The «appointment» of Alexey Dyumin, Vladimir Putin’s aide and former security guard, as either «Commander of the Northern Direction of the Strategic Defence Forces» or «head of the anti-terrorist operation in the Kursk region» became the most mysterious political story of the week. Dyumin was appointed to these posts not by the country’s top leadership, but by Telegram channels. The little-known Politsatirka was the first Telegram channel to break the story of Putin allegedly delegating «important tasks» in the Kursk region to his aide, specifying that Dyumin would supposedly «coordinate» the actions of law enforcement and civilian structures in the region. Subsequently, other Telegram channels began to refer to Dyumin as a «senior official» in charge of the anti-terrorist operation, as well as its «curator» or «coordinator». However, there are no such positions in the official nomenclature, while Russian legislation clearly states that the country’s Federal Security Service is in charge of the anti-terrorist operation regime.
Military reporter Alexander Sladkov went so far as to announce that the presidential aide had been made «commander of the northern direction of the Strategic Defense Forces.» Nikolay Ivanov, a Kursk Duma deputy representing the Communist party, also decided to flaunt his insider knowledge and began publicly speculating that Dyumin had become the commander in charge of the anti-terrorist operation (although representatives of the parliamentary opposition are not privy to such matters). In just 24 hours, the avalanche of rumors subsided: Sladkov apologized to his readers and announced that there had been no appointment made, while channels sympathetic to Dyumin began to write cautiously that he was preparing some kind of «report» for Putin and is tasked with finding those responsible for the AFU’s breakthrough into the Russian territory. No documentary evidence of the presidential aide’s new mission has surfaced either. Nevertheless, many Western and opposition Russian media and bloggers believed that Dyumin had indeed received new powers and positions.
What triggered rumors of Dyumin’s fake «appointment» was his participation in a meeting of heads of security agencies chaired by Vladimir Putin himself; the subject matter: the «situation» in the Kursk region. His presence was quite logical: the presidential aide is involved in the defense industry and serves as secretary of the State Council, which includes Russian governors as members. The heads of the regions bordering Ukraine were also present at the meeting. It is quite possible that Putin instructed Dyumin (by virtue of the latter’s position) to establish and facilitate interaction between local civilian authorities and law enforcement agencies. What happened next was the usual media strategy set in motion, the media strategy long used by the clan of Rosgvardia chief and former presidential security chief Viktor Zolotov. Alexey Dyumin is widely considered to be the «prince» of this clan and has been waiting for a long time for a high appointment (the media had previously speculated that he might become the head of the Defense Ministry, the deputy Prime Minister or the director of the Federal Security Service). As a result, Dyumin received an influential post of presidential aide, but the resources that come with this post and its weight in the power vertical are quite limited and do not compare with the weight of the top brass of the siloviki. That is why the media managers of the Zolotov clan are trying to put a positive spin on Dyumin’s appointment and every event connected with it. Russian Telegram channels, which have long become a tool for transmitting signals between elite groups, began to write about the influence of this structure and its bright prospects after Dyumin’s actual appointment as curator of the State Council.
However, the Council of State, whose existence is enshrined in the Constitution, has no real influence or authority to speak of. The appointment (or rather re-appointment) of the heads of the Council’s commissions changed from being a rather matter-of-fact, routine event into a landmark one, as Dyumin himself spoke to the heads of the commissions, i.e. the governors. It must be said that this media strategy has not failed so far. After some political observers claimed in 2016 that Dyumin was a possible successor to Putin, he became a mysterious and supposedly powerful figure within the power vertical. From then on, every rumor about his possible appointment was taken seriously, and failures to advance through the ranks in a timely manner were easily repackaged and presented as successes: «This is not a simple presidential aide with limited influence, but Dyumin himself». Some observers even went so far as to declare Dyumin the true powerbroker of the Defense Minister or éminence grise. The buzz of «special missions» and «important reports» creates a favorable vibe around the prince of the Zolotov clan and attracts interest to him, making him a super important figure within the Russian leadership. Most importantly, Dyumin’s critics and those opposed to his patrons have little evidence to expose him as a fraud: there are indeed some missions he has been assigned, and he is most likely engaged in «coordination» in the sense of helping to harmonize the actions of security forces and civilian authorities.
Dyumin’s fake «appointment» offers a nuanced insight into the mood of the Russian elites. First, the pro-war part of Russian society, including politicians and war reporters, lives in expectation of a kind of messiah who will be able to defeat Ukraine very quickly and then restore order in Russia. Dyumin easily fits the mold or the type of such a messiah — a brave, soft-spoken and mysterious strongman who has won Putin’s trust. The above-mentioned Alexander Sladkov has not only announced Dyumin’s appointment as commander, but openly rejoiced over it. Second, some elites are disappointed with Putin’s conservatism in his personnel policies, and with him being in no hurry to make serious decisions. Promising officials who did not get the appointments they wanted spread rumors about their increased influence and the fact that they did not manage to become real ministers, but «shadow» ministers so as not to look like real losers. Dyumin’s strategy fits in well with this spirit of the times, and the rumors about a «high official» begin to look quite plausible against the background of these «shadow» ministers. Third, even disproved information is stored in the subconscious, which is why public figures (such as Sladkov) explicitly swear loyalty to the presidential advisor, just to be on the safe side. We have also seen that (dis)information spread via Telegram channels can resonate very widely — from Western media to Russian military circles. This means that this messenger has become a serious weapon in the media battle.
Taken together, this generally speaks to the imbalance of the power vertical: its participants are beginning to look for alternative centers of influence, hoping for their emergence, because they are no longer satisfied with the existing order. Moreover, some actors have learned how to use this imbalance to their own political advantage and generate interest in themselves.
Maritime Fellow
Vladimir Putin has signed a decree establishing the Maritime Collegium of Russia, appointing Nikolay Patrushev, the former head of the Security Council, as its head. The focus of the new body’s work is quite narrow: security in the sphere of maritime activities. In line with the outlined narrowness of this field of activity, Patrushev, who had fallen into a strange disgrace, received only an annual guarantee of access to (meeting with) Putin, which is one of the main assets cherished by the Russian elite. All this may look like another evidence of Patrushev’s disgrace, but he managed to get Putin create a new Collegium so as to employ his aides. In addition, the new platform could become a lobbying tool, since it includes the ministers of industry, energy, and transport, that is to say, people who manage and oversee substantial budget funding. In this sense, Patrushev can work his way into lobbying schemes and connect the right people with members of his newly minted Collegium who run ministries. In the long run, this Maritime Collegium could become one of the elite lobbying clubs, like the Russian Geographical Society or the Russian Military Society before it. Finally, in the fog of war and in the fog created and spread by various Telegram channels, this institution can almost be presented as a «shadow government,» and we are very likely to see such interpretations again. Patrushev most likely understands these advantages very well, and he lobbied for the creation of the Collegium in order to obtain them.
