Russia exchanged prisoners with the United States and European Union countries. Among those released were not only foreign journalists and citizens (Evan Gershkovich, Paul Whelan, Patrick Schebel and Rico Krieger), but also Russian political prisoners, including Ilya Yashin, Vladimir Kara-Murza, head of Memorial Oleg Orlov, former head of Open Russia Andrei Pivovarov, Ksenia Fadeeva, Liliya Chanysheva and Vadim Ostanin, heads of Alexei Navalny’s regional headquarters. In addition, Russia has exchanged Radio Liberty journalist Alsa Kurmasheva, German Mojzes and Kevin Leek (all of whom hold dual citizenship), and artist Sasha Skochilenko. The Kremlin has received intelligence officers (such as hitman Vadim Krasikov) and hackers from Western countries.
The Russian leadership has made no secret of the fact that it has long wanted Krasikov returned to Russia (Putin himself has said so publicly). The Kremlin has always treated its arrested agents and errand boys and girls like Viktor Bout and Maria Butina with nothing short of veneration. Putin and his inner circle are eager to demonstrate corporate solidarity in this way, given their KGB backgrounds. At the same time, Putin was clearly in no hurry to swap Alexei Navalny for Krasikov: in this case, personal animosity was more important than corporate solidarity.
At first glance, the mass prisoner swap seems to show signs of a political thaw: the «generous» Kremlin is releasing political prisoners and is ready to make peace with the West. Some commentators even see it as a sign of an imminent peace deal with Ukraine. Nothing could be further from the truth, however; some of those exchanged — Alsa Kurmasheva, Evan Gershkovich, or Patrick Schebel, for example — were clearly arrested to replenish Russia’s exchange fund. The Russian authorities wanted to free their FSS and sleeper agents, and they succeeded; by this logic, the exchange could have taken place months earlier (or later) and has little to do with the negotiations on Ukraine, which are also clearly underway. Nor does it seem likely that the Kremlin wants to get rid of inconvenient political prisoners and is ready to expel them as far away as possible: municipal deputy Alexey Gorinov, head of the Golos association Grigory Melkonyants, Khabarovsk journalist Sergey Mingazov, and many other political prisoners remain in detention. Kremlin’s crackdown on dissent continues, and the policy of intimidation in the form of sentencing people to prison for spreading «fakes» about the Russian army and state treason is an important part of it. At the same time, it is also hard to see the Kremlin as a clear winner here: the United States and the EU countries have secured the release of their citizens and helped political prisoners. The importance of this result should not be underestimated, and the exchange list proves that the negotiations were far from easy: Putin and his circle always do their best to incur lower costs.
Russian propaganda tells citizens about the important mission of the returned agents and hackers. The exchanged oppositionists are already being presented as minor nuisance, mere saboteurs who will not be able to interfere with the Russian authorities and their supporters from abroad. It is possible that some of the returned intelligence agents will even get an entry ticket to public politics, as was the case with Maria Butina (currently, a State Duma MP) or Viktor Bout (a member of the Ulyanovsk parliament). Of course, propaganda will not be able to turn former spies into popular politicians (the above-mentioned Butina only received her mandate because the Kirov governor had given up his), but the KGB fraternity in the Kremlin will be pleased. It has held a psychotherapy session for itself called «We do not abandon our own» and it is no coincidence that the swapped agents were personally received by Putin in Moscow. He shook hands with the men, gave flowers to the women, and gave a warm embrace to Vadim Krasikov. It is unlikely that these ceremonies are intended for the middle and low-ranking members of the special services: these people will carry out the tasks assigned to them by their superiors. But the release of their «colleagues» will warm the souls of the bosses themselves. The Vnukovo airport meeting ceremony showed that Putin wanted his own back, and he got them back. This event proved once again the Putin-centeredness of the Russian power vertical: it does not operate by rational considerations or benefits. The president’s personal wishes become laws and guides for actions.
Senator, a protégé of Dyumin, under arrest
On Friday, at the last meeting of the Federation Council in the spring session, Senator Dmitry Savelyev from the Tula Region was detained. The Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov, who initiated the case, personally came to the Upper House of the Russian Parliament to see through the senator’s detention. Savelyev is accused of murdering his business partner. Senators and even the speaker of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko did not expect such a development: Savelyev was detained during Matvienko’s farewell speech to parliamentarians leaving for the summer recess. The Prosecutor General’s Office conducted a real special operation, ruining the high spirits of the last session of the Federation Council.
