The arrest of Pavel Durov in Paris and his subsequent release on bail with the condition that he not leave France has left the Kremlin’s media and political machine at a loss. Neither the media loyal to the presidential administration, nor pro-government pundits, nor systemic parties have been able to put forward a unified position on the prosecution of the Telegram founder, nor have they given a unified assessment of his public persona. Even the Vzglyad portal, which belongs to the Kremlin’s EISR research center, publishes conflicting assessments of the French authorities’ actions. Either they did the «right thing» and the messengers indeed need stronger content moderation, while Russia should follow this behavior as an example. Or the French are «on a rampage» at the behest of the United States, destroying the last vestiges of freedom. The only more or less understandable line that propaganda has been able to develop is the usual: «In the West, freedom of speech is being destroyed and repression is being used.»
The pro-Kremlin media’s assessment of Durov and his public persona also reflects confusion and the lack of a pre-coordinated, common narrative. Former Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Russia Today chief Margarita Simonyan have criticized Durov, while the pro-Kremlin «New People» party is holding rallies in his support. Russian oppositionists are also divided over Durov: some believe that he was detained for a reason (collaboration with Russian authorities), while others insist that the businessman fell victim to political repression and suffered for practicing freedom of speech.
The behavior of the information-political branch of the vertical of power shows that it does not really know how to deal with complex cases. And Pavel Durov and his persecution in France is such a complicated case. The founder of Telegram has long been trying to run between the raindrops, choosing to cooperate (at least partially) with the authorities of different countries (including Russia and the EU) but also refusing to give them certain things that they wanted. The presidential administration does not dare to turn him into a hero. In the minds of many citizens Durov is still linked to the notion of «freedom of speech» and «freedom of information,» which is clearly not what the Russian authorities want to promote. But the presidential administration can’t help itself: it simply can’t miss the opportunity to capitalize on the «our people in the West are being oppressed again» case. The Kremlin cannot unequivocally condemn the actions of the French — after all, the Russian authorities are also thinking of blocking the messenger — but neither can it unequivocally support them in order to justify its own actions — after all, Telegram is, in a sense, «our very own, Russian thing». As a result, official Moscow is «watching» Durov, and the contradictory statements made by both the «ultra-patriots,» who consider the businessman almost a «traitor,» and his Kremlin-loyal defenders (the above-mentioned «New People» party) do not please either groups within the society. Once again, the Kremlin has tried to avoid taking a public position on a controversial issue so as not to alienate the loyal majority, and this position has once again caused contradictions and divisions within this majority.
Rating anomaly
Major sociological centers quite loyal to the Russian authorities and working with government agencies — VСIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) and FOM (Public Opinion Foundation) — have recorded a tangible decline in Vladimir Putin’s ratings and an increase in anxious sentiments among Russians. According to VCIOM, in the two weeks after the AFU entered the Kursk region, the number of citizens who approve of the activities of the Russian leader fell by 4.7% to 72.4% (before the Ukrainian army’s offensive, this figure was at 77.1%). Compared to June of this year, the approval rating fell by 6.6%. The level of trust in Putin fell by 5.8% compared to June, dropping to 75.7%. According to FOM, the approval rating has fallen by 5% compared to the end of July, and the number of Russians who trust the head of Russia has decreased by the same amount.
Fear and anxiety among Russians, as measured by the FOM, have increased by 13% (and now stands at 46%) compared to July, and the share of citizens who assess the public mood as fearful began to grow even before the AFU invasion. Interestingly, against this background, the approval ratings of Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin are quite stable, although they are lower than those of Putin.
The end of summer and the beginning of fall were often a problematic time for the Russian authorities in terms of ratings. Relaxed holiday mood was replaced by fears and worries. Most Russian families were preparing their children for school, comparing prices with last year’s and resenting their increase. This was the case even in the relatively inflation-free pre-war years. In a sense, this fluctuation could be called seasonal, and the indicators eventually began to return to their previous levels. With the outbreak of the full-scale war, the seasonal fluctuations disappeared: last year, according to VCIOM, there was no noticeable drop in ratings in August. This year, at least, the drop has returned. The reasons for the decline, which so far has not been the most significant ever, are easy enough to name: prices are rising every month, and there are more reasons for anxiety than before: the war has come directly to the territory of Russia. The Kremlin and the Russian army are trying to eliminate this cause of citizens’ concern and drive the AFU out of the Kursk region, but it is obvious that this will not happen quickly, while society is still failing to fully get used to the «new reality». The FOM shows not only an increase in the level of fear, but also a decline in the standard of living: over the two summer months, the number of citizens who consider their financial situation «bad» has increased by 5% (from 15% to 20%). The number of Russians who consider their financial situation «good» has decreased by 6% (from 28% to 22%). In June this year, 15% of FOM respondents spoke about the deterioration of their situation, and in August their share was already 21%. The percentage of those expecting their financial situation to improve fell from 31% to 25%.
VCIOM and FOM would hardly publish this information, which is not very pleasant for the Russian authorities, without the Kremlin’s permission. The information about the decline in ratings, even if it is not the most significant, should reach the top leadership of the country, which, judging by its behavior, considers itself super popular and beloved by the people. It is quite likely that the real figures look a little different and show a more serious decline. We can say that the decline in Putin’s ratings against the background of the Prime Minister’s ratings, which have practically frozen, may indicate that a part of society is beginning to blame the head of state for its problems. Against the backdrop of rising prices, it would seem logical that the prime minister’s ratings would collapse, but this is not the case. Mishustin, who is in charge of the economy, is viewed as a neutral figure who makes sure that there are no extreme changes in the everyday lives of ordinary citizens during the war, or that they are minimal. Propaganda assigned this role to the head of the government even before the war: a capable manager takes care of the economy while the president performs his great deeds on the international arena. For a long time this scheme was very convenient. The government and the prime minister were to blame for the social problems that inevitably arose, but the president was doing everything right: Russia was growing stronger and stronger, dictating its terms to the rest of the world. Propaganda allowed Putin to be presented as a leader with ephemeral symbolic capital, while the head of government could be blamed for the real problems, which, unlike geopolitical «achievements,» were easy to touch and see.
Judging by the trajectory of the ratings, this scheme is no longer working now. Prices are rising, Russians are worried, they are becoming anxious and doubtful about the future, but this does not affect the prime minister’s approval ratings. In the minds of ordinary Russians social problems can be associated with the war, which is Putin’s core prerogative and domain. Putin himself has long tried to normalize the war, to teach the people to learn to live with it, to normalize it in their minds. On the other hand, the regime wanted to attract particularly restless men to volunteer for the front, while on the other hand, it sought to present the military hostilities as a mere backdrop for ordinary life. Now this background is coming to the fore and is beginning to affect everyday realities.
The war itself is not going so smoothly either: the advance of the Russian army in Donbass does little to offset the advance of the AFU in the Kursk region. Therefore, the decline in Putin’s ratings may become a trend, since the rise in prices cannot be stopped for objective reasons, and the Ukrainian army may be entrenched in the Russian border areas for a long time. The stability of the ratings of the prime minister and the government in such conditions will mean that their «apolitical» and «technocratic» nature, their distance from the major geopolitical issues will begin to be perceived as a good thing, which is more in line with the public mood. The ratings of the president and the prime minister (if the true figures will still be published to begin with) will converge and sooner or later they will meet. This moment will be a serious test for the Russian vertical of power and elite groups.
