Vladimir Putin held a meeting on the development of newly occupied territories—Donetsk, Luhansk (referred to in Russia as «people’s republics»), and parts of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. He promised that by 2030, these regions would reach an «average Russian level,» including in terms of «people’s quality of life.» However, the foundation of Putin’s aspirations harks back not to Soviet times but to the Tsarist era.
«The industrial, agricultural, logistical, and economic potential of the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics, as well as Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, is immense. They made significant contributions to the development of our entire country in both the pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods. Brilliant scientific and professional schools were formed here, staffed by highly qualified specialists,» Putin mused, predictably adding that Ukrainian authorities had brought these territories to ruin.
He did not clarify how «brilliant scientific schools» relate to the current situation in these war-torn regions. Putin’s subordinates, mostly government officials, showered him with figures and reported successes in restoring infrastructure destroyed due to the Russian invasion. «In some settlements, pipe wear was 80 percent. To date, 4,130 facilities and over 1,300 kilometers of networks have been restored and modernized, and comprehensive modern heating and water supply systems for the regions have been developed,» reported Deputy Prime Minister for Construction Marat Khusnullin. Officials from the regions themselves, along with their federal overseers from the Kremlin’s political bloc and the government, staged Putin’s favorite spectacle, inviting children and teenagers to speak about the «improvements» allegedly brought by Russia’s invasion.
The Russian president has long been fascinated by both large-scale and localized projects. These consume significant federal budget resources, as well as those of state and state-loyal businesses. Examples include the 2014 Olympics, the 2018 European Football Championship, and free economic zones in the Far East. Large resources ensure that these projects are realized, at least in some form, and can be presented as evidence of success to the rest of the country, where things are far less rosy. Putin’s subordinates understand that involvement in these projects can propel them up the power vertical and benefit business structures close to officials. Bringing the newly annexed territories to a pre-revolutionary state—not even their pre-war condition—has become the president’s new favorite toy, so government and Kremlin administration employees will do their utmost to join this project.
However, ordinary Russian citizens may not approve of such focus on Ukraine’s occupied territories. The Russian economy is facing serious challenges, as acknowledged by top officials at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (though Putin continues to ignore them). Several months ago, the federal budget began cutting funds for infrastructure projects, a trend mirrored by regional budgets. This sequestration is likely to continue, and citizens will feel its consequences. Meanwhile, many Russian cities and towns, even before the war, could not boast significant infrastructure improvements beyond relatively cheap urban projects. The grandiose PR campaign around restoring foreign territories amid domestic decline will likely backfire. Even in 2015, during the wave of ultra-patriotic fervor following Crimea’s annexation, 74% of Russians believed Crimea and Sevastopol should receive federal support on par with other regions, with only 15% favoring priority support. The sentiment toward other annexed territories is likely similar. Excessive focus on the president’s pet project of restoring a pre-revolutionary «Novorossiya» at the expense of the rest of the country will be met with public disapproval.
A New Old Enemy
Russia’s power system is traditionally called a vertical, but in practice, its elements have stopped coordinating many actions and plans. The mass detentions of Azerbaijanis and the subsequent escalation of tensions between the Kremlin and Azerbaijan’s leadership are an example of this discord. The Foreign Ministry, the Kremlin’s foreign policy bloc, and the government were clearly unprepared for such developments and have yet to respond adequately. The crackdown on the Azerbaijani diaspora in several major regions (primarily Sverdlovsk and Voronezh) was likely a security service operation, about which they chose not to inform civilian leadership in detail. However, the execution spiraled out of control. Azerbaijan’s leadership responded harshly, suspending visits by high-ranking Russian officials and arresting employees of Sputnik Azerbaijan. Russian IT workers were also caught up in demonstratively harsh detentions, facing beatings and drug trafficking accusations. Neither security nor civilian officials foresaw such consequences.
Ultra-patriots quickly began calling for attacks on Azerbaijan, insulting its leadership, and labeling Baku a Russian city, demanding a «tough response» from the Kremlin. The silence of Russian officials and the Foreign Ministry’s cautious criticism hardly qualify as such. The ultra-patriots may, as in the past, forget their outrage or harbor resentment.
Meanwhile, the authorities (at least their security wing) may be planning further escalation, targeting not only Azerbaijanis but other diasporas from post-Soviet countries. If the war in Ukraine ends or the economy worsens—or both—public discontent will need a new outlet. Migrants are an ideal scapegoat. Pro-government activists are already openly discussing diaspora bans. Even the relatively moderate, system-aligned New People party is partly campaigning on anti-migrant rhetoric. Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Yuri Kokov, in an interview with the official Rossiyskaya Gazeta, cited FSO polls, which are rarely publicized. «According to an FSO survey of labor migrants, 43.5% prefer Sharia over secular law, 24% are willing to protest to live in Russia under religious norms, and 15.3% are ready to participate in illegal political actions,» Kokov stated. Such data will fuel anti-migrant sentiment.
Defeating such an enemy is relatively easy and media-friendly: organize deportation raids, ban work rights, or impose visa regimes with post-Soviet states. This «victory» might impress some of the population temporarily, but social problems will persist and likely worsen.
