Deputy Justice Minister Oleg Sviridenko called the sanctions under the current «foreign agents» law insignificant and proposed tightening them further (despite the fact that criminal cases are already being widely initiated against foreign agents). His superior, Justice Minister Konstantin Chuychenko, condemned the Decembrists, stating that they «willingly succumbed to Western influence and studied Western ideas.» He also suggested closing criminal cases if their defendants were protecting certain «moral values.» The head of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, suggested that labor migrants should be prohibited from bringing their families. Putin’s advisor Anton Kobyakov speculated that the USSR «legally» continues to exist. Former President and Prime Minister, now Deputy Chairman of the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, explained that Russia would prefer Ukraine’s complete capitulation over peace negotiations. These statements were made at the latest St. Petersburg International Legal Forum, an event that was once a prominent and prestigious occasion among those organized by Russian authorities.
The significance of these statements should not be overstated, though some may well come to fruition, fitting into the state’s prohibitive logic. New punishments are already being devised for foreign agents, and migrants are under increasingly strict scrutiny. Far more interesting is the trajectory of the forum itself. Established in 2011, it became a showcase platform for Dmitry Medvedev, then president. The first forum took place before it became clear that he would not seek a second term and would yield the presidency to his predecessor. At the time, Medvedev positioned himself as an advocate of liberal and democratic ideas, innovation, and technological development. The inaugural forum was attended by justice ministers from 15 countries and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland, with the theme framed as «Law — an instrument for innovative and secure development of the global world.» The second forum in 2013 saw the attendance of justice ministers from the US and UK, and the third extended to venues in London, Paris, The Hague, Rome, and Budapest. A distinctive feature of the forum was the «Legal Street» evenings held on famous bar streets, fostering informal interactions among participants and journalists. The organization of the St. Petersburg Legal Forum, its guests, and its themes underscored Medvedev’s liberal positioning. After the annexation of Crimea, delegates from the EU and US were gradually replaced by representatives from the so-called «Global South,» though the liberal spirit had not entirely dissipated. The event began to take on a more practical character, with Russian lawyers discussing specific issues of legal practice.
The situation changed with the onset of the full-scale war and the transformation of Medvedev’s public image. The former liberal began posting insults and threats against Western and Ukrainian politicians on his Telegram channel. This shift puzzled many observers. Some believe that by becoming the «chief hawk,» Medvedev is shielding himself from accusations of past liberalism and ties to the West, while others think he is demonstrating loyalty to Putin to remain relevant in his information agenda. Over the three years of the full-scale war, Medvedev has not deviated from this new persona and seems to have fully embraced it. The St. Petersburg Forum, as Medvedev’s main platform for public positioning, was reformatted in the same vein. It is no longer an international venue for Russian lawyers to engage with global expertise but a conservative forum where absurd ideas can be voiced. The former president and prime minister is well-versed in PR and knows which security officials and bureaucrats can deliver statements guaranteed to make headlines and YouTube clips. Medvedev’s allies, Chuychenko and Sviridenko, understand their boss’s mood and speak in a similar tone. Alexander Bastrykin has long used the issue of combating migrants to boost his popularity.
The forum can now be seen as an extension of Dmitry Medvedev’s Telegram channel, with a few like-minded co-authors invited to join. The primary audience for this event is President Vladimir Putin. It is with his attention in mind that the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum has transformed into a parade of prominent conservatives, where they can pitch their ideas and, through news feeds, ensure they reach the daily information digest prepared for Putin. The presence of Bastrykin and Constitutional Court head Valery Zorkin suggests that the Russian president may indeed pay attention to this showcase of conservative ideas organized by Medvedev; otherwise, such prominent figures in the power vertical would likely not participate.
Atomic Shield for the Political Bloc
On Tuesday, Vladimir Putin visited the Kursk region. One of the main highlights of his visit was a tour of one of the under-construction power units at the Kurchatov Nuclear Power Plant. The tour was led not only by Rosatom’s General Director Alexey Likhachev but also by Sergei Kiriyenko, head of the Kremlin’s political bloc. Kiriyenko currently chairs Rosatom’s supervisory board, which, according to the corporation’s charter, is its highest governing body, making its chairman effectively the top figure. Alexey Likhachev is one of Kiriyenko’s closest allies and trusted confidants. The head of the Kremlin’s political bloc has maintained control over the state corporation, openly acknowledges it, and emphasizes his connection to the nuclear industry for the president. Rosatom serves as a financial resource for the political bloc’s personnel projects but also carries a symbolic role. During the past week, Likhachev spoke before the Federation Council, clearly outlining the corporation’s role: «The absolute priority is the mission for which we were created 80 years ago—protecting our sovereignty, ensuring our country’s defense capabilities, and maintaining and developing the ‘nuclear shield’ of our Motherland,» he said. Kiriyenko and his team deliberately leverage this image, understanding its appeal and relevance to Putin. This «nuclear shield» serves as reliable additional cover for the Kremlin’s political bloc and its leader.
Trade-off for Shoigu
A close ally of Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu failed to become a senator from Tuva. Ruslan Tsalikov, Shoigu’s former deputy in the Defense Ministry and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, was included in Tuva’s United Russia party list for parliamentary elections less than a year ago to secure a regional deputy mandate, a prerequisite for entering the Federation Council. Tsalikov successfully joined the council, but his advancement to a higher level stalled: the issue of his senatorial appointment repeatedly disappeared from the parliament’s agenda, and even Shoigu’s personal intervention could not resolve the situation. For some time, the region was represented in the upper chamber by the then-senator Dina Oyun, who later resigned, leaving the seat vacant. Ultimately, Shoigu’s distant relative, Sholban Kozhuget, became the senator. The Security Council Secretary failed to secure senatorial immunity for his close ally. Amid criminal cases against his former deputies in the Defense Ministry, Tsalikov’s uncertain status affects Shoigu’s morale and, to some extent, his future. However, the country’s top leadership did not entirely sideline the Security Council Secretary, granting a senatorial seat to his relative. Additionally, former Roscosmos head Yuri Borisov, who also served as Shoigu’s deputy for a long time, received a Federation Council seat and immunity, representing the Arkhangelsk region, with which he previously had no ties.
Sergei Shoigu finds himself in a dual position. On one hand, he retains a high-ranking post, engages in informal diplomacy for Putin, and is not personally in disgrace. The Russia-24 channel even produced a complimentary film for his anniversary titled Shoigu 70: Rules of Life. On the other hand, his adversaries—primarily Rosgvardia head Viktor Zolotov and Rostec head Sergei Chemezov (the former has long sought to oust the minister and replace him with Putin’s former adjutant and ex-Tula region head Alexey Dyumin, while the latter clashed with Shoigu after he publicly criticized Rostec’s performance)—continue to obstruct the career advancement of his closest ally, thereby undermining Shoigu’s own position.
