Vladimir Putin’s increased media activity marked the second week of Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk. However, most of what the president did or said in public had nothing to do with the AFU offensive. Putin visited Azerbaijan, after which the country’s leadership had applied to join BRICS, made a brief stop in Beslan two weeks before the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attack on that city, and paid a visit to Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya. The Kursk region was the focus of the Russian leader’s meetings with officials and the siloviki, which seemed boring and routine against the backdrop of Putin’s exciting travels. The Kremlin once again resorted to its beloved tactic: in the acute phase of a crisis, when its outcome is not obvious, Putin prefers to keep a low profile and disappears off the media radar. This was the case during the Prigozhin mutiny, the terrorist attacks in Dagestan, or the anti-Israeli protests in that republic. The Russian leader appears in public only when it becomes absolutely clear to him and his entourage that the worst has been avoided. In the case of the AFU invasion, the worst-case scenario is the potential capture of the town of Kurchatov, where the Kursk nuclear power plant is located, or even of the regional center of Kursk itself. By the end of last week, however, the pace of the AFU’s advance into Russian territory had slowed considerably or even frozen, giving Putin an opportune moment to go public.
In the aftermath of the crisis, the Kremlin is doing its best to convince the population that all is well. Putin is actively holding meetings, visiting regions and traveling abroad whenever possible. All of this is meant to send a «business as usual» signal to citizens and to assure them that little has changed, the president is busy with routine matters, which means that nothing serious is happening or has happened. According to this logic, Putin does not visit places where there is a crisis, because his very arrival would indicate the exceptional nature and therefore the seriousness of what is happening. The Kremlin is doing its best to prevent Russians from taking the threat seriously. Russians are shown various ways to help refugees from the Kursk region with food, to buy an Ozone (Russia’s equivalent of the Amazon) certificate on Gosuslugi, and this is reminiscent of the many earlier disaster relief campaigns, as if the Ukrainian invasion of Russian territory were a natural disaster, not part of the ongoing war. The inhabitants of the Kursk region, evacuated from the territories occupied by the AFU, should appear as such victims of some natural disaster. And this perception should also reassure the rest of Russians, because they have escaped the «the storm».
This tactic has been successful in resolving crises, such as the Prigozhin mutiny and the unrest in Dagestan. In the context of the ongoing event, however, it can only work if the official point of view completely dominates the media. If the majority of citizens (as was the case in the 2000s) got their information from television news, the Kremlin media machine would be able to routinize the AFU offensive and diminish its importance in the eyes of viewers. Now, however, more and more citizens prefer to read the news on the Internet, and there they can learn about the real state of affairs not only from independent media, but also from Telegram channels. Even military reporters loyal to the Kremlin often provide information, which is not too far removed from the real situation on the ground. Against this backdrop, Putin’s therapeutic nonchalance will cause more and more confusion, and Putin himself has already acquired the image of a leader who avoids crisis situations and disappears from public view when the going gets tough.
Gifts for Kadyrov
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has long invited Vladimir Putin to Chechnya, and last week his persistent requests were answered. The Russian leader came to the region, met with Kadyrov, toured a Grozny district project named after him — «Putin» — and presented the Grozny mosque with a Quran. In addition, the president was photographed with the Chechen leader’s children and took a separate picture with his son Adam. Adam gained notoriety after beating Nikita Zhuravel. Zhuravel had been arrested and charged with «insulting the feelings of religious believers» for burning a Quran. Most likely, Kadyrov managed to get Putin to come to Chechnya against the backdrop of the «Akhmat» battalion’s participation in the operation in the Kursk region. The president’s visit to North Ossetia prior to the anniversary of the Beslan tragedy was clearly planned, and the head of Chechnya could easily have taken advantage of the president’s arrival in the nearby region and called him to visit Chechnya, for example, on the pretext of raising the spirit of the «Akhmat» battalion. Kadyrov and Putin talked about the «foot soldiers», and the head of Russia publicly praised «Akhmat».
It is quite clear what the Chechen leader stands to gain from Putin’s visit. He always uses his special proximity to the president as an argument in disputes with his opponents in the security and civilian structures. Whenever conflicts or obstacles arise, Ramzan Kadyrov always seeks a meeting with the president, where he receives Putin’s approval for his work. According to the rules of the power vertical, after Putin’s public praise, the attacks on the addressee should stop, and this rule has always worked in Kadyrov’s case. The media have previously reported that Ramzan Kadyrov has developed health problems and would like to pass the levers of power in the republic to his children, or at least to some representatives of his clan. Some Kremlin officials have their own take on the issue: for example, they see Apti Alautdinov, the commander of «Akhmat’, or Putin’s aide Ruslan Edelgeriyev, who has drifted away from Kadyrov, as possible leaders of Chechnya. The arrival of the president and a photo with a possible successor could become an argument in this dispute.
Putin, on the other hand, has little to gain from this trip. First of all, the people of Chechnya are already (at least formally and publicly) loyal to him as is. Second, Russian nationalists, one of the most motivated pro-war groups in the country, had nothing nice to say about Putin posing for a photo with Kadyrov Jr. Finally, Putin decided to kiss a Quran, and this scene was immediately broadcast by the Chechen media. The Christian part of the Russian society (or at least, those who identify as such) are certain to have questions about this gesture: what religion does the president really profess? He attends church services on Orthodox holidays and donates icons to the Russian Orthodox Church, only to make a gesture of reverence to the holy book of Islam in a mosque. Putin’s gesture can be interpreted in two ways, and both interpretations are detrimental to Putin’s image as an «Orthodox president.» Either Putin does not believe in God at all and is using religion for self-serving PR purposes. Or his faith is very exotic and he believes in all gods at once (and such statements have been made by Putin). Both versions will inevitably repel supporters of traditional religions. The president brought Ramzan Kadyrov generous gifts at the expense of the loss of his own image, which his subordinates had spent so much time building.
The Rise of Anna Tsivileva
Anna Tsivileva, the daughter of Putin’s late cousin, colloquially referred to as Putin’s niece, who has recently became Deputy Defense Minister, continues to move up the ranks. This rise can be called slow, but as the saying goes, «slow and steady wins the race.» Tsivileva has moved up half a step and received the post of State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense in addition to the status of Deputy Minister. Now she will represent the Ministry in civilian government agencies, including the State Duma and the Federation Council. This will give her the opportunity to establish even more contacts within the Russian political elite. Most importantly, this interaction will not raise any questions: after all, it is now Tsivileva’s job description. The president’s niece clearly knows what she wants and clearly has influence over her uncle. Before Tsivileva’s promotion, Putin tried not to appoint his relatives to official public positions, partly to give the elites no reason to fear the transfer of power by inheritance within the presidential family. Under the influence of his niece, the president gave in, and Anna Tsivileva, dizzy with her own success, continues to take the power vertical by storm. It is likely that after working in the Ministry of Defense she will head one of the civilian ministries or get an important position in one of the chambers of the Russian parliament (even the job of a chairperson is not off-limits for her career rise).
However, Tsivileva’s heightened activity is unlikely to have a positive impact on the work of the Defense Ministry. We have already written elsewhere that the appointment of deputy ministers who do not know each other and, above all, have no prior history with Minister Andrey Belousov, disrupts the coordination of the Ministry’s work. Anna Tsivileva quickly launched her own PR campaign, and now she has also secured a new appointment. She clearly sends a signal of being an alternative center of influence and power within the Defense Ministry, and the sheer emergence of such centers does not bode well for vertical power structures.
