Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many experts on the post-Soviet space concluded that the war would lead directly to a sharp decline or even complete collapse of Russian influence in the region. The main arguments centered on the idea that Western sanctions and the shift of the Russian economy toward a war footing would inevitably reduce Moscow’s economic footprint, while the rejection of the invasion by most countries in Northern Eurasia would erode political leverage and soft power tools. It was assumed that all key Russian partners except Belarus would actively distance themselves to minimize their own risks.
A fresh wave of discussions about weakening Moscow’s positions was triggered by intensified U.S. diplomacy across a vast territory—from the Caucasus and Central Asia to even Belarus. Relations between Russia and the South Caucasus countries indeed appear extremely challenging for the Kremlin. Washington’s mediation in normalizing Armenian-Azerbaijani ties and the agreed «Trump route» have effectively deprived Russia of its role as the primary peacemaker and negotiator in the region—a position that seemed unassailable not long ago. At the same time, Moscow itself damaged relations with both Yerevan and Baku even before the Washington agreements.
In Central Asia, on one hand, China’s influence is steadily growing, while on the other, all regional countries are actively pursuing productive ties with Washington to balance pressures from both Beijing and Moscow. This dynamic is compounded by Russia’s overtly anti-migrant policies, which have intensified following the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall.
Nevertheless, the process of losing (or more accurately, transforming) Russian influence is proceeding nonlinearly and far less unambiguously than it might appear at first glance.
«It’s the economy, stupid»
If one looks solely at economic indicators, the picture is entirely different: Moscow has not only maintained but actively expanded cooperation with many neighbors. All post-Soviet states (excluding the Baltic countries and Ukraine) can be divided into five groups based on trade dynamics with Russia.
1. Phenomenal growth: Armenia
The most striking example is trade between Russia and Armenia. In 2020, bilateral turnover stood at $ 2.3 billion; in 2021, $ 2.6 billion; in 2022, it exceeded $ 5 billion; in 2023, it reached $ 7.4 billion; and in 2024, it hit a record of around $ 12 billion (with some estimates varying between $ 11.7 billion and $ 12.4 billion). Available data suggest a contraction in 2025, but the impressive growth in prior years nonetheless fully refutes the pessimistic forecasts of 2022. By the end of 2024, Russia accounted for about 39% of Armenia’s external trade (up more than 10 percentage points). Trade grew especially rapidly during the second Karabakh war, when—according to widespread opinion in Armenia—Russia failed to fulfill its allied obligations and did not come to Yerevan’s aid.
The primary driver of this growth was the war in Ukraine: it created vast opportunities for parallel imports to Russia, sanctions evasion, and sharply increased demand for key categories of Armenian exports. Today, around 80% of Armenia’s exports to Russia consist of re-exports of goods specifically purchased for resale in the Russian Federation.
2. Substantial growth: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan
Kyrgyzstan ranks second in growth rates after Armenia. Significant increases began in 2021 (+47%, to $ 2.4 billion), then reached $ 3.4 billion in 2023 and around $ 3.9 billion in 2024. The share of re-exports in trade grew 7−8 times, again driven primarily by Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Uzbekistan is roughly on par with Kyrgyzstan in terms of growth: $ 5.8 billion in 2020, $ 7.5 billion in 2021, $ 9.3 billion in 2022, $ 9.8 billion in 2023, and around $ 11.6 billion in 2024. By year-end 2024, Russia nearly matched China in Uzbekistan’s external trade structure (25.6% vs. 26.4%). Re-export shares grew 5−8 times.
Trade with Turkmenistan grew unexpectedly (despite traditionally questionable statistics): from $ 970 million in 2020 to $ 1.6 billion in 2024, with projections of $ 2.5 billion in 2025. Unlike other neighbors, growth here is driven not by re-exports but by traditional commodity groups from both sides.
Azerbaijan falls into the same group: $ 2.9 billion in 2020, $ 3 billion in 2021, $ 3.7 billion in 2022, $ 4.3 billion in 2023, and $ 4.8 billion in 2024. Growth occurred amid Azerbaijan’s acute conflict with Russia’s ally Armenia and rising Turkish influence in the Caucasus—events also interpreted as diplomatic setbacks for Moscow. Re-export shares rose from 10−20% to 25−45%. Azerbaijan plays a special role in helping Russia route oil to global markets.
3. Steady growth: Belarus, Tajikistan
Countries with stable, though less dramatic, trade growth include Belarus and Tajikistan.
Russia’s key ally and indirect participant in the Ukraine war, Belarus, has only strengthened its importance to Moscow over the past four years, while Russia has deepened its influence in Belarus. Turnover has grown steadily: $ 28.5 billion in 2020, $ 38.5 billion in 2021, $ 43.4 billion in 2022, $ 53 billion in 2023, and $ 57.6 billion in 2024 (with some estimates reaching $ 60 billion).Due to sanctions, Belarus can no longer actively assist Moscow with re-exports, but its industrial output and agricultural goods continue to play a vital role in adapting the Russian economy to wartime consequences. In 2025, for instance, Minsk significantly increased fuel supplies to Russia to offset damage from Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries.
