Sergey Kiriyenko, head of the Kremlin’s political bloc, is steadily expanding his formal and informal influence. Beyond domestic politics, his allies control the cultural sphere (primarily through censorship), universities, and schools. Recently, the political bloc has taken on the «external contour”—political technology operations in post-Soviet states and Africa. The «Social Architects» project was initially intended as a purely domestic initiative. Through it, the Kremlin is rebranding «political technologists.»
Even before Kiriyenko, the Kremlin’s political bloc suppressed competition, building a political dominance machine. Under Kiriyenko, authorities have mastered securing desired election results through corporate mobilization, electronic voting, and traditional falsification methods. Political technologists became redundant in this system, but disgruntled specialists could spark social protests. Moreover, professionals are still needed for major federal and problematic regional campaigns. The political bloc offered technologists roles in social projects for government bodies—from territorial branding to organizing holidays and referendums on budget spending.
However, «social architects» have proven useful for Kiriyenko’s influence expansion. The Russian Public Relations Association, linked to the political bloc, held a roundtable on «Social Architecture in Major Russian Companies: Best Practices.» Participants included prominent political technologists like Yevgeny Minchenko, the previously low-profile deputy head of the Kremlin’s social monitoring department Alexey Semenov, and top managers from major private companies responsible for government relations, HR, and regional operations. Delegates from Metalloinvest, Sibur, Polyus Gold, retailer X5, and others shared their «social architecture» experiences (in plain terms, working with clients, staff, and populations in regions where their facilities operate) and expressed readiness to collaborate with specialists proposed by the Kremlin’s Administration. The Kremlin, in turn, is ready to supply such personnel to businesses.
«In October, we will form project teams capable of addressing tasks at any level. We see both government bodies and corporations as partners,» said Alexey Semenov.
Likely, preliminary work was done with companies and their owners: «services from the political bloc» were offered either by Kiriyenko himself or his influential allies, such as Semenov’s direct superior, Alexander Kharichev. Businesses loyal to the regime understand the rules and are unlikely to refuse offers from one of Putin’s favorites. The roundtable outlined targets: around 5,000 Russian companies with revenues exceeding 2 billion rubles could become clients of «social architects» (and their Kremlin overseers).
Embedding «social architects» in big business will allow Kiriyenko to create a new layer of influence: his representatives will shape corporate social policies, partially determining their behavior. This resembles the role of Soviet party workers in enterprises. According to the «Social Architect» presentation by EISI director Firduus Aliyev (available to the author), the top competency for a «social architect» is «understanding and sharing the foundations of state ideological policy.» In other words, Kiriyenko’s «architects» must publicly support the regime and demonstrate loyalty.
Kiriyenko is clearly drawn to Soviet experience, but party politics is alien to him: his key projects, like «young technocrats» and «Leaders of Russia,» are deliberately apolitical and distant from parties. If Soviet loyalty was enforced by party cells, now non-party «architects» will likely take this role. «Understanding and sharing» state ideology implies its implementation, which «social architects» will also handle. They will likely organize corporate mobilization for elections and plebiscites. Such representatives will give Kiriyenko access to company leadership and owners, plus leverage. For instance, they could raise concerns about employees’ insufficient loyalty to Putin’s course, offer assistance, and request favors in return.
The political bloc aims to tighten control over dependent voters, gradually encompassing the public sector and Kremlin-loyal businesses. This ensures new records for Putin and United Russia. However, in a serious political crisis, this control system may prove ineffective: «social architects» are geared toward positive scenarios and rely on project funding.
Expulsion from Digital Paradise
In Russian regions, internet access is being widely disabled, and websites of major companies selling popular goods or services are failing—presumably due to hacker attacks or state efforts to curb undesirable foreign services and messengers. Regional authorities call these outages a «digital detox,» emphasizing their supposed benefits. However, this «detox» prevents Russians from paying by card, ordering taxis via apps, or arranging deliveries. In a short time, websites of Aeroflot, VkusVill, several retail chains, and pharmacies have crashed. Public reactions show significant irritation. The government long promoted digitization, advertising online services and cashless payments, partly to combat shadow cash transactions. Russians were actively drawn into this «digital paradise,» which was genuinely convenient: apps made delivery and taxis accessible, integral to daily life in big cities. Later, this digital paradise was used for propaganda: the Kremlin cited it to lure back emigrated specialists, like IT professionals. The propaganda was simple: in «backward» Europe and America, you can’t order delivery at 3 a.m. or pay with a smile, and taxis cost a fortune. These arguments often worked, as many Russians missed affordable services. «Convenience» became an informal Russian brand: despite democratic flaws, the country offered perks outweighing (for some) the drawbacks.
Now, however, the state (or rather, its security arm) is expelling Russians from this digital paradise, which hinders internet crackdowns. Officials who once championed digital services now tout the benefits of «digital detox,» while deputies advise carrying cash to pay for goods and services during internet and card outages. Regional authorities’ statements suggest mobile internet disruptions will become routine. Meanwhile, the government pushes the digital ruble, chasing its KPIs and goals. This fuels public discontent, evident in angry social media comments. Civil authorities offer nothing but vague talk of «digital detox.»
