It is only natural that after Friday’s White House exchange between President Zelensky and senior US leadership, pessimism about the quality of the deal Ukraine might get as a result of Russia-US negotiations is running at unprecedented levels. News swirls about the Trump administration ending all support to Ukraine and commanding Pentagon Cyber Command to stop all operations aimed at assisting Ukraine’s war efforts. Previously, Washington has made it very clear that there is no future for Ukraine in NATO and hinted at a withdrawal of some US forces stationed in the European Union. Ukraine’s pessimism is only matched by Russia’s optimism, where the tone of Trump’s remarks has already made the entire nation less anxious about the future.
Does this mean that the war will soon end on terms that satisfy Putin’s Russia?
First, let’s be clear: so far, Russia-USA negotiations are primarily about Russia-US relations. The first Saudi round was essentially about how to get back to being able to conduct necessary talks, with what tools, and with a minimal acceptable degree of trust. Of course, any talks between any Russian and US delegation by default cannot avoid discussing Ukraine, but what we know so far from both sides is that what has been agreed upon is the assumption that both Russia and the USA want this war to end. It would be unfair to say that the devil is in the details because Russia’s peace demands are not just the deliverer but hell itself.
What does Russia want?
On one side, the Russian position on Ukraine, in terms of why the war started, has always been as flexible as possible, with such a variety of answers and explanations: from the defense of Russian speakers in Ukraine, an almost R2P claim of the need to «prevent genocide», to NATO expansion as the cause; to the war taking place because of the Western-backed «coup of 2013,» and finally because it was God’s will. We should not forget such reasons as Nazis in power and thus the need to de-Nazify Ukraine, and less Ukraine-based reasons such as the «unification of Russian people,» the return of «lost territories,» and simply the advancement of the interests of the Russian nation. Depending on the circumstances and the audience, Russian leadership can prioritize one or another of the abovementioned reasons to support whatever argument they are making.
However, when it comes to Moscow’s demands, they have been quite consistent since 2022, with close to no variations or easing in favor of the West or Ukraine.
Let’s look at what they are, whether Trump can satisfy them all, and, more importantly, if his say would be enough to make Kyiv and the EU follow his lead.
1.No NATO for Ukraine
Trump has already agreed to this, despite most NATO countries being ambiguous about it or at least trying to leave a hint of some form of direct cooperation and/or security guarantees. But let’s be clear: Trump’s «NO» here is not nearly enough to consider it a done deal. But that’s not even what Putin is asking, though. In 2019, Ukraine amended its constitution to include its aspiration to join NATO as a governing principle of Ukrainian statehood. So, in order to satisfy Putin, Ukraine will have to amend its constitution and instead add a clause that would guarantee Ukraine’s neutral status. Russia has also mandated NATO to officially disavow its 2008 promise to accept Ukraine into NATO. Knowing how much Putin distrusts NATO as a whole and keeps bringing up the broken oral promise to Gorbachev of no expansion to the East, there is no doubt that Trump’s word alone would not suffice. Moscow would not be satisfied until the «No NATO» clauses are written, sealed, and accepted as axioms.
2.Russian «territorial integrity»
Since 2022, Russia recognizes the territories of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions within the borders as they were in 1991 when they became part of independent Ukraine. Russia does not control the entire territory of those regions. Aside from smaller cities, these territories contain two major Ukrainian cities: Kherson, which Russia occupied from March to November 2022, currently with a population of about 71,000, down from 300,000 pre-war; and Zaporizhzhya, with a 710,000-population pre-war. All in all, the territories of these four regions that Russia claims host at the very least over a million Ukrainian civilians. Per Russia’s request, these people should either welcome Russian occupation and become Russian citizens or be given a chance to leave their homes and head west of the Dnipro River into what Russia now recognizes as Ukraine. There is also the case of Ukraine-occupied parts of the Russian Kursk region, which the Kremlin has repeatedly said would not even be considered for any kind of swap by Moscow.
3.Legal status of Russia-occupied territories and sanctions
International and naturally Ukrainian recognition of all the territories that Russia has been occupying since 2014 is a logical consequence of the previous demand. As per Moscow’s logic, only the recognition of those territories by Ukraine and the international community as Russian «fair and square» may guarantee that Russia would view the conclusion of peace talks as promising and worth approving. A half-baked solution, such as recognition of those territories as «temporarily occupied by Russia,» would not cut it, as it would imply Ukrainian intent on taking them back and thus would be deemed an invitation to resume the fighting. A non-recognition of those territories by key members of the international community as Russia would also imply an invitation to «solve the issue» later, which again goes against the core Russian demand to install permanent solutions to the cause of the war in Ukraine.
Once those territories are recognized as Russian, a complete withdrawal of all sanctions imposed on Russia would be expected.
It should also be noted that, per Putin, Russia is ready to enter into negotiations with Ukraine and stop the hostilities only (!) when Ukraine withdraws its forces from the four regions where the fighting is ongoing, as well as the Kursk region, and after it officially announces its plans to abandon NATO aspirations. Before that, Russia will continue fighting, and thus all negotiations prior to this point would be supplemented with continued fighting, as it is now. All proposals to halt the hostilities for the duration of the talks have been consistently rejected by Russian officials.
