions are by definition declared erroneous or hostile.
The theorists of chaos go further and proclaim the death of grand universal ideas: «The era of big ideas, theories, programs, and expectations appears to have come to an end.» This radical nihilism is presented as the most sober and realistic view of the world—the only one capable of guaranteeing a state’s survival amid universal turbulence. Russia is urged to develop its own mode of existence, complete with a unique set of values and norms that foster internal stability and ensure the implementation of the foreign-policy course deemed optimal by the current leadership. This approach strongly resembles the «state-civilization» concept that gained prominence in 2023 and was ceremonially presented by Vladimir Putin. A Russian «state-civilization» is by definition under no obligation to fit into either Western or Eastern normative frameworks. Its own distinctive value-and-normative code and historical path are determined by the present leadership, which selectively draws from Russian history only those elements that are convenient at the given moment and interprets them in a way that serves the current political needs.
Finally, the fifth postulate of the «Chaos Theory» states that «military power is the guarantee of survival.» The theorists of chaos are convinced that as the new world order takes shape, the number of conflicts will only increase: «The forthcoming historical period will be accompanied by conflicts and, very probably, military clashes that are inevitable in the process of forming a new international order.» At the same time, the resolution of contradictions will no longer rely on legal norms and the institutions that guaranteed them: «International institutions are receding into the background, giving way to more archaic methods of conflict resolution.» In this way, the concept’s authors effectively return us to a pre-Westphalian world in which raw force alone could guarantee sovereignty and independence: «The sovereign state reaffirms its status as a structural unit of international relations. And military machines play a crucial role in this.»
In parallel, war as such—and rhetoric about the use of nuclear weapons—is being normalized. First, war ceases to be seen as an anomaly or an extreme measure: «There is a conviction that one can wage war—the only question is the minimization of losses and the maximization of results.» Second, the possibility of a limited nuclear strike is increasingly entertained: this option is «already being discussed as a preventive measure. New types of non-nuclear weapons are appearing whose use could have catastrophic consequences for the defense capability of an opposing state.»
The Valdai theorists conclude that military power remains the principal factor of state stability: «The balance of power among great powers, encompassing all categories that fall under the concept of ‘power,’ remains the most important factor of stability.» At the same time, the risk of global war becomes a permanent backdrop to international life: «The specter of all-out war will linger for a long time, if not forever.»
Theory and Practice
The annual Valdai Club reports, presented at the club’s events with Vladimir Putin in attendance, serve to provide conceptual justification for the already-established trajectories of Russian foreign policy—from the full-scale war in Ukraine to withdrawal from a range of international treaties and organizations. These are given political realities that experts are not expected to challenge but rather to interpret in such a way that the leadership’s actions appear logical, well-founded, and often the only possible course.
Platforms such as the Valdai Club and the Russian Council on Foreign Affairs face a clear task: to package current policy into an elaborate intellectual construct, embed it in a global context, deduce its internal logic for future steps (effectively producing a set of recommendations), and generate meanings suitable for both domestic and foreign audiences. The «Chaos Theory» performs this task highly effectively: it evolves in parallel with the practical implementation of Russia’s foreign policy and consistently adjusts its theses to new realities and Kremlin priorities.
The central challenge that Russian foreign-policy thinkers have been tackling since 2014—how to conceptually justify the annexation of Crimea and the manifest violation of previous commitments and norms of international law—has been successfully resolved. According to the «Chaos Theory,» Russia bears neither blame nor does Putin bear personal responsibility: it is global chaos that is destroying the old rules and foundations. Moreover, the actor that first recognizes the irreversibility of the old system’s collapse will gain a strategic advantage in building the new one. In other words, the «Chaos Theory» all but guarantees that sooner or later both the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of other Ukrainian territories will be recognized, and sanctions lifted—simply because in the new configuration of world order they will cease to have any meaning.
The «Chaos Theory» postulates the necessity of comprehensive militarization of society and state—not as a temporary measure for the duration of the war in Ukraine but as a permanent condition. The struggle against domestic dissent and countering Western influence is framed within this concept as tasks of national security, thereby automatically legitimizing any securitization measures and repressive practices. The theory’s authors emphasize that the era of universal values is over. Consequently, concepts of human rights and citizens’ rights must be radically revised in line with Russian national interests and the historical context deemed correct by the current leadership.
Given that the «Chaos Theory» has been under development for at least the past decade, it can confidently be said to reflect the position of at least a segment of Russia’s ruling elite. It is particularly resonant with proposals from the domestic-policy bloc on managing social processes.
The «chaos» concept performs a triple function: it records the already-accomplished changes in the rules of Russian foreign policy, supplies them with an intellectual explanation, and creates a broad context within which further unprincipled foreign-policy steps appear logical and justified.
At the same time, the «Chaos Theory» by no means implies that Russia has set itself the goal of destroying the remaining elements of the current system of international relations—there is no intention to renounce the veto right in the UN Security Council as long as that institution retains even minimal significance. Yet it is equally clear that the Russian leadership has no reason to make concessions on issues it considers vital, above all the goals and objectives in Ukraine. Nor should one expect Moscow to abandon persistent attempts to impose on the international community a dialogue on the fundamental restructuring of European and global security architectures.
