Vladimir Putin spoke at the congress of the pro-government children’s «Movement of the First» and participated in a meeting of its supervisory board. This «new pioneer movement» was established in December 2022 and, according to its leaders, has recruited 11 million members in just a couple of years—more than a third of Russia’s underage population. The «Movement of the First» is one of the projects of the presidential administration’s political bloc, a Potemkin village of patriotic Russia. It is built according to the blueprints of other decorative schemes devised by Kremlin administrators.
Such projects always emphasize their record-breaking numbers. Numbers matter to Putin, which is why Kremlin officials fabricate new official records for him during elections. The membership of the «Movement of the First» is secured through the coercion typical of Putin’s power vertical. Complaints abound on most parenting forums, with class teachers reportedly pressuring children to join the «new pioneers.» Neither the students nor their parents typically want to clash with teachers, so they comply. School principals and deputies demand key performance indicators (KPIs) for enrollment in the «Movement» from teachers, while municipal and regional authorities pressure the administrators. As a result, Vladimir Putin sees impressive figures and proudly calls the movement «a whole army,» giving him yet another reason to praise the head of the political bloc, Sergey Kiriyenko, and his team.
Projects like this are managed by trusted careerist bureaucrats loyal to Kiriyenko, and the «Movement of the First» is no exception. It is led by Artem Metelev, a former functionary of United Russia’s «Young Guard,» a former official, and a participant in the Kremlin’s «Leaders of Russia» personnel competition. Metelev knows exactly what his bosses—both immediate and higher up—want and how to present the numbers to them. At the Movement’s council meeting, its leadership invited children whose families are somehow connected to the war or who are personally fascinated by it. War is Putin’s top priority, and his subordinates tailor their efforts to his interests. It’s no coincidence that last year, the organization’s headquarters was headed by Artur Orlov, a participant in the war against Ukraine.
Through the Movement’s congress and the supervisory board meeting, political administrators tried to plant the idea in Putin’s mind that the country could use a dedicated agency for youth upbringing. All adult participants in the council meeting spoke, in one way or another, about «systemic work» in this area. The political bloc of the Presidential Administration (AP) has long wanted to establish a ministry or at least an agency for upbringing. Currently, Kiriyenko and his team must coordinate with multiple government ministries and agencies, pushing their projects through them and securing funding. Having «their own» ministry would allow them to employ team members and direct financial flows as needed. The congress and council meeting, with carefully selected participants and speeches, could nudge the president toward decisions favorable to the political administrators.
Surprises from Volodin
State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin has delayed the adoption of amendments to electoral legislation that would allow regions to make electronic voting (DEG) the primary method of voting in elections. This scheme was already tested in a semi-experimental format during last year’s elections to the Moscow City Duma. All voters were automatically enrolled in electronic voting, though paper ballots were available upon prior written request to the election commission. By prioritizing electronic voting, Moscow authorities made obtaining paper ballots as difficult as possible. Paper ballots were typically used by protest-minded voters: experts believe DEG cannot be monitored, allowing authorities to manipulate election results as desired. The introduction of «e-voting» in the capital turned a protest-prone city into one of the electoral sultanates. While opposition candidates won half the seats in the 2019 Moscow City Duma elections, in 2024, administrative candidates swept every district (Moscow City Duma elections use a purely majoritarian system).
This scheme is also appealing to federal authorities, who aim to maximize electronic voting coverage in the upcoming State Duma elections, where United Russia must achieve new records despite low approval ratings. The bill prioritizing electronic voting was introduced by Pavel Krasheninnikov, head of the Duma’s constitutional legislation committee, and Andrey Klishas, head of the Federation Council’s legislation committee. This high-profile duo always submits bills approved (and sometimes drafted) at the top levels of the presidential administration. Until recently, all initiatives from Klishas and Krasheninnikov received a green light. But for the second time, Vyacheslav Volodin has flashed a yellow light at bills from these prominent United Russia figures (and, by extension, the presidential administration).
