A religious procession took place in Moscow, organized by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) with support from the «Tsargrad» organization and its namesake TV channel, owned by Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, as well as nationalist movements like the «Russian Community.» Estimates suggest 20,000 to 40,000 people participated, marching through Moscow’s streets and embankments. The procession, led by Patriarch Kirill, was dedicated to the relatively minor church holiday of the Assembly of Moscow Saints. Many participants carried imperial flags and wore T-shirts and hoodies with symbols of nationalist organizations. The crowd included many young people and older men with the typical appearance of right-wing movement supporters, reminiscent of those seen at past «Russian Marches» or «Russian Runs.»
Patriotic church events have recently become a gathering point for nationalists, though before the war, their actions were, to put it mildly, not welcomed by the authorities. «Russian Marches» were long relegated to Moscow’s outskirts. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, right-wing movements have gained relevance: they’ve become a base for recruiting volunteers for the front and raising funds for military needs. Since 2022−2023, their members have collaborated with security forces (and, apparently, are directly overseen by them) in «raids» against migrants. The «Russian Community» has grown particularly close to the Orthodox Church. This patriotic activity has allowed nationalists to emerge from political obscurity.
The massive procession indeed looked impressive: Moscow hasn’t seen so many people on the streets since the war began. Unsurprisingly, rumors quickly spread—for instance, claims that over 100,000 people participated, mostly nationalists rather than churchgoers. Russian authorities often underreport attendance at opposition events by two or three times, but the ROC’s procession was not an opposition event—it was held with the Kremlin’s and Moscow mayor’s approval. Exaggerating the numbers suggests that ultra-patriotic right-wingers are still seen by the authorities as a potentially dangerous phenomenon. This narrative also suits some opposition-minded citizens, who find it pleasing to believe the Kremlin faces a threat.
Based on available photos and videos, the reported range of 20,000−40,000 participants seems realistic. Why would the authorities underreport attendance at a patriotic event tied to traditional church values? For a city of nearly 15 million with over a thousand churches, 40,000 participants—averaging about 40 people per parish—is modest rather than impressive. It highlights the low level of active involvement in Moscow’s church life. A Kommersant report adds nuance: participants included not only Muscovites but also people from the Moscow region and other parts of Russia, representing both the church and the «Russian Community.» With this «external» factor, 40,000 no longer seems triumphant.
The procession shows that mobilizing patriots, Orthodox believers, and nationalists for an officially sanctioned event is challenging. A similar number of people attended opposition rallies in Moscow in 2012, when the protest movement was already fading. Patriots are showing this turnout at their peak—during a war, amid state-driven propaganda. The same applies to nationalist movements: they’ve learned to make noise in the media and create news, but when it comes to real mobilization, they fall short.
The same pattern applies to the exaggerated influence of «angry patriots«—supporters of Igor Strelkov and businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, who advocated for total mobilization, a war economy, and conquering Ukraine entirely. Many saw them as a serious threat to the Kremlin, but the «angry patriots» turned out to be disoriented. Strelkov’s supporters couldn’t muster a significant protest after his arrest, Prigozhin attempted a march on Moscow but turned back his mercenaries and later died under mysterious circumstances.
It’s unlikely that people hiding under the ROC’s umbrella at an official event will spark rebellion or discontent. They primarily demonstrate loyalty. The procession’s turnout suggests that Russia’s nationalist war fervor is not as strong as claimed, and the authorities struggle to fully mobilize this segment of society.
The Populist’s Failure
We’ve previously noted the growing popularity of «new populism» among Russian bureaucrats. For some, this approach boosts their appeal and maintains Vladimir Putin’s interest—RFPI head Kirill Dmitriev is a prime example. However, playing this role isn’t easy, and «new populism» has claimed its first victim.
Samara region governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev quickly became one of the new wave of flamboyant governors. He wears a distinctive uniform, publicly scolds subordinates, and supports war participants. Fedorishchev actively ran a Telegram channel, posting videos for followers, though this was primarily aimed at impressing higher-ups. But succeeding in this role requires political instinct, which Fedorishchev apparently lacks.
The governor sought to boost his visibility by intervening in a conflict between Safe Internet League head Ekaterina Mizulina and pop singer Egor Kreed. Mizulina accused Kreed of undermining traditional values. Kreed retaliated by criticizing her public extramarital relationship with Shaman. It soon emerged that Kreed has influential backers, including Kremlin-connected International Boxing Federation president Umar Kremlev. At the aforementioned procession, Kreed and Kremlev walked side by side.
Fedorishchev, who criticized Kreed and invited him to Samara for a talk, was apparently unaware of this. Shortly after, he announced he was abandoning Telegram for the state-run MAX messenger. This wasn’t his only misstep: earlier, he tried to debunk rumors of excessive drinking, though they weren’t widely circulated. In an interview with his PR manager Ernest Staratelev, Fedorishchev inexplicably mentioned the «Sukhodrishchev» Telegram channel, which regularly criticizes him, inadvertently boosting his detractors. Fedorishchev also publicly clashed with local businessman Vladimir Avetisyan. Ultimately, he abandoned Telegram entirely.
Fedorishchev continued his feud with Kreed, demanding that the Safe Internet League «protect» youth from Kreed, whom he accused of «promoting pornography.» This «war» will likely end in failure—Fedorishchev is clearly not cut out for public populism. He attracts scandals he can’t handle. For bureaucrats lacking PR talent, populism is risky. This odd conflict also shows that mid-level officials often misunderstand the power structure’s hierarchies, attacking seemingly weak opponents who have powerful backers.
