Back in 2014, the parliamentary «systemic» opposition parties — CPRF, LDPR, and A Just Russia — gave their unconditional backing to the annexation of Crimea. In return, the Kremlin granted them informal quotas: reserved spots for governorships and «coordinated» single-mandate districts in federal parliamentary elections.
Under this arrangement, a systemic opposition candidate (carefully vetted and approved by the Kremlin’s political bloc) enjoyed a comfortable playing field. United Russia refrained from fielding a strong contender against them, and administrative resources were quietly tilted in their favor. The system was devised by Vyacheslav Volodin, the architect of the post-Crimea party consensus and then-head of the Kremlin’s domestic politics team. It survived largely intact under his successor, Sergei Kiriyenko. In both the 2016 and 2021 State Duma elections, roughly 20 such coordinated districts were allocated to the parliamentary opposition.
Kiriyenko, however, has been steadily rewriting the rules. The number of governors from systemic parties has already dwindled: the LDPR no longer has any regional heads (once there were two — Alexei Ostrovsky in Smolensk and Mikhail Degtyarev in Khabarovsk). Now the single-mandate quotas are being cut back as well. According to Vedomosti, for the 2026 Duma elections the number of coordinated districts is expected to fall to 10−13 — roughly half the figure from 2021.
Among the Communists, Vedomosti names several figures likely to receive guaranteed nomination and election in districts: State Duma CIS Affairs Committee chairman Leonid Kalashnikov, First Deputy Science Committee chairman Oleg Smolin, First Deputy Small and Medium Business Committee chairman Sergei Kazankov, and cosmonaut Oleg Novitsky. For A Just Russia the quotas may cover Competition Protection Committee head Valery Gartung, Financial Markets Committee head Anatoly Aksakov, and Construction Committee Deputy Chairman Alexander Aksenenko. The LDPR is expected to get slots for St. Petersburg branch leader Ivan Esipov (who has publicly sent fighters to the front) and Health Protection Committee chairman Sergei Leonov. New People could field former presidential candidate Vladislav Davankov and ex-Yakutsk mayor Sardana Avksentieva.
The profile of these «quota» candidates reveals that the Kremlin is simultaneously slashing the total number and fundamentally altering the logic behind them.
Under Volodin the practice mostly favored locally popular opposition figures — those who already stood a strong chance of winning on their own merits (meaning United Russia and the Kremlin were almost certain to lose those districts anyway). In the first Duma elections overseen by Kiriyenko the old logic was largely preserved. At the same time, the newly created (and Kremlin-assisted) New People party placed several regime-preferred candidates in coordinated districts: Liza Alert search-team coordinator Oleg Leonov and ultra-patriotic actor Dmitry Pevtsov. While Leonov’s profile fit the party’s urban, hip image reasonably well, Pevtsov’s strident patriotism clashed noticeably with it in Moscow.
Today quotas remain, but they are now awarded primarily not to strong regional heavyweights but to figures the authorities themselves need most. Top of the list are long-serving Duma committee chairmen and their first deputies — classic parliamentary bureaucrats who have grown comfortable and predictable for the executive branch.
Also being promoted are «SVO participant» Esipov (LDPR) and cosmonaut Novitsky (CPRF). Notably, Novitsky — who has never previously been linked to the Communist Party — is slated for Irkutsk Oblast, a region where the Communists have historically strong positions and their own well-known, charismatic local politicians.
The few holdovers from the old model — Communist Kazankov (son of a major Mari El agribusiness head) and Sardana Avksentieva — only highlight how thoroughly the previous system of coordinated districts for genuine regional heavyweights has been dismantled.
The very principle now governing quota allocation confirms the ongoing bureaucratization and hollowing-out of the systemic opposition. The Kremlin’s political bloc is steadily filling the parliamentary factions of «opposition» parties with either its own direct placemen or thoroughly loyal Duma functionaries who could just as easily run under United Russia. At the same time, genuinely influential local politicians face mounting obstacles to even participating in campaigns.
Take Maria Prusakova, head of the Altai Krai Communist committee, who won a fiercely contested single-mandate district in 2021. Today that once-strong regional Communist organization is under heavy pressure from law-enforcement structures. Meanwhile the Irkutsk branch will now have to campaign for an outsider, Novitsky.
In short, the Kremlin aims to purge the federal parliament of any truly weighty regional figures. Yet there is no guarantee this strategy will succeed. In 2021 local politicians still managed to defeat United Russia candidates in six districts. Given the mounting economic and social strains expected by 2026, the number of such surprise local victories could easily rise.
The Slow-motion Telegram Throttling
Russian authorities have now officially acknowledged that they have begun throttling Telegram — one of the country’s most widely used messengers, which Russians rely on not only for private communication but as a major source of uncensored news and information. Voice and video calls were blocked in the app several months ago; the latest restrictions are making it much harder to send media files.
Against this backdrop the government is aggressively promoting the «national» messenger MAX, which only recently added public channels modeled on Telegram.
Official statements about the situation are contradictory. Some State Duma deputies insist nothing serious is happening to Telegram, while others openly predict its full blockage. The Kremlin itself remains silent for now. Ordinary users have good reason to worry: WhatsApp followed exactly the same path — from blocked calls, through deliberate slowdown, to eventual full ban.
Remarkably, even the most loyal pro-regime segments of society are reacting negatively to the Telegram restrictions. The complaints come from regime-aligned political consultants, propagandists, war correspondents, and active-duty military personnel fighting in Ukraine. It turns out that Pavel Durov’s messenger remains the only stable communication channel on the front lines. Yet the authorities are ignoring even the military’s protests. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov and State Duma Defense Committee head Andrei Kartapolov have questioned whether Telegram is really so widely used in the trenches — prompting sharp backlash from ultra-patriots, including A Just Russia leader Sergei Mironov, who called those behind the throttling «idiots» and took the opportunity to slam Roskomnadzor.
The campaign against foreign messengers has been underway for years. The security services have long pushed for total bans in order to achieve complete control over information flows. Civilian officials in the political and information blocs, by contrast, have preferred to keep the most popular platforms alive — both to avoid unnecessary social unrest and to preserve at least some channels for communicating with society and pushing approved narratives.
So far the siloviki are winning this intra-elite tug-of-war. The civilians previously «surrendered» WhatsApp in exchange for keeping Telegram, where the Kremlin and its structures have long and successfully built their own vast channel networks. But the security tower has refused to stop: now Durov’s messenger is in the crosshairs too. The situation is further complicated by the fact that political bloc head Sergei Kiriyenko receives a consolation prize — the problems with Telegram will inevitably drive users toward the state-backed MAX messenger, which is being developed by VK under the direction of Kiriyenko’s son.
It is possible that civilian officials will manage to delay a complete Telegram ban at least until the Duma elections. Even a half-functional messenger would make it far easier for United Russia to run its campaign, spread talking points, and coordinate corporate mobilization. But once voting day is over, the odds of a final shutdown in Russia remain very high. The siloviki will then have a convenient pretext — the need to prevent possible post-election protests.
