Sergey Kiriyenko, head of the presidential administration’s political bloc, has been entrusted with overseeing the post-Soviet space. Vladimir Putin abolished the presidential administration’s departments for interregional and cultural relations with foreign countries and for cross-border cooperation, replacing them with a single department for strategic partnership. The new structure, replicating the responsibilities of the eliminated departments, will focus on «cooperation» with CIS countries and the unrecognized republics of Georgia.
The abolished departments were under the control of Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Dmitry Kozak, while the new one will be overseen by Sergey Kiriyenko. Thus, the head of the political bloc, who has actively started to engage in the «external contour”—an area uncharacteristic for his predecessors—has effectively stripped Kozak of his entire sphere of influence. Kiriyenko received even more from Putin than he had anticipated: initially, he planned either to create a new department operating in parallel with Kozak’s structures or to take control of one of Kozak’s departments. In the end, the president not only established a new structure but also completely dismantled the old ones, thereby eliminating competition, including for budget funds allocated to this area.
Kiriyenko employed an aggressive tactic, unusual for the power vertical. He actively pointed out Kozak’s and his departments’ mistakes to Putin, emphasized crises in countries and regions, requested their transfer under his control, and tried to demonstrate results (although so far, results have only been achieved in Abkhazia, and even then through rather crude methods). As a result, Putin relented, transferring all of Kozak’s powers—both formal and informal—to Kiriyenko. Regardless of what role or sphere of responsibility Kozak may receive in the future, Kiriyenko has already achieved his goal. Notably, the conflict is not personal: Kozak simply stood in the way of Kiriyenko’s ambitions.
The outcome of this conflict highlights a serious dysfunction in the power vertical system. Until recently, its participants, responsible for specific areas, did not have to worry about competitors’ intrigues. The boundaries of authority were clearly defined and generally respected, with attempts to violate them strictly suppressed. Kiriyenko disregarded these rules—and succeeded. This resembles the redistribution of property actively occurring in the economy. So far, the victims have primarily been large regional businesses without high-level patrons. Powerful federal clans or at least significant federal players like Oleg Deripaska, owner of Rusal, or Vladimir Lisin, owner of NLMK, remain protected from redistribution—for now.
Kiriyenko initiated a redistribution of spheres of influence at the very top of the power vertical, not at its middle or lower levels. On one hand, the victim was not the most powerful lone official, especially one who was already in disfavor. Dmitry Kozak opposed the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on rational grounds and did not hesitate to voice his position to the president. On the other hand, Kozak had long been considered a close friend of Putin and his trusted ally. He oversaw key projects for the Kremlin and Putin personally, including the Sochi Olympics and the local self-government reform. Additionally, Kozak served as the presidential envoy to the North Caucasus during a period of intense conflicts in the region. He handled his tasks quite successfully, establishing himself as one of the best crisis managers. Unlike crude forceful methods, he preferred more sophisticated approaches to problem-solving. For example, in 2019, he devised an intricate scheme that allowed the deprivation of power levers from Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc. The scheme involved an alliance of pro-Russian and pro-Western forces, and it indeed worked.
However, the time for such creative approaches has passed. Putin now favors the straightforward methods proposed by Kiriyenko. The president, it seems, sees no need to curb the ambitions of the political bloc’s head, who is establishing new rules for the power vertical before our eyes. According to these rules, even a long-time friend of Putin can be sidelined from the political game.
As we noted, Sergey Kiriyenko has candidates for the leadership of the new department. The most logical figure appears to be Senator and former head of Rossotrudnichestvo Lyubov Glebova, a long-time ally of Kiriyenko from their Komsomol days. However, media reports suggest that Igor Chaika, deputy head of Rossotrudnichestvo and son of former Prosecutor General and current North Caucasus envoy Yuri Chaika, is also a contender for the position. Appointing Chaika Jr. would allow Kiriyenko to strengthen his position through a new elite alliance (especially since Chaika would likely be supervised by a deputy loyal to the political bloc’s head). If the department is led by someone from Kiriyenko’s inner circle, it would ensure even tighter control over the new structure.
The success of Kiriyenko’s «storm and stress» tactic may prove contagious, potentially triggering bureaucratic wars within the presidential administration and individual government agencies. Kiriyenko has paved the way for such competition, but whether the power vertical, built on different principles, can withstand it remains a significant question.
Putin Center for the Region
Vladimir Putin opened the first regional branch of the «Russia» National Center in Vladivostok. The center itself was established in Moscow based on the eponymous exhibition, which became a key element of Putin’s 2025 election campaign. The exhibition was meant to showcase the country’s achievements over 25 years of his rule, following a «then/now» principle. However, the regions focused on creating stands with augmented reality, an abundance of screens, treats, songs, and dances—likely because a real «then vs. now» comparison was not as impressive. Putin was satisfied with this approach and signed a decree transforming the exhibition into a «National Center,» with virtual reality stands declared an important «legacy.»
The Vladivostok branch provides insight into what regional «Russia» centers will look like. It’s the same virtual reality with interactive entertainment: visitors are offered helicopter flights, submarine dives, and walks along a «nature trail» with neuro-games. The theme of war is also present: electronic screens display figures of its participants. The exhibition opens with a quote from Putin about the Far East. Local authorities have already announced that the branch will serve as a base for various events, primarily for youth.
In essence, these exhibitions are a modern version of patriotic local history museums with high-tech elements. However, it’s unlikely that these virtual worlds will attract local residents: sea walks or forest hikes are available in real life, and helicopter flight simulators can be replaced by computer games at home. The opening of such branches is primarily needed by governors eager to report to Kremlin superiors. In turn, these superiors will later present the network of «Putin Centers» to the president as evidence of public adoration. The «Russia» exhibition’s attendance was already driven by public sector workers and schoolchildren, and they will likely be required to visit the regional branches as well.
