The hybrid warfare employed by Belarus in recent years reflects a well-calculated state strategy rather than one-off provocations. Since the start of Alexander Lukashenko’s latest mandate in 2020, Minsk has deployed a two-dimensional hybrid toolkit. In the first phase, in 2021, illegal migration was instrumentalized to exert pressure at the borders with EU-NATO member states (Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia). Later, in 2025, during the second phase, Minsk shifted to airspace violations, using weather balloons to smuggle illicit goods into the EU via the Lithuanian segment.
Both hybrid tactics resemble the provocative actions of other authoritarian regimes—illegal migration in Libya and the «garbage» balloons by North Korea. The 2015−2016 orchestration of illegal migration in Scandinavia by Russia, along with Russia’s rapprochement with Pyongyang following the 2022 aggression against Ukraine, can help explain how Minsk began using this migrants-and-balloons hybrid warfare.
The embrace of hybrid activity by Belarus demonstrates the autocratic regime’s capacity for innovation in its warfare techniques, exploiting the limitations of Western borders despite their ongoing securitization. Belarus’s subversive actions appear to be retaliation for the EU’s post-2020 isolationist diplomatic tactics. Belarusian premeditated targeting of the EU’s eastern borders occurs because Russia provides its security umbrella. The deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in April 2024 has further reduced Minsk’s perception of the costs associated with its hostile actions in the EU’s proximity, encouraging its adamant approach toward hybrid activity against its Western neighbours.
Although Belarusian hybrid actions against its neighbours directly affect NATO’s security and enable the Russian geopolitical agenda, the US has been reluctant to intervene decisively. This explains Minsk’s appetite for testing new hybrid techniques—both to expand the types of illegal crossings into the EU via underground tunnels and to launch meteorological balloons. The US remained vigilant and heeded warnings from allies when restricting contacts with Belarus, even as, bilaterally, Donald Trump’s administration began a normalization process with Lukashenko’s regime by easing sanctions in exchange for the gradual release of political prisoners.
Belarus is perceived in the US as another channel for communication with Russia on Ukraine peace talks; engaging with it is preferable to ignoring it. This utilitarian calculus from the US gives Lukashenko manoeuvring room, which he uses to the advantage of US allies in NATO, especially Poland and Lithuania. In Minsk, this is read as a «green light» for its hybrid actions, which seek impunity from the US for those actions by serving as a mediator with Moscow to find peace solutions to the war in Ukraine—a sensitive file on Trump’s desk
First Phase of Hybrid Warfare by Belarus: Smuggling Illegal Migrants
Four years have passed since the migration crisis erupted at the EU’s eastern borders. This was preceded by the forced landing of Ryanair Flight FR4978 in May 2021, during which the regime of Alexander Lukashenko managed to seize the opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich on board. In response to this aviation «raid» by Minsk, in June 2021, the EU adopted the fourth package of sanctions against Belarus, targeting 78 individuals and eight entities. These measures targeted Belarusian brands worldwide, such as BELAZ and MAZ, which had an irritating effect on Lukashenko’s close circle.
In retaliation against the EU for the sanctions and for recognizing the opposition as the lawful winner in the 2020 presidential elections, Alexander Lukashenko publicly vowed not to catch illegal migrants or halt drug smuggling at the EU border any longer. This closely resembled threats made by the former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who in 2011 warned of flooding Europe with illegal immigrants. However, it was Russia that, in 2015, allowed illegal border crossings with Finland (and another Schengen country, Norway). Russia’s first use of instrumentalized migration was episodic, with full denial of attribution. This made it possible for the first time for «coercive engineered migration» to take place at the EU’s eastern flank, along what has become known as the «Russian Arctic Route» for illegally crossing into the EU.
During the height of the EU’s 2015 migration crisis, the northern Russia-Finland border was targeted for its proximity to Norway, which appealed due to its generous asylum-seeking policy. From Moscow, third-country citizens were traveling to Murmansk to reach the checkpoints at Raja-Jooseppi and Salla in Finland illegally. The Finnish authorities referred to organized crime groups in Russia operating such human smuggling operations. Without coverage and facilitation from the official side—be it Russian intelligence or law enforcement—such criminal schemes would not operate so organized. The resort to illegal migrants was linked to Russia’s response to the 2015 Finnish-NATO military training exercise. This phenomenon began recurring shortly after Finland joined NATO (April 2023), with 1,700 crossings registered between August and November 2023.
