In Russia, arrests of senior regional officials occur almost daily. Just last week, law enforcement detained the former head of Tambov Region, Maksim Egorov, ex-deputy governor of Chelyabinsk Region, Alexander Bogashov, the current regional property minister, Eldar Belousov, and the governor’s office manager, Roman Menzhinsky. Arrests also targeted the deputy governor of Bryansk Region, Nikolai Simonenko, the transport minister of Novgorod Region, Konstantin Kuranov, several Belgorod officials, and the deputy mayor of Khimki in the Moscow Region. On one hand, we see the formation of regional «clusters» of cases. Law enforcement started with the «Kursk» case, which led to the death of Transport Minister Roman Starovoit, followed by the «Bryansk» and «Belgorod» cases, all linked to the construction of fortifications—an issue critical to top federal leadership, giving investigators and FSB agents free rein. While Chelyabinsk Region is far from the front lines, law enforcement has long been purging the inner circle of Chelyabinsk Governor Alexei Teksler, seemingly targeting the governor himself. Against this backdrop, a redistribution of property is underway in the region, with major industrial or resource assets being seized from local elites and nationalized.
Chelyabinsk Region appears to be a testing ground for reshaping the elite structure in Russia’s major industrial regions. Owners of large enterprises have learned to work with outsider governors, supporting them and ensuring «correct» voting at their enterprises, funding election campaigns, and backing social projects. These entrepreneurs often maintain good relations with the federal government. However, their assets are increasingly attractive for nationalization, often to the benefit of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. It remains unclear whether this redistribution will lead to managerial collapse in the regions or undermine the power vertical. Local business elites play a key role in ensuring regional political loyalty, including election outcomes, and in maintaining social welfare. If the Chelyabinsk experiment succeeds, it could be replicated in other major industrial regions where key assets remain in the hands of local elites, such as Sverdlovsk Region, Krasnoyarsk and Perm Territories, and Tyumen and Irkutsk Regions.
Other arrests indicate a sharp increase in law enforcement’s capabilities. They are ready to target the highest levels of regional bureaucracy, undeterred by ongoing elections (a gubernatorial campaign in Bryansk and regional elections in Chelyabinsk) or potential damage to the government’s approval ratings. There is no clear pattern in the arrests, nor is there a public anti-corruption campaign. Representatives of various factions are being targeted, fueling rumors among their rivals about their «weakening.» For example, former Tambov governor Maksim Egorov was close to United Russia’s general secretary, Vladimir Yakushev, and was slated to lead the party’s executive committee. Egorov left his regional post for this role but was arrested before the appointment could be finalized, as no suitable position was found for the current committee head, Alexander Sidyakin. Had the appointment gone through, Egorov likely would have avoided arrest, as law enforcement would hesitate to detain a senior United Russia figure ahead of Duma elections. Yakushev, who backed Egorov, is part of Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin’s circle, leading to rumors of Sobyanin’s team «weakening,» though Egorov was never directly part of it. The arrest of Bryansk official Simonenko sparked speculation about issues for Dmitry Medvedev, who allegedly supports local governor Alexander Bogomaz. The abundance of rumors reflects growing uncertainty among Russian elites, who are searching for hidden motives and anticipating broader repression.
Law Enforcement on the «Baza»
Arrests are also targeting journalists previously considered loyal to the authorities or even close to law enforcement. A bribery case was opened against the editor-in-chief of the outlet Baza, Gleb Trifonov, and its producer, Tatyana Lukyanova, suspected of buying information from security officials. Earlier, Ura.ru editor Denis Allayarov was arrested on similar charges. Baza and Ura.ru are fundamentally different outlets. Baza, like many projects backed by media manager Aram Gabrelyanov, who supported Trifonov, focuses on tabloid-style news—crime, human interest stories, and the like—never publishing politically subversive content, possibly as part of an unspoken agreement with the Kremlin. However, Baza enjoyed some freedom in its coverage. Ura.ru, meanwhile, worked more closely with the Presidential Administration, publishing politically favorable news. Both outlets share a focus on crime stories, which drive traffic. The common theme in these cases suggests law enforcement is genuinely concerned about information leaks from their ranks. Rising social tensions, including incidents like the suicide of Transport Minister Roman Starovoit and increasing interethnic conflicts, make such information valuable and marketable. These cases aim to deter other media from delving into this increasingly sensitive sphere, as censored and undesirable content grows, signaling tighter censorship ahead.
The Mad Printer Before the Pause
In its final days of the spring session, the State Duma worked at a frenetic pace, passing a law criminalizing the search for «extremist materials» online, introducing year-round military conscription, and banning films in Russian distribution that contradict «traditional values.» This flurry of restrictive legislation does not necessarily signal major shifts in the power vertical. The authorities are clearly tightening repression and control and will continue to do so. The parliamentary rush is tied to the upcoming recess, with accelerated lawmaking before breaks becoming a tradition. Parliamentarians and executive bodies rush to finalize projects left untouched during the session. Summer is a strategic time for unpopular or restrictive initiatives, as many Russians are on vacation, less attentive to news, and in a more positive mood than in fall or winter.
Meanwhile, the parliamentary systemic opposition and Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin are clearly preparing for the next election cycle. Most deputies from the New People, Communist Party (CPRF), and A Just Russia factions voted against the bill criminalizing the search for «extremist materials.» Such protest votes are not surprising, as United Russia has enough votes to pass any initiative, including constitutional amendments (except for Chapter 1). Other factions are allowed to vote «against» to maintain their electorate by showing some opposition. However, the CPRF and especially the Presidential Administration-aligned New People are not stopping there. Former presidential candidate and Duma Deputy Speaker Vladislav Davankov called on senators to oppose the bill, though the upper chamber is unlikely to heed him. The systemic opposition is raising its voice to retain and attract voters. The Communists aim to prove they haven’t been co-opted by the Kremlin, while the New People position themselves as the «party of common sense.» Their loud protest highlights the bill’s extreme unpopularity, with even typically loyal A Just Russia members opposing it. Volodin also capitalized on this unpopularity, summoning Communications Minister Maksut Shadayev to explain the bill to deputies—a symbolic move, as the bill had already passed its second reading, and the third reading allows no amendments. Still, Volodin distanced himself from the law and implicitly criticized it. This is not his only unusual move: he recently reprimanded Economy Minister Maxim Reshetnikov for liberalism and proposed punishing stores and marketplaces for imposing services.
Volodin’s activity is likely to intensify. He will make ultra-patriotic and populist statements and criticize government officials to demonstrate loyalty to Putin and appeal to voters. As Duma Speaker, he seeks to retain his influential post, with no equivalent position available. Thanks to his activity and the coordinated dissent of the systemic opposition, the Duma will draw more attention in its final year of work.