In addition, the law-enforcement agencies disrupted the plans of the Tula authorities — Dmitry Savelyev was sent back to the Upper House of parliament by Dmitry Milyaev, the acting governor of Tula. Before that, Savelyev was twice sent to the Federation Council by the former head of the region Alexei Dyumin, a former security guard of Vladimir Putin and his current aide. In this sense, the senator can be called a representative of Dyumin’s team, and the official media emphasize his connection with this team. At the same time, Savelyev began his career in the 1990s as part of Sergey Kiriyenko’s and Boris Nemtsov’s team (now the Tula senator’s relations with Kiriyenko are openly hostile). Judging by the attack on Dmitry Savelyev, Dyumin, one of the presidential favorites, has serious enemies who have the power to initiate the arrest of a member of his team and disrupt its plans. Now Dyumin’s people have to decide who to delegate to the Federation Council, and the arrest of a sitting member of the FC and a candidate for senator from the governor-in-waiting has a negative impact on Dmitry Milyaev’s campaign.
State Duma in the «mad printer» mode
The State Duma closed its session with the speedy adoption of several bills. Russian authorities at various levels have long been engaged in an exemplary struggle with migrants. Governors issue decrees prohibiting migrants from working in the most popular spheres for labor migration: construction, public transport and services. The authorities of the Moscow Region and Primorsky Krai are creating people’s militias composed of former participants in Russia’s war against Ukraine and giving them broad powers, including the task of fighting illegal migration. Anti-immigrant sentiments in Russian society are quite strong, but they are further fueled by government officials and ultra-conservatives, such as Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeev and war reporters. Apparently, the political bloc of the presidential administration wants to turn the fight against migrants into one of the valves for the release of social discontent, so it highlights it in the media. It is likely that Vladimir Putin, who is fond of populist moves also perceives the issue in this way. The speaker of the State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, who has always been good at reading the Kremlin’s mood and often successfully guessed the president’s wishes, could not stay away from this process: the parliament is going on vacation, and Volodin was clearly in a hurry to secure his niche in the anti-immigration campaign. Perhaps the speaker was also spurred on by an attack from the head of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, who called the parliament «State Foola» (playing on the similarity of the Russian words for «Duma», parliament and «dur», a female fool) and accused it of not wanting to intervene in the «migrant problem».
In three readings, MPs approved a law that establishes a «expulsion regime» for migrants. It will affect people whose documents for staying in the country have expired, as well as those who have committed «crimes,» including administrative offenses. Migrants who fall under this regime will not be able to buy real estate, houses and cars, they will not be able to get bank loans. They will be deprived of the right to marry and to move freely around the country. Such foreign citizens will be entered into a special register and will have to report their whereabouts to the police. In case of violation of the «expulsion regime» migrants will be deported. In addition, the period of visa-free stay in Russia for foreigners has been reduced from six to three months, and the law now prohibits them from «interfering» in Russia’s internal affairs and obliges migrants to «respect traditional values».
In its prohibitionist zeal, the State Duma did not limit itself to the question of migration. It also criminalized drug propaganda and gave the authorities the right to declare foreign state organizations «undesirable.» It is obvious that Vyacheslav Volodin, counting on Putin’s favor, is ready to stick to a radical line, expecting not to be punished for conservative-patriotic excesses, and perhaps even to be rewarded. At the same time, the speaker and the MPs are ready to assist other actors of the power vertical. A few days ago, the State Duma supported in the first reading an amendment proposed by representatives of the Defense Ministry to ban the use of mobile phones at the front. Following criticism from radical war reporters, the document was amended to specify which devices would be banned and under what conditions. However, the haste with which the decision was passed in the first reading shows that the parliament and its speaker are willing to do favors for influential actors (in this case, the Ministry of Defense) in the expectation of reciprocal loyalty and favor.
At the same time, it seems that the Duma’s media activity in the populist sphere is beginning to worry the Kremlin’s political bloc, which does not fully control it. In popular political Telegram channels, which have long been one of the main means of sending signals to the Russian elite under conditions of censorship, posts criticizing the actions of Volodin and the Duma have begun to appear. The speaker and the parliament are accused of excessive PR, chaotic adoption of laws, and trying to please all players. These signals can be seen as warnings to Volodin sent by the Kremlin’s political management, and it is likely that Vladimir Putin is receiving the same signals. As the case of former «United Russia» party Secretary General Andrei Turchak showed, the president no longer appreciates the excessive zeal of the system’s players and is even suspicious of it. Therefore, Volodin’s efforts may very well backfire.