Only half a decade after Russia’s establishment of the «Arctic Route,» asylum seekers from the same distressed regions were flying to Belarus to reach the Schengen region via the Baltics and Poland. In practical terms, between June and October 2021, Belarus first suspended its participation in the Eastern Partnership and the migration cooperation with the EU (including the 2020 readmission agreement). Subsequently, Belarusian state-owned companies, such as the travel agency Centrkurort, began issuing tourist entry visas to third-country citizens—a previously exclusive mandate of Belarusian consulates abroad. Equipped with tourist visas, the migrants could legally stay in Belarus. The UAE, Türkiye, Lebanon, and Ukraine served as initial transit countries for direct flights to Belarus, mainly from the Middle East, Africa, and Afghanistan.
Until 2025, illegal migrants were able to enter Belarus via Russia by using Russian visas, indicating a certain level of «coordination» between Moscow and Minsk. The final legs of the flights to Belarus have been operated by Belavia, which has carried passengers with authentic documents (tourist visas) issued by the Belarusian state. On the ground, Belarusian border services were allegedly guiding migrants to the border. EU data for 2023, two years after the first incidents, showed a 236% increase in arrivals compared to 2022 (4,700 cases). In late 2025, illegal migrants shifted from storming the borders on the ground to using underground tunnels to bypass the Polish iron walls. Photos of at least one identified tunnel (100 meters long and 1.5 meters high) suggest that special equipment was needed to drill it so that it stayed intact while 180 illegal migrants went through it. The Polish side did not provide evidence establishing the extent of the Belarusian authorities’ involvement in the construction of the tunnel, or whether more such tunnels exist.
Belarus denies any participation in the instrumentalization of illegal migration, stressing that of the total number of illegal migrants caught crossing the border, only 0.5% were Belarusian citizens. Back in 2021, Belarus’s deployment of illegal migrants at the border was intended as a cheap retaliatory measure against the EU. It could also have been a well-thought-out subversive operation to divert the EU’s attention from Moscow’s military aggression against Ukraine in early 2022. Today, Minsk offers the EU the option to work diplomatically to resolve the migration issue rather than spending on border securitization.
The Second Phase: «Weather Balloons» Operations à la «North Korean Style»
After almost five years of weaponizing irregular migration at the EU’s eastern borders, Minsk began paralyzing neighbours’ airspace by launching «weather balloons» carrying smuggled goods. This may have been inspired by North Korea’s «garbage balloons» used against Seoul in 2024. Around 3,500 «balloons» carrying garbage (a total of 15 tons) were sent into South Korea’s airspace as a response by Pyongyang to «balloons» carrying propagandistic leaflets from civil activists.
The peak of the «smuggling-cigarette balloons» sent from Belarus into Lithuania was registered in October-November 2025. Minsk has blamed Lithuanian criminal groups engaged in smuggling for full responsibility for these balloon-related operations. In an authoritarian, top-down, controlled system like Belarus, any large-scale criminal activity with implications for the state (sanctions, etc.) is at least known, if not green-lighted, at the highest level. Similar to the orchestrated illegal migration, by not addressing criminal activities targeting the EU, Minsk effectively becomes complicit.
Before the incursion of smuggling balloons, Lithuanian airspace was traversed by Russian drones entering from Belarus in late July 2025. At least one incident involved the Geran-2 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) carrying two kilograms of explosive material. The Lithuanian authorities requested NATO support to strengthen air defence capabilities on its eastern flank, although they admitted that Russian drones had accidentally landed after their course was redirected by the Ukrainian anti-UAV system. However, in late August, Lithuania declared a no-fly zone at the border with Belarus until October 2025 after the incidents with Russian drones occurred in neighbouring Poland. The drone incidents took a different turn when Minsk accused Lithuania of being the launch site for a drone that dropped «extremist» propaganda materials in early December.
