Few expect revelations, breakthroughs, or sensational news from Vladimir Putin’s direct lines and press conferences. The content of the questions, the individuals posing them, and the president’s responses offer indirect insights into Russia’s current priorities and the leader’s interests, though ordinary citizens need not concern themselves with such nuances. The event’s organizers—the Kremlin’s information and political teams—have long curated convenient questions for Putin, primarily those aligning with his own agenda.
The hybrid direct line and press conference staged by the Kremlin on December 19 followed a familiar and predictable pattern. Nonetheless, it is worth noting several significant themes and emphases that were previously less prominent or entirely absent, as well as key presidential statements overshadowed by less substantive remarks.
Responding to journalists’ questions about negotiations with Ukraine, Putin stated unequivocally: «We are ready and willing to end this conflict by peaceful means, based on the principles I outlined in June last year at the Russian Foreign Ministry, and by addressing the root causes that led to this crisis.» Referring back to Putin’s June 14, 2024, address at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its transcript makes clear that the Russian leader demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the entire territory of the four regions incorporated into the Russian Constitution—Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Capturing Kherson and Zaporizhzhia by Russian forces appears unrealistic, while seizing major cities in Donetsk oblast (Sloviansk and Kramatorsk) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future.
A year ago, many analysts viewed these demands as an inflated opening position for bargaining, intended to secure peace along the line of contact or on terms involving significantly smaller territorial concessions to Russia. Following the initiation of Kremlin talks with U.S. President Donald Trump and his representatives, reports emerged suggesting Putin might settle for Ukrainian withdrawal from Donbas alone. Trump’s aide Stephen Witkoff, for instance, interpreted the Russian leader’s stance this way, though doubts arose even then about the accuracy of that reading.
It is possible that Putin feigned compromise on Donbas to maintain Trump’s interest in negotiations while never intending to deviate from the Foreign Ministry demands. As soon as a Donbas-focused scenario began to be discussed as relatively plausible, the president chose to publicly reaffirm his June requirements. This likely dooms the next round of talks to failure once again, prolonging the fighting.
A novelty this year was the full-fledged participation of a serviceman—Naran Ochir-Goryaev, involved in the assault on the Ukrainian town of Siversk. Putin introduced him at the outset and repeatedly turned to him for endorsement and advice. Viewers and journalists endured lengthy accounts of capturing small settlements, after which the president referenced Goryaev in various contexts (large families, the «Time of Heroes» personnel program) and posed questions to him. This segment felt profoundly out of place.
Equally awkward were the interjections by TV hosts Pavel Zarubin and Ekaterina Berezovskaya, often unrelated to Putin’s questions or answers. Zarubin’s contributions at times resembled monologues from political talk shows. Ultimately, the event featured multiple co-equal protagonists—Putin himself, the serviceman, Zarubin, and Berezovskaya—seriously undermining its cohesion and traditional format.
Surprisingly, pointed questions did surface during the «direct line.» A bakery owner from the Moscow region spoke of tax hikes and resulting hardships: «We’re looking to the future, frankly, without much optimism. Many will close or go underground.» Pavel Zarubin read out a message from a father of many children about rising prices: «Why has everything become so expensive? Even chicken prices have nearly doubled. I’m a father of three, I work, my salary is 50,000 rubles, but even with that I can’t meet their needs or feed them properly.» Questions in the hall addressed the increase in the utilization fee.
These issues genuinely concern Russians, and the organizers evidently deemed it impossible to ignore them entirely. However, Vladimir Putin’s responses were such that the questions might as well not have been asked. Addressing the entrepreneur, the president clearly confused different business types and tax regimes, displaying a complete lack of grasp on the subject. His comments on price rises were no less vague: Putin reduced it all to people’s subjective perceptions and the composition of their shopping baskets, effectively advising them to buy cheaper goods. He justified the utilization fee as necessary to support the domestic auto industry. In all three cases, Putin expressed hope for improvement, noting that such measures might eventually be reversed. Deferring solutions to an indefinite future became the conference’s leitmotif: it was evident that these unpleasant topics interested Putin far less than battlefield successes or boosting birth rates.
Putin also voiced outright bizarre notions. «The peoples of the Caucasus have a very good tradition: they marry off their children at a fairly young age. That’s actually right. We should take their example,» the president declared in all seriousness, overlooking relevant Criminal Code articles and society’s general rejection of early marriages in Russia.
The direct line, once a format where Putin resolved minor and medium-sized public issues live on air, has long outlived its genre: against the backdrop of major systemic challenges, the president’s «small deeds» now interest few. From a PR standpoint, the event has ceased to yield tangible benefits and is beginning to cause direct harm. Russia’s leader appears as «Mr. Later,» postponing problem-solving indefinitely for the sake of his priorities while visibly avoiding uncomfortable discussions. It would come as no surprise if, next year, the presidential administration’s information and political teams persuade Putin to abandon the direct line format altogether.
Turmoil in the State Duma
Amid the compilation of party lists for the 2026 State Duma elections, a scandal erupted in parliament. New People deputy and former Yakutsk mayor Sardana Avksentyeva uncovered a Telegram channel offering paid participation in Duma round tables. Avksentyeva publicly expressed outrage and called on the lower chamber’s leadership to investigate.
State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin ordered an internal probe, which revealed that passes for these events were issued by aides to deputies Andrey Svintsov and Kaplan Panesh (LDPR), as well as Roza Chemeris (New People). The lawmakers themselves vehemently deny involvement in the scheme, though their signatures should appear on the passes. Volodin has already threatened them with revocation of their mandates.
The scandal could significantly impact party list formation and the allocation of leadership positions in the next Duma convocation. Roza Chemeris has strained relations with New People leaders, often voting in line with United Russia (she previously served as a United Russia deputy in Vladivostok’s city duma), and rumors suggest she might run under the LDPR banner. Now, New People leader Alexey Nechayev will find it easier to shed this discordant element.
LDPR leader Leonid Slutsky faces no obstacles in dropping Svintsov and Panesh if he aims to build a faction maximally loyal to himself. Finally, questions arise about Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin himself, who has carefully cultivated the parliament’s image as an efficient machine for passing Kremlin-backed laws. Volodin has headed the Duma for a second consecutive term, and amid personnel stagnation, the speaker’s chair attracts influential contenders—for instance, United Russia leader and Security Council deputy chairman Dmitry Medvedev, who has yet to secure a major role since stepping down as prime minister.
