Vladimir Putin spoke at the Valdai Forum shortly after the U.S. election, which was won by Republican candidate Donald Trump. At Valdai, the Russian president traditionally presents his views to an audience of international experts (although in recent years this audience has been dominated either by representatives of so-called «friendly» countries or by pro-Russian residents of the countries Russia deems unfriendly). As usual, the Russian leader delivered a lecture on the destruction of the Western unipolar world and the establishment of a complex multipolar world in which there should be no «oppressed nations», accused the West of attempts at «messianism» and did not hesitate to emphasize Russia’s messianic role:”Russia has more than once stopped those who clamored for world domination, whoever they were. It will continue to do so. But of course Russia’s role is not limited to protecting and preserving itself. It may sound a little grand, but Russia’s very existence is a guarantee that the world will retain its color, diversity and complexity, and this is the guarantee of successful development," he argued.
A new term appeared in Putin’s speech: «polyphony.» This is how he (or rather his advisers) decided to describe the essence of the new multipolar world, where the voice of every «nation» will be heard. There were other fresh tropes in the new Valdai speech. For example, the president recalled a private conversation between St Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in which Kohl allegedly admitted that Germany would rather be Russia’s ally than that of the United States. Neither Kohl nor Sobchak can confirm these words — neither of them is alive today. Putin also quoted a certain Western politician who allegedly described Russia as a «blunt tool» in the hands of Western civilization. Exactly who said this, under what circumstances, and whether he or she said it at all is unclear; an internet search turned up no results. But the combination of recollections of conversations between deceased senior politicians and alleged speeches by anonymous individuals suggests that Putin is eagerly adopting and employing these new rhetorical techniques.
The highlight of the speech — the news that Putin had congratulated Donald Trump on his election victory and said a lot of nice things about him. The Russian leader called Trump a «courageous man» and said that Trump was ready to «help resolve the Ukrainian crisis». It seems that Putin, as well as part of the elite, believes that Trump, as a «pragmatist», will stop helping Ukraine and achieve a ceasefire on Russia’s terms. After the forum was over, the Kremlin declared that Putin’s conditions had not changed (and they consist of recognizing the Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions as Russian territory). However, Trump is likely to demand concessions from both Ukraine and Russia, which Putin is clearly unwilling to make. Paradoxically, Putin, who routinely accuses the US of hegemony and neocolonialism, hopes that the White House and its new leader will mediate between Ukraine and Russia, albeit in Russia’s favor. In essence, this is a recognition of US primacy in the world order, although Putin and his speechwriters may be unaware of these contradictions. The president turns a blind eye to the anti-Iranian and anti-Chinese initiatives of the winner of the American elections and continues to talk about the confrontation between the West and the US. Putin also prefers to ignore the difficulties that «Russia’s friends» will inevitably face with Trump’s election, although he will still have to choose sides according to all the rules of overt and covert diplomacy. So far, the Russian president’s behavior seems irrational — he simply hopes that everything will work out well, that all contradictions will be ironed out and that his ideas will be accepted by everyone, from Trump to the leaders of the BRICS countries.
Governor appointments: old rules with new twists
Ahead of the single day of elections, which takes place on the first Sunday of September each year, the Kremlin has begun the traditional autumn rotation of the gubernatorial corps. The rules for replacing regional heads of state have become well established in recent years. Most regions already employ officials who have gone through the process of «unification» and «standardization» within Sergey Kiriyenko’s political bloc. They have attended the so-called School of Governors, where they have learnt the practices of corporate governance and scripts for public behavior (both of which often do not work well in concrete rather than abstract situations, especially in crisis situations). Kiriyenko’s «technocrats», or as they are now called, «the new wave of managers», have replaced the «old wave managers» in most regions. Most of these cookie cutter regional heads have already served their first term, and they are usually given extended terms — partly because there has long been a staffing bottleneck at the federal level. As a result, there have only been isolated, individual changes in the corps of governors for a number of years. Either regional heads appointed under the former heads of the political bloc, Vladislav Surkov and Vyacheslav Volodin, or completely unsuccessful governors are subject to rotation. Another case (though not the most common) is when an official leaves for promotion in federal structures. All these rules have been respected now as well.