Russia-Tajikistan turnover was $ 838 million in 2020, $ 1.2 billion in 2021, $ 1.4 billion in 2022, $ 1.7 billion in 2023, and $ 1.9 billion in 2024. Russia’s share in Tajikistan’s external trade is about 22%—three times China’s.
Re-exports from Tajikistan peaked in 2022 (30−40% of mutual trade) but have since fallen to 10−20% after Dushanbe’s pledges not to aid sanctions evasion. Despite tightened anti-migrant policies in Russia, around 1.2 million Tajik labor migrants still work there, with remittances forming a significant part of Tajikistan’s economy (17% of GDP in 2024).
4. Moderate growth: Georgia, Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan, Russia’s most important Central Asian partner, alongside Armenia remains a key channel for sanctions evasion and parallel imports—as clearly reflected in trade statistics. Turnover was $ 19 billion in 2020, $ 25.6 billion in 2021, $ 26 billion in 2022, $ 28.4 billion in 2023, and $ 28.7 billion in 2024, with growth to $ 30 billion expected in 2025.
Despite Kazakhstan’s regular statements against using its territory for sanctions evasion, the absence of customs controls on the Russia border within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) effectively precludes meaningful oversight of such schemes. The European Union, in turn, refrains from sanctioning all EAEU members, guaranteeing Russia continued evasion routes through key partners.
Moreover, even non-formal allies like Georgia actively participate in parallel imports and Russian oil re-exports. Russia has steadily increased trade with Georgia: $ 1.2 billion in 2020, $ 1.6 billion in 2021, $ 2.4 billion in 2022 and 2023, and $ 2.5 billion in 2024. In some years, up to a quarter of Georgian exports to Russia were re-export goods. Warming Russian-Georgian relations and steady trade growth began after the Georgian Dream party came to power and intensified amid the Ukraine war.
5. Decline: Moldova
Moldova stands apart, where Russian influence and Moscow’s overt attempts to shift Chișinău’s political course from EU orientation toward closer Kremlin ties have intensified in recent years. The EU is actively involved in Moldova’s fate, fully aware that amid the Ukraine war, Moldova is highly vulnerable due to Russia’s role in Transnistria’s energy security. This political dynamic is vividly reflected in trade.
According to Moldovan statistics, turnover was $ 447.7 million in 2020, $ 658 million in 2021, $ 826 million in 2022, $ 472 million in 2023, and $ 326 million in 2024. Trends in 2025 suggest an even lower final figure.
Resilience and Reliability
Overall Russian turnover with all post-Soviet states rose from $ 63 billion in 2020 to $ 125 billion in 2024. Over the same period, trade with China increased from $ 107.8 billion to $ 244.8 billion, slightly outpacing growth with post-Soviet countries.
What conclusions can be drawn from these data?
First, there is a clear imbalance in interpreting economic statistics. Russian-Chinese trade is often portrayed as the key pillar of Russia’s stability and guarantor of continued war in Ukraine. It is emphasized that China continues buying Russian exports, while Russia reliably obtains nearly everything needed for its military machine and civilian sectors. Beijing formally complies with some sanctions but actively trades with Moscow. More than doubling over recent years fully reflects this dynamic.
Yet the analogous doubling of trade with post-Soviet countries paradoxically remains overshadowed in discussions. Given the significant re-export share, Moscow’s relations not only with EAEU partners but all mentioned countries (except Moldova) play a critical role in Russian economic resilience, providing additional channels for sanctioned goods and parallel imports via multiple routes. Trade growth ensures sustained regional interest in supplying what Russia is willing to pay for. Moscow, of course, actively uses these markets for its own goods and services. Since the USSR’s collapse, Russian economic ties with former republics have never been so strong, promising, and vital for Moscow.
Second, economic relations can thrive despite—or entirely detached from—political dynamics. This creates a unique situation: Russia is objectively losing political influence, facing growing competition from other players in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia, yet its economic presence is strengthening. Such transformation is already reshaping Russian foreign policy approaches—evident, for example, in the Middle East, where aggressive Moscow rhetoric contrasts with pragmatism, flexibility, and de facto acceptance of lost «unique roles.» Ukraine remains Russia’s priority, forcing it to conserve efforts elsewhere and adapt to new realities.
Third, Russian economic partnerships with Central Asian countries have yet to peak—unlike, apparently, Russian-Chinese ties. In nearly all cases, 2025 trade figures will exceed 2024 levels. No matter how regional countries assure the EU and U.S. of sanctions compliance, economic incentives drive them to find new ways to meet Russian demand. Except for Moldova, all regional states economically benefit from the Ukraine war’s consequences.
Fourth, even after the war ends or a truce leads to partial sanctions relief, economic cooperation with post-Soviet countries will remain a Moscow priority. Having lost some political influence—due to the war or longer-term trends—Russia will seek to preserve and strengthen growing economic ties to compete with China in Central Asia and multiple players in the South Caucasus. Economic influence will eventually convert into political leverage, albeit in a more competitive environment.
In a sense, the Ukraine war has forced Russia to rediscover the post-Soviet space, revealing that interest in cooperating with Moscow remains significant almost everywhere (with rare exceptions).