In continuation of that, Belarus accused Lithuania of attempting to fly the same drone into Poland to provoke «an interstate conflict.» Although Lithuania dismissed the allegations, the case indicated that Belarus uses the drone incidents to shift responsibility for airspace violations onto the West. This allows Belarus to counterbalance the media coverage, which portrays it as a proxy in Russian drone provocations against Ukraine and Western neighbours.
Despite Belarus’s attempts to portray the balloons merely as tools for cigarette smuggling, NATO treats them as part of the «proactive» stance of Russian hybrid warfare. The negative impacts are already evident, causing various disruptions to Lithuanian air communication and posing risks to the safety of civilian aviation. Over 600 balloons landed in Lithuania from Belarus in 2025. In October alone, Lithuanian airspace was disrupted at least 71 times. Between October and December, airports in Vilnius and Kaunas were closed 15 times, affecting 320 flights. The Lithuanian authorities declared a state of emergency, benefiting from an expression of solidarity from the EU, which described the «smuggling balloons» as a form of «hybrid attack.» It was only after the intervention of the US envoy John Coale that Lukashenko agreed to handle the «balloons» affair.
Minsk will very likely consider the US requests to avoid spoiling the ongoing normalization of bilateral relations, which is critical to lifting sanctions and fragmenting the US-EU sanctions cooperation («the political prisoners-potash sanctions deal»). The resumption of the smuggling balloon operations can take place at any time, given that such provocations have revealed vulnerabilities in the airspace protection of the Baltic region. Such measures can be part of a longer-term strategy by Belarus and Russia to intimidate the EU’s easternmost member states, which, during the Russian aggression against Ukraine, have infused the EU’s foreign policy with greater awareness of Russian threats.
The likelihood that Minsk’s hybrid operations are coordinated with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service is very high, since the Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) has an openly set joint agenda with Moscow to address the «aggressive» policy of the «collective West.» Belarus-led hybrid operations resemble below-war-threshold actions against EU-NATO member states, which Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov perceives as «Russophobic» states that «Estonize» the EU’s foreign policy.
Russian Strategic Benefits
A «satellite» like Belarus, functioning as a multiplier of anti-Western hybrid warfare at EU borders, advantages Russia. It allows testing the Western political resolve and technical abilities to address border security threats. Essentially, Belarusian hybrid warfare serves as a testing ground for gauging European political and security policy responses (allocated funds, institutional transformations, etc.), from which Russia can adapt its strategic outlook toward the EU. The EU’s response to Russia-Belarus military and hybrid actions is described as «hybrid warfare» targeting sovereignty.
Such views in the EU of a joint Belarus-Russia hybrid offensive are used by Russian state propaganda to accelerate the Union-State convergence. Despite the geopolitical chemistry with Vladimir Putin, Lukashenko is not using top-down directives to finalize the 28 integration programs with Russia, keeping the transfer of Belarusian sovereignty at a lower level. This partly explains why Lukashenko wants to establish close ties with North Korea, using the precedent set by Moscow rather than by direct Russian intermediation.
Finally, with the help of hybrid tactics in Belarus, Russia amplifies the perception of threat in the EU, forcing it to divert more funds from social to defense expenditure. This reinforces the Russian official narratives about the militarization of the EU, which could lead to a nuclear escalation with Russia. The prioritization of the defense budget fissures societal cohesion along the peace-war dilemma, potentially favoring far-right forces in upcoming electoral cycles across Europe. Therefore, Belarusian hybrid warfare on the EU’s borders should be seen as complementary, not separate, from Russia’s global strategy to empower «Make Europe Great Again» sovereigntists forces against the EU’s supranational elites’ efforts to establish effective robust European geopolitical autonomy.
In all respects, although the Lukashenko regime attempts to assert agency, Russia is continuously absorbing elements of Belarusian sovereignty (borders, airspace, etc.) into a broader power strategy along the Western neighborhood. Belarus is easily convertible into a Russian asset used to neutralize resistance, mainly from the Baltics, due to its proximity to Kaliningrad, better fitting the region into Russia’s sphere of influence ambitions in the multipolar international system.
