A Pskov court has placed politician and deputy chairman of the Yabloko party, Lev Shlosberg, under house arrest. He is accused of «discrediting the army» based on a post in an Odnoklassniki account that Shlosberg has no connection to. The Pskov branch, led by Shlosberg, has long been considered one of Yabloko’s strongest. His team not only elected candidates to the regional legislature and the regional capital’s council but also secured positions as heads of districts and small towns. Shlosberg himself has long been one of Yabloko’s most prominent figures. The stance of Yabloko and Shlosberg on the war can be described as highly cautious, though not aligned with the Kremlin’s line. Party members advocate for an immediate ceasefire and freezing the conflict along the front line (a view similar to the negotiating position of Donald Trump’s administration). Shlosberg himself criticized Russian opposition figures abroad for supporting the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ incursion into Kursk Oblast. In an interview with TV host Ksenia Sobchak, he stated that he does not consider Ukraine a victim, as it continues to resist. He has also faced regular criticism in response. In pre-war times, Shlosberg’s publicly expressed position could have been called ultra-moderate, even loyalist, and before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he likely would not have made such statements. Under the old rules, this partial alignment of public rhetoric with the Kremlin’s official stance would have granted a politician or public figure some leniency. But the rules have changed.
The Kremlin pushed Shlosberg out of legal politics back in 2015 by labeling him a foreign agent. As a result, the Pskov Yabloko leader lost his parliamentary mandate, and later, foreign agents were barred from running for any elected office. This significantly hampered the branch’s work: its well-known frontman could no longer lead party lists in elections at various levels, automatically worsening Yabloko’s results. By 2024, foreign agent status had become an almost guaranteed trigger for criminal prosecution. Lev Shlosberg complied with all foreign agent regulations, but by the second year of the full-scale war, this was no longer enough—cases were initiated over private messages and posts in closed groups. Many immediately saw the first criminal case against Shlosberg as an attempt to force him to leave the country. He refused to emigrate, and was then accused of discrediting the army.
House arrest for a politician who demonstrated moderation, with some of his actions interpretable as a compromise with the Kremlin, is proof that the rules of systemic politics in Russia have fundamentally changed. To continue working in the country, one must support the Kremlin in its main endeavors and not deviate from the party line. But the new case against Shlosberg reveals another new rule: there should be no prominent figures in Russia’s systemic public sphere capable of inspiring interest or sympathy. Lev Shlosberg evoked these emotions in many. He did not hide, remained visible, spoke publicly, and drew attention. In the non-profit «Systemic Opposition», people like Vladislav Davankov, deputy chairman of New People, are preferred—figures who shift between bureaucratic posts and parliamentary seats. Davankov’s ultra-moderate populism, along with his party colleagues, is still not the worst option. The Kremlin’s political bloc plans to elevate the LDPR, led by Leonid Slutsky, who secured the party chairmanship with Kremlin support, to a secondary role. Even loyalist experts admit Slutsky is neither a «charismatic leader» nor a «tribune.» Prominent, charismatic figures like Shlosberg only highlight the artificiality of legal systemic opposition members. Many citizens would be reluctant to vote for such an alternative when vivid figures, even those barred from elections, remain in the country and speak publicly. Meanwhile, political managers led by Sergei Kirienko need voter turnout to report impressive figures to Vladimir Putin. This is likely one reason they tried to push Lev Shlosberg into exile and later stripped him of his public platform. It’s possible that this is an attempt to silence the Pskov Yabloko leader and remove him from public life entirely. A similar fate befell another popular politician, former Yekaterinburg mayor Yevgeny Roizman, who withdrew from public life after a conviction for discrediting the army. However, it’s possible that even this silence may eventually become insufficient for the regime system. Silence or mild criticism must be replaced by unconditional support.
A Death Sentence Position
Security forces have launched a criminal case against Krasnoyarsk Mayor Vladimir Loginov, accusing the official of corruption. Loginov was not an opposition figure and had long worked within government structures. He belonged to the team of the previous regional governor, Alexander Uss, but had no conflicts with the current governor, Mikhail Kotyukov, and continued his work.
Until recently, the arrest of a mayor of a million-plus city, even a United Russia member, would have been a major federal news story. But Loginov’s case has already drowned in the information stream—mayoral arrests have become routine and commonplace. The reason is that regional center mayors have gradually lost the influence they once wielded (when they could compete with governors in influence). By now, they’ve become secondary figures, easily replaceable. In the era of elected officials, such an arrest would have paralyzed government operations and sparked competition for the post. Under recent amendments to the local self-governance law, regional capital heads are appointed by deputies on the governor’s recommendation—no competitive election campaigns are needed. The only challenge in selecting candidates is finding someone willing to lead a municipality under complete regional oversight from authorities and and intense scrutiny from security forces. In Russia’s major cities, problems are already emerging with appointing heads—experienced managers are reluctant to apply for selection contests or offer their services to governors. The position of mayor in a large city has effectively become a death sentence, and it’s possible that these roles will increasingly be filled by officials who have fallen out of favor with regional leaders or the Kremlin.
This declining interest in mayoral positions likely allowed Loginov to retain his post during the governor transition, despite initially having no ties to Mikhail Kotyukov’s team. His arrest will likely further reduce the motivation of managers still considering mayoral roles in hopes of career advancement, versus choosing a different career path. Such doubts will further degrade Russia’s municipal management level, and projects like the Presidential Administration’s «School of Mayors» are unlikely to dispel these concerns.
