Vladimir Putin has sacked the head of ROSKOSMOS, Yuri Borisov. Borisov was replaced by Deputy Transport Minister Dmitry Bakanov, a young (39 yo) official who was previously in charge of the Gonets satellite communications system (a subsidiary of ROSKOSMOS). Borisov’s sacking looks like a logical continuation of the dismantling of the clan of former Defense Minister and Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu. Between 2012 and 2018. Yuri Borisov worked as Shoigu’s deputy and was in charge of arms supplies before joining the government as deputy prime minister for the defense industrial complex. The official had rather strained relations with ROSTEC. It was Borisov’s move to ROSKOSMOS in 2022 that gave ROSTEC chief Sergey Chemezov’s group the opportunity to promote Denis Manturov to deputy prime minister (in the new government, Manturov became first Deputy Prime Minister). ROSTEC was one of the main lobbyists for Shoigu’s dismissal as Defense Minister.
At the same time, Yuri Borisov has long enjoyed the favor of Vladimir Putin — during his two and a half years in office, the president has met with him six times. This is quite a lot, even for a minister, especially considering that Borisov took office after the full-scale invasion had begun, which occupies most of the Russian president’s time. RBC.ru reports that the main claims against Borisov have to do with the construction of the National Space Centre on the premises of the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Centre. This is a large-scale project that was launched in 2019 and has attracted Putin’s attention. Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin promised the president that the Center would be built by the end of 2023, but it is still not fully finished. Construction has slowed down because of rising costs, and there are objective reasons for this: the price of construction materials and equipment has risen due to sanctions and military needs, and there is competition for labor as men are actively recruited to fight in Ukraine or work for the military defense industry. The Space Center has moved from the center of attention of the country’s top leadership to the backburner, as the spending on war is more important now than funding space programs. At the same time, while giving priority to the war, Putin does not want other projects to be sidelined, even temporarily. The president’s «ultra-optimism» is based on the premise that Russia’s economy is fine and that there should be enough money in the budget for everything. If the funding is not enough, it is the problem of lower-level officials. Borisov can be called the first victim of this approach, and a convenient one at that since he belongs to an already severely weakened political clan.
The appointment of Dmitry Bakanov, a previously little-known official, to head ROSKOSMOS is further evidence that the space sector has (for the time being at least) fallen off the radar of the country’s top leadership. Both Borisov and his predecessor, Dmitry Rogozin, were previously Deputy Prime Ministers, a position well above that of Deputy Federal Minister. So far, Vladimir Putin has not found time to meet with Bakanov, although pro-government Telegram channels have begun to promote him as «Russia’s answer to Elon Musk», citing his age and professionalism. Indeed, Bakanov is no stranger to the space industry, but it is not enough for the head of ROSKOSMOS to be a professional technocrat: he will have to interact with ROSTEC, major construction companies and the government, making demands on them and, most likely, coming into conflict with them. Rogozin and Borisov were considered heavyweights when they were CEOs of the company, and Bakanov does not have that weight. He may acquire it during his tenure, for example through personal meetings with Putin, but so far, all the signs are that the president has put space programs on the backburner, despite his public statements about their priority status.
Party squabbles
Russia’s systemic parties are gradually entering the campaign for the State Duma elections to be held in September 2026. The political bloc of the presidential administration clearly wants to oust the Communist party as the second most popular party in Russia. The head of the political bloc, Sergey Kiriyenko, said at the LDPR’s anniversary congress that the party had achieved «the second best result after the „United Russia“ party» in last year’s regional elections. However, Kiriyenko specified that the Liberal Democrats achieved the «second best result» in terms of the total number of mandates they received. The Communists continue to lead in the party-list elections to local councils. At the same time, it is obvious that pro-Kremlin pundits are pedaling the issue of the crisis in the CPRF, while sociological pollsters have already put the LDPR in second place. According to VTsIOM, 10.1% of respondents would vote for the Communists, while 10.3% would vote for the LDPR. FOM gives a similar picture: the Communists have 8 per cent support, while Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s supporters have 9 per cent.
The Communists are feeling the pressure and are already beginning to criticize the political bloc of the presidential administration at the Duma. But the Kremlin is unlikely to back down from its plans, although they may be hampered by a split in the LDPR. Zhirinovsky’s allies (such as Yaroslav Nilov and Alexey Didenko) are unhappy with the actions of Leonid Slutsky, who became party leader under the auspices of the presidential administration. At the same time, the old LDPR members head the Duma committees, which allows them to make contact with elite groups and control some of the regional branches. Slutsky is aware of this and is removing the old guard from party positions. This confrontation may become public, which will certainly undermine the party’s rating. Other systemic parties, which also want to compete for the position of the second most popular political force in the country, could also take advantage of the split. The first of these is the «New People» party, a party created under the auspices of the political bloc of the presidential administration for the 2021 State Duma elections. The «New People» party is already hijacking the potential votes of those who are dissatisfied with the position of the LDPR leadership at the regional level. In the event of a conflict at a higher level, the «New People» party can also offer seats to prominent LDPR members.
At the same time, the LDPR could cannibalize the «Just Russia» party, which, according to FOM and VTsIOM, does not stand the chance of passing the electoral threshold. At the same time, it has notable representatives of the regional elites among its members: Valery Gartung (Chelyabinsk region), Fedot Tumusov (Yakutia) and Yuri Grigoryev (Zabaikalye region). Considering that these regional politicians have had to put up with the ultra-patriotic rhetoric of the «Just Russia» leadership, and sometimes resort to such rhetoric themselves, their move to the LDPR seems quite logical. However, the «New People» party could also compete for moderate regionalists from the «Just Russia».
It is already clear that the presidential administration is preparing to turn the battle for the second best electoral result into a Duma election intrigue. At the same time, the intrigue cannot be called entirely artificial: we can see that parties are already getting involved in this battle. However, the real political situation will not be affected by two or three percent points cent separating the runners-up from the parties that come third and fourth.