The head of the Rostov region, Vasily Golubev, who had been appointed governor in 2010 (Vladislav Surkov was the head of the political bloc within the presidential administration at the time), resigned. Golubev was a rather powerful «Varangian» (imported) manager, who was not popular in the region, but people were used to him. Few doubted that the veteran governor would not be sanctioned for a fourth term. Golubev was promised an honorable retirement — the post of senator from the region. Komi head Vladimir Uyba was appointed in 2020, under Kiriyenko, and was close to ROSATOM as head of the Federal Medical and Biological Agency, which oversees the corporation’s medical facilities. Uyba was considered the most unsuccessful example of a regional appointee from Kiriyenko’s bloc. He failed to build a stable team, clashed with local elites (including those from the «United Russia» party) and was constantly embroiled in public scandals. Thanks to his patrons, Vladimir Uyba had worked almost to the end of his term and will now work in the Ministry of Defense. Uyba’s replacement brought a change in the Jewish Autonomous Region: its governor, Rostislav Goldstein, became the head of Komi. The current head of the Tambov region, Maxim Egorov, was a member of the «United Russia’s» acting Secretary General Vladimir Yakushev’s team when he worked in the Ministry of Construction, Housing and Utilities. Now Yakushev is again assembling his people in the ruling party into his own team, and Egorov is expected to take a senior position in the «United Russia’s» executive committee.
The rules for appointing new regional heads have largely remained the same. The Rostov region will be headed by Yury Slyusar, head of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). UAC is part of the ROSTEC, which means that control of a large, rich and strategically important region has once again been given to a representative of one of the influential federal groups — in this case a representative of the clan of ROSTEC’s CEO Sergey Chemezov. The Rostov region is home to one of ROSVERTOL’s main plants. The Chemezov clan also controls the Nizhny Novgorod and Kaliningrad regions, which are run by Gleb Nikitin and Alexei Besprozvannykh, who worked in ROSTEC’s stronghold, the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
At first glance, the appointment of the head of the Tambov region appears to have been made in accordance with the new rules. According to the media loyal to the presidential administration, Yevgeny Pervyshov, a graduate of the Kremlin’s «Time of Heroes» program for war veterans, has been appointed acting head of the region. But Pervyshov is first and foremost a seasoned manager — he served as mayor of Krasnodar and then as a State Duma deputy. The declaration of participation in the war and enrolment in the «Time of Heroes» became an alternative to the School of Governors, although the essence of these career lifts is the same: they operate for the current members of the vertical, members of federal clans or high-ranking officials and deputies. Whether Pervyshov has been promoted or demoted is hard to say: Krasnodar’s population is a third larger than Tambov’s with a much larger budget. Tambov Oblast is considered a depressed region. It is difficult to score political points and ensure further growth, as the region is on the periphery of the federal leadership’s attention. Pervyshov had far more opportunities for growth in Krasnodar. Thus, the appointment looks quite traditional: the region was headed by a «Varangian» official who fit into one of Kiriyenko’s personnel programs.
The appointment of Rostislav Goldstein as head of Komi breaks with the general rules. He was a prominent representative of the republic’s elite, a deputy in the region’s State Council and a representative in the State Duma. He has not lost his connections in Komi. As a rule, the presidential administration tries to appoint «imported» appointees as regional heads who are not connected to local influential groups — the new acting heads may have a formal connection to the region (for example, they may have been born there or gone to school there), but they should not be embedded in local power divisions. Goldstein was an exception, because the situation in Komi is also exceptional. After the arrest of the region’s governor, Vyacheslav Gaizer, and most of his team in 2015, the republic’s system of governance was destroyed. The new head, Sergey Gaplikov, who came from Olimpstroy company, has been unable to rebuild it, and the difficult and conflict-prone Vladimir Uyba has only made matters worse. Apparently the presidential administration is hoping that Goldstein — a rather tough man and manager — will be able to establish contacts with local groups he knows well. One of the factors in the appointment of a «local» was the reluctance of prominent system players to take on the post of head of a politically problematic region. In the Jewish Autonomous Region, Goldstein was able to retain a representative of his team — the former deputy mayor of Birobidzhan and his former chief of staff, Marina Kostyuk. At the same time, Kostyuk was placed in a desirable military context for the appointment — in recent months she has been working for the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, which is headed by Putin’s niece Anna Tsivileva.
The gubernatorial rotation showed that the rules for appointing regional leaders remain the same, although they have been slightly restyled. The Kremlin appoints either members of influential clans or «Varangians» as governors. At the same time, it is desirable for them to fit into the current trendy context, which now includes participation in the war against Ukraine or support for the military effort. But this conformity to the trend is a mere addition to the main role: both Pervyshov and Kostyuk were prominent figures before their participation in the war or work in the military foundation. Well, the protégés of influential clans such as Yuri Slyusar do not need to rely on any extra achievements favorable to their candidacy: be it Kiriyenko’s School of Governors, let alone volunteering for the front.