The first instance came last year when the Duma speaker stalled an AP initiative by Klishas and Krasheninnikov. That bill involved amendments to local self-government (LSG) laws, abolishing first-tier municipalities (rural and urban settlements). This idea logically followed the constitutional amendments adopted in 2020, and in many regions, the first tier had already been effectively eliminated. However, its nationwide abolition displeased the leadership of two wealthy republics: Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The existence of first-tier LSG allows local elites to secure prestigious posts for their protégés in large, affluent villages and provincial towns. Eliminating these settlements would reduce the number of municipal positions, depriving republican leaders of a key resource in dealing with clans. Tatarstan’s leader, Rustam Minnikhanov, fiercely opposed the idea, with Bashkortostan’s Radiy Khabirov offering quieter support. Volodin lobbied on their behalf, pausing the bill and later securing amendments. Deputies granted regional legislatures the right to abolish first-tier municipalities but also allowed them to retain them. Most regions will likely eliminate them, but a few—primarily Tatarstan and Bashkortostan—will keep them. The Kremlin got its way, and the republics preserved what mattered to them.
Now, Volodin is repeating the same playbook: he takes an initiative vital to the AP’s political bloc for ensuring election results, temporarily torpedoes it, and enters negotiations. He has long-standing scores to settle with the AP’s political managers—Volodin himself was the Kremlin’s political overseer until 2016 and didn’t want to leave the post. Opposition to the Klishas-Krasheninnikov initiative may come from the same national republics and regions like Krasnodar Krai. These areas played a key role in federal elections as electoral sultanates, delivering record turnout and results for government candidates, which earned their leaders special favor and leverage with the national leadership. Electronic voting levels the playing field, as seen in Moscow. Thus, the leaders of these «sultanates» may have turned to their trusted lobbyist to avoid losses from the political bloc’s initiative. It’s also disadvantageous to systemic parties, already heavily dependent on Kremlin administrators, as widespread DEG would deepen that reliance. By blocking the elimination of paper ballots, Volodin indirectly aids the systemic opposition and acts as a mediator between it and the Kremlin.
For now, the Duma speaker faces no resistance. This is likely because Vladimir Putin is preoccupied with the war and uninterested in elections far off in the future or the current political agenda. Volodin bets that no one will escalate the conflict, the political bloc will find it easier to negotiate with him, and he’ll secure a compromise favoring his allies and influential groups through his lobbying. So far, this tactic works, even if it bends most rules of the power vertical.
An Involuntary Liberal
Yevgeny Kuyvashev, the now-former governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast—one of the last veteran governors not tied to Sergey Kiriyenko’s «school» of regional heads—has left his post. Rumors of his resignation had circulated for years. Kuyvashev himself wanted a federal role, while the industrial region attracted influential players. However, no Moscow position materialized, and he held onto the governorship with support from Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin (Kuyvashev began his bureaucratic career in Tyumen Oblast, Sobyanin’s stronghold). During his tenure, much happened in the region. In 2013, amid a protest wave and tensions between regional and city authorities, opposition figure Yevgeny Roizman won the mayoral election in Yekaterinburg. Residents of the regional capital protested—e.g., against a church construction in a city park. Kuyvashev’s entourage faced corruption scandals, and he himself was both a public irritant (e.g., over the church) and a defender of residents. He criticized propagandist Vladimir Solovyov for calling Yekaterinburg a «city of demons» and defended the Yeltsin Center from filmmaker Nikita Mikhalkov’s attacks. This earned him a reputation as the last liberal governor. Yet, under him, Yekaterinburg’s mayoral elections were abolished.
His replacement is Denis Pasler, former Orenburg Oblast governor and a native of Sverdlovsk Oblast, where he served in the regional parliament and as Kuyvashev’s premier. A product of Viktor Vekselberg’s Renova company, Pasler attended the Kremlin’s governor school, like all recent appointees. Interestingly, while in Orenburg, he had a poor reputation in the Kremlin, where his resignation was even considered. His promotion suggests clan lobbying outweighs personal failures. Vekselberg, who influenced Sverdlovsk Oblast before outsider governors like Kuyvashev and his predecessor Alexander Misharin, is regaining his former clout.
Pasler’s Orenburg post went to Yevgeny Solntsev, former premier of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), whose rise we predicted in a prior review. Before moving to occupied Donbas, Solntsev worked at Russian Railways, a structure controlled by the Rotenberg brothers. Thus, the Rotenberg group has gained a new region in its portfolio.