How Moscow feels about its position
Contrary to Trump’s suggestions that the Russian «economy is failing» and his peace talk offers are «a big favor,» Russian senior leadership certainly does not view economic concerns as a key motivation to enter the talks. In a similar way to how Russian leadership treats its citizens sent over to Ukraine to die in numerous assaults with high death tolls (and we know of at least nearly 100,000 KIA Russian soldiers), the certain imbalances of the Russian economy and the hardship of an «average Joe» are of little concern in the bigger picture. That being said, sober assessments estimate that Russia can continue fighting well into 2026 without feeling the stress that might eventually become a political factor to raise concern for Putin.
It is true that it has become harder for Russia to motivate more men to sign up for war, but ever-increasing payments for contract soldiers so far do the job, and it would not be a stretch to say that Moscow understands that Ukraine’s problems in this regard are a much more acute issue. If push comes to shove, Moscow can still do another round of mobilization; although politically pricey, it will likely give the Russian army a significant edge over war-torn Ukraine.
The Russian military industry has been significantly underestimated for most of the war, ridiculed for using old tanks and other obsolete machinery. It is in a state of wartime production rates that do not go down due to sanctions or other economic pressure put on Russia. At the very least, Russian drone production rates have increased to the point that it makes a difference in the efforts to minimize human loss on the battlefield.
There could be more informed takes on the state of the military situation on the ground, but the fact remains that Putin understands he is clearly better off in the span of this year and the next already. Add on top of that the termination or a reduction of US military support, and you get an informed decision to aim for maximum gains at any negotiations.
There are no good reasons for the Kremlin to meet Ukraine halfway since Ukraine is considered significantly weakened, with a downhill trend. In fact, the Kremlin may well believe it is in the interest of Ukraine to seek a deal soon before the circumstances worsen. The Kremlin has repeatedly stated that any solution will have to be based on the situation on the ground, and there are no major roadblocks in the way of the Kremlin’s appetites that would go beyond what is being asked now. We should bear in mind how the full-scale invasion began: with Russian troops marching to Kyiv from the north and to Odesa from the south.
It goes without saying that the Kremlin has consistently viewed the USA as the key driver of Ukraine’s resistance and does not likely view the EU as capable of producing enough political will to take over and stand with Kyiv’s position as it is today.
Enter Trump
What can Trump do? Well, he can’t make Kyiv accept all that Putin wants, since that is a little short of conditional capitulation, and we certainly do not yet see that shaping up in Kyiv. The Trump administration cannot make the European Union stop supporting Ukraine, albeit the key question here would be whether Trump would allow the EU to pay for US-produced weapons to be sent to Ukraine. Would Washington go as far as to prohibit EU sales of US arms legally destined for EU needs but then sent over to Ukraine?
It is unlikely that Trump can force Zelensky to hold presidential elections in the near future—a situation that Moscow would welcome, as it would open up many possibilities to weaken Ukraine.
However, Trump may, as he promised, halt the support Ukraine gets today, halt US intelligence and cyber assistance, and deprive Kyiv of much-needed elements of warfare that make a significant difference to the war efforts.
As it stands in early March, it is unclear what exactly Trump is offering to Kyiv as gains. The Trump administration ditches all questions about security guarantees, implying that Putin may agree to EU troops stationed somewhere in Ukraine, which, even if theoretically possible (though not clear), would be absolutely unacceptable to Putin. French, UK, or Polish troops—even if marked as armies of sovereign EU states—are troops of NATO countries, and thus their presence goes against the fundamental demands of the Russian state.
But even if we entertain the idea of third-party troops in Ukraine, it could only be imagined as a topic for negotiations with Russia once Ukraine satisfies Russia’s core demands—withdraws from «Russian land» and agrees to amend its constitution.
In a similar manner, we must abandon the idea that, for some reason, Putin will agree to pause this war, allowing the West to make Ukraine into an «Israel of Europe,» arming it to the teeth and allowing it to regain the capacities to attempt to reclaim what Russia currently occupies. On the contrary, any type of deal with Russia, if it were to succeed, would imply a significant limit to what Ukraine can possess in terms of arms post-war. Essentially, Moscow would want to define quantitatively how many arms Ukraine would need to have as an officially «neutral state.»
Putin-Trump deal
It is, however, feasible for Putin and Trump to make a deal. It would not be a deal over Ukraine, or rather not only about Ukraine. Whatever Trump might impose on Ukraine that Kyiv refuses would allow the US administration to claim they have tried their best—and Ukraine refused while «Putin was ready to stop the war.» It could open up the possibility for Russia and the USA to conduct continued negotiations on everything else but Ukraine (provided that Trump would either withdraw all support or most of the support for Ukraine). There is plenty Moscow can offer to Trump for a «US exit from Europe»: from talks on Syria and Iran to energy and some trade, to even China, North Korea, and issues of global governance. Putin does not have to give up China, Iran, and North Korea to talk to Trump about those issues. Putin may even «do a Lukashenka» and offer to mediate between the US and China if needed.
Essentially, that would be the multipolar relationship Moscow has been preaching for years. You get out of our backyard, recognize us as a grand power, and then all the cards are open to be played on the table. And since values and norms that the US previously stood for—or at least declared standing for—are no longer an issue, there is no reason for Putin not to be genuinely interested in doing business with Trump.
It would, however, be true to say that actual agenda-rich negotiations between Russia and the US are at too early a stage to conclude that all of this is imminent. It is absolutely not, but what was previously considered impossible is now definitely an option.
