Vladimir Putin turned this year’s BRICS summit in Kazan into his very own one-man show. On the one hand, he failed to achieve even the most elusive agreements on the creation of a single payment system, let alone a single currency. On the other hand, the Russian leader was able to show that he has not become a complete pariah and outcast on the world stage following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The leaders of China, India, South Africa and other major countries are shaking hands with him. They do not hesitate and are not embarrassed to come to Russia. The BRICS effect on the international public has worked. Putin tries in every way possible to emphasise his special relationship with world leaders — for example, during his conversation with India’s prime-minster Narendra Modi, he said that both sides understood each other without an interpreter. All this backslapping confuses Putin’s interlocutors, but it may work for some of Russia’s domestic audience as it seems to send the message: «Our leader is on good terms with everyone, he is a friend and brother to other world leaders.»
However, other world leaders’ motives are primarily pragmatic: to buy hydrocarbons at reduced prices or to make money by circumventing sanctions. In this sense, BRICS as an economic union is a viable option for them. Once upon a time, the organization was created for the cooperation of emerging economies, and this had a pragmatic meaning for its creators (including Putin). Now the Russian president has clearly begun to move away from this pragmatism: he is trying to turn BRICS into an anti-Western club and to present himself as its leader. This is why countries whose economies are neither developed nor emerging are being encouraged to join the organization. The BRICS locomotives (e.g. India and South Africa) are not satisfied with this policy, especially as Russia is extending invitations to their rival states. These states also do not want to enter into a direct confrontation (albeit economic and ideological) with the West, as this undermines pragmatic interests. Putin runs the risk of overdoing it and turning the BRICS into a place of ritual meetings where interested members can get discounts on oil and gas. In such a case, the real decisions will be taken in another club, one of which Vladimir Vladimirovich is not a member.
The trials and tribulations of the Shoigu clan
Tyva’s parliamentarians have once again ignored the task of appointing a senator, which is the responsibility of the region’s Khural (Tyva’s parliament). The main contender for the post is Ruslan Tsalikov, a former deputy Defense Minister and close associate of Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu. Tsalikov previously worked with Shoigu in the Emergency Situations Ministry. The post of senator brings with it immunity from prosecution, which is important for prominent representatives of the Security Council secretary’s clan against the background of criminal cases against former deputy Defense Ministers Timur Ivanov, Pavel Popov and other ex-Defense officials. Shoigu managed to get his close associate on the list of the «United Russia» party for the parliamentary elections in his home region of Tyva. What is more, the former official managed to secure his place by bypassing the primaries of the ruling party. Initially, it was expected that Tsalikov would become a senator, and this nomination was approved for him at the highest level. The statutes of the «United Russia» party allow candidates to bypass primaries, but such a situation is considered an emergency and requires the approval of the party’s top leadership. The republican authorities complied with this decision, although the head of Tyva, Vladislav Khovalyg, does not have the easiest of relations with Shoigu.
However, after being elected as a regional deputy (required in order to be delegated to the Federation Council), Tsalikov ran into problems. He was not appointed a senator at either the first or the second session of the Khural. Then Shoigu came to Tyva to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the republic’s accession to the USSR, appeared at all the events with Ruslan Tsalikov and, it seems, finally resolved the problems. The appointment of the former deputy minister was supposed to take place on 23 October, but Tsalikov did not attend the meeting of the Khural, and the issue of the senator’s delegation was not discussed at the meeting. The deadline for the MPs to decide on a member of the Federation Council is 25 October: they have to decide on a candidate 30 days after the first session (it was held on 26 September), and it is already clear that they will not be able to meet the legal deadline. There are no sanctions for the regional parliaments, but it is likely that they will have to find a new candidate. Tsalikov has not yet overcome the obstacle clearly set by the federal leadership of the security services and the opponents of the Shoigu clan (we have written elsewhere that these are the groups of Rosgvardiya head Viktor Zolotov and ROSTEC head Sergey Chemezov), because the civilian political administrators have agreed to Tsalikov’s nomination.
The Security Council secretary’s enemies have managed to inflict serious image damage on him and his group. Even if Tsalikov is eventually appointed a senator, the elites have become convinced that Shoigu no longer has his former influence with Putin. His closest associate has been humiliated, at least procedurally. The former Defense Minister’s traditional resource was his proximity to the president — they used to holiday together in the taiga and take photographs. In those days, Shoigu was apparently able to solve almost any problem with the Russian leader. Now his closest ally has to suffer the humiliation in order to be appointed to a post that is not even the most important one in the power vertical. The elites need to ensure that the former closeness between Shoigu and Putin is gone. If Tsalikov’s appointment is finally blocked, it will show that even decisions already taken at the top can now be reconsidered in the course of intra-elite conflicts.
Azarov’s casus
The former governor of Samara Region, Dmitry Azarov, also faced a backlash from competing influential groups. In 2023, he received the Kremlin’s sanction for re-election, but this did not prevent his opponents (most notably Alexander Khinshtein, a State Duma deputy from the «United Russia» party) from masterminding a criminal prosecution of Azarov’s team. Khinshtein’s proximity to the head of Rosgvardiya gave him every opportunity to do so. The attacks continued even after Dmitry Azarov won the election. The arrests of officials and the leaking of compromising information even took place against the backdrop of the presidential campaign, the traditional time of «water truce» for the elite (in The Jungle Book Kipling wrote that droughts usually brought all the animals to gather at the last remaining pool and the Law of the Jungle allegedly forbade them to hunt and attack each other). In the run-up to federal elections, influential groups try to dampen conflicts, or at least prevent them from becoming public. In the Samara Region, this rule no longer works. Shortly after election day, Dmitry Azarov resigned, ostensibly voluntarily, after serving only a few months following his re-election. As governor, he worked closely with ROSTEC (the region is home to Russia’s largest carmaker, AvtoVAZ) and was appointed adviser to the company’s head, Sergey Chemezov. Through ROSTEC, Azarov became one of the three senators selected by the region’s new head, Vyacheslav Fedorishchev — before registering to run for the elections, each gubernatorial candidate, is expected to make a list of three potential senators from the executive branch of his or her region. Like Tsalikov, the seat in the Upper House granted him immunity from prosecution. And as in the case of Shoigu’s associate, Azarov’s appointment was cancelled and another person became a senator. The security services began to take an interest in the former governor, who was left without immunity.
The events surrounding Azarov and Tsalikov give a sense of the tense atmosphere rife with conflict that reigns within the power vertical. Conflicts within the elite groups are not being resolved: the Kremlin either cannot or will not do it. Every decision can be revoked or blocked. Strong players, sensing the competitor’s weakness, try to go all the way and deprive the competitor of all resources or, better yet, freedom. The main detractor of the former governor of Samara, the deputy Alexander Khinshtein, opaquely and publicly hints that criminal investigations will soon be launched against Azarov himself. If earlier the victims of such disputes were individual players (for example, the former head of Mari-El, Leonid Markelov) or members of less influential federal groups (the former head of the Komi Republic, Vyacheslav Gaizer), now representatives of the recently powerful federal clans or people close to them are being targeted. All this is making members of the power vertical nervous: it is not really easy to operate in a system where there are no clear guarantees and the intercession of high patrons does not play a decisive role. The vertical used to be able to create comfortable conditions for its members, but now belonging to it can in many cases bring more problems than benefits.
