Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin delivered his annual report to the State Duma on the government’s performance in 2025. There were no personal attacks on the premier or individual ministers from the deputies. On the contrary, parliamentarians—including those from the systemic opposition—largely praised Mishustin and promised to approve his report. State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin found reasons to thank Deputy Prime Ministers Denis Manturov and Dmitry Patrushev, as well as Finance Minister Anton Siluanov. Mishustin, in turn, expressed gratitude to the speaker and the Duma as a whole.
Criticism from lawmakers did surface, but it remained mostly general and without a direct target. Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov and Fair Russia chief Sergei Mironov spoke of economic decline. Volodin mentioned the sharp rise in housing and utilities tariffs. More pointed criticism targeted the Central Bank over its high key rate, but Mishustin immediately came to Elvira Nabiullina’s defense and backed her institution.
Mishustin’s report itself struck a moderately optimistic note, despite the mounting economic headwinds. The premier highlighted new schools, hospitals, and roads, plus a 4% year-on-year increase in the number of small and medium-sized enterprises (by his count). It was essentially a «therapeutic» narrative about a relatively calm 2025.
That said, the prime minister did not entirely sidestep current problems. He acknowledged the budget deficit and referred to late-night, non-public meetings at Vladimir Putin’s with various government members to hunt for solutions. «Just yesterday we stayed up very late with the president and many cabinet members discussing a huge number of approaches,» Mishustin let slip, without specifying what exactly was on the table. «I think we spent many, many hours in discussion with the president—all of us together—trying to find the best solution for the country.»
The structure and emphases of Mishustin’s speech suggest it was prepared not only (and perhaps not primarily) for the deputies, but for Vladimir Putin himself. Family support and boosting birth rates—a presidential obsession—occupied a prominent place. The premier spoke at length about social assistance to war participants and their families, while only in passing mentioning arms deliveries to the front. Where he once avoided direct war references, he now carefully aligns with the new «military» etiquette of the vertical of power, stressing social protection above all.
Mishustin consistently underscored subordination, reminding everyone that virtually every government step was taken on presidential instructions, decrees, or with his approval. «We have concentrated resources on the priorities set by the president,» he formulated the cabinet’s operating style at the outset. He closed by referring to «the tasks assigned» by Putin. Deputies, too, kept invoking presidential directives, and Volodin specified that the government operates within «the economic model created by the president.»
In the end, the report showed Mishustin confidently combining the roles of political therapist and crisis manager. He enjoys publicity and knows how to use it, yet he clearly grasps the rules of a personalist regime: everything significant happens solely on Putin’s initiative, while the government is merely the executor of his will. The premier deliberately steps into the background, hiding behind the collective of ministers. This tactic pays off: it signals loyalty to the president while shielding Mishustin from personal blame for unpopular measures—potentially useful if the political configuration shifts down the road.
Downward Course
The Kremlin’s political bloc has publicly signaled a lowering of target KPIs for turnout in the upcoming State Duma elections. Not long ago the benchmarks were 55% turnout and 55% for United Russia. Now the plan has been adjusted: overall turnout at 50%, United Russia result at 55%.
The political bloc is reacting to economic difficulties that inevitably drag down approval ratings for the authorities. Kremlin «mathematics» clearly reveals where the red lines lie for its political managers and where there is still room for maneuver.
In 2016, under Vyacheslav Volodin, the political bloc deliberately «dried out» turnout to secure a high United Russia share: mostly dependent and loyal voters showed up, while disloyal ones were left undisturbed so they would stay home. Drying turnout implied a low-key United Russia campaign and tacit agreements for restrained agitation by systemic parties. The focus was on the result for pro-regime candidates; turnout became secondary. United Russia then took 54.2% with 47.8% turnout. The turnout figures displeased Vladimir Putin: less than half the electorate came out, and the president evidently wanted broader mobilization. As a result, Volodin lost his political-bloc post and was sent to chair the Duma he had just helped elect.
Volodin’s successor, Sergei Kiriyenko, learned the lesson and prioritized electorate mobilization: high turnout became an equal KPI alongside United Russia’s percentage. Under his watch, records were set for Putin’s presidential results, United Russia’s parliamentary scores, and overall turnout alike.
Now we see that 50% turnout remains a red line for the political bloc, but Kiriyenko’s team has no intention of overheating the indicator or chasing new records. The adepts of «planned elections» are taking a step toward reality, aiming to post more believable numbers: in the context of a deepening economic crisis, sky-high turnout and United Russia figures would look implausible.
There is likely another reason for the forced downgrade. The political bloc’s turnout records have relied on budgetary and corporate mobilization (in plain terms, coercion of dependent voters). But economic troubles leading to layoffs in the public sector and at industrial enterprises shrink that dependent pool. The Kremlin is adjusting for this shrinkage and lowering the KPI to a minimum Putin will accept.
Keep in mind that figures leaked to the media always tend to be understated. They represent a kind of minimum program, a public floor meant to build in a safety margin. On the last Duma elections, Kiriyenko’s formula was «45 on 45»: 45% turnout and 45% for United Russia. Official results came in at 51.72% turnout and 49.82% for the party. A similar pattern appeared in the 2024 presidential election: public expectations were modest compared with the ultimately sky-high numbers.
Given this pattern, what reaches the media is the lower bound, while the system in reality aims higher. Kiriyenko’s team is most likely targeting 55% turnout and 60% for United Russia. If the economy worsens further, discontent grows, or administrative resources dry up, they retain a retreat path to the lower benchmark. This is not yet a full Volodin-style turnout «drying,» but it is already a shift toward a more cautious tactic.
Kiriyenko’s team is forced to adjust course, adapting to new realities. The question is whether Vladimir Putin—accustomed in recent years to super-high support figures for regime candidates in federal elections—is ready for such a turn.
